

COPING WITH CRIME IN NEWARK

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Governmental Responses to Crime Project
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Written May 1980
Revised October 1983

Prepared in part under Grant No. 78NI-AX-0096 from the National Institute of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice. The points of view and opinions stated in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

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Chapter 1

Difficult Problems; Inadequate Solutions

A feeling for the way Newark has gone about coping with its street crime problems during the last thirty years can be conveyed by a recent example of how the police department has dealt with its heating problems.

"We're going to give you a Newark window," a workman told the Deputy Chief in charge of the Communications Division. The Chief's window was wide and high, fitting its location on the fourth floor of a solid limestone building built sixty years ago to house the Board of Education.

"A Newark window? What's that?"

The workman shrugged, "There is only one way the new air vent from the roof can go down the side of the building. We have to brick up your window."

The police department does not need one more Newark window; among other things it needs a new central headquarters.

The city has a great many Newark windows, like vacant eyes in the face of vacant buildings. The abandonment of buildings is an obvious feature of urban decay, and the bricking in of windows and doors on the solid masonry structures are makeshift steps which do nothing to ameliorate the basic problems. For the interim, the bricking-in prevents these buildings from being a site for shooting heroin, from having plumbing ripped out, or from being burned down. Over the three decades, the more acute street

Acknowledgments. This study has benefited from the skilled and accurate research assistance of Lois Dedes, Carol Russ, Marilyn Williams, Mary Yurow, Melanie Griffin, George Burns, and Robert Byrne. The librarians of the New Jersey Reference Room of the Newark Public Library, Charles Cummings and Robert Blackwell, have provided manifold leads into the history of Newark.

crime problems have grown, the more the city's responses have resembled the bricking in of windows. The city's policies have not addressed the causes of the condition. Instead, the city has taken actions which stave off some disasters, but which are totally inadequate to the size and shape of the problems.

This study is a political analysis of the decisions made in Newark between 1948 and 1978 to cope with the city's crime problems. Because the police department is a city's major agency to responding to crime problems, the study extends to include the major issues in the administration and performance of the police department.


This manuscript is part of a massive study conceived and directed by Herbert Jacob and Robert Lineberry, with operational direction by Anne Heinz, out of the Center for Urban Studies at Northwestern University. Begun in 1979 the larger study aimed to understand the nature of governmental responses to crime during the period 1948-78. One, how and why did crime rates increase in American cities? Two, how did attentiveness to crime change over the period? Three, what were the principal connections between the structures and patterns of local government and their responses to crime problems? Four, what were the major policy changes in urban police service? Five, what were the major policy changes in courts, prosecutorial systems, and corrections? Six, what were the major legislative policy responses to crime? The answers to these questions came from intensive study of ten cities supplemented by available data from the 396 cities with population over 50,000. The ten cities span the continent and the range of affluence and demographic composition. They are: Newark, Philadelphia, Minneapolis, Phoenix, San Jose, Boston, Atlanta, Indianapolis, Houston and Oakland. Case studies of the first five cities are published in Anne M. Heinz, Herbert

Jacob and Robert Lineberry, eds. Crime in City Politics, New York: Longmans, 1983. This manuscript is more detailed early version of the Newark chapter. The other published study of Newark stemming from the Northwestern project details the 1975-79 conflict over police layoffs. Written with Lois Dedes, "Layoffs" appears in the Journal of Police Science and Administration, 10,4 (December 1982), pp. 435-451

Introducing Newark

Newark is an old city of 330,000 people crowded into 24 square miles making it the third most densely populated American city, just behind its neighbors, New York City and Jersey City. Located on the inner ring of the greater New York metropolitan area, Newark is in the shadows of New York City and surrounded by New Jersey suburbs. Starting from City Hall one would have to travel across twenty miles of suburbs to reach the nearest farmland. The boundaries of the city very roughly resemble a four pointed star. From City Hall the farthest distance to the city limits, westward through Vailsburg, is four miles. The shortest distance, northeast across the Passaic River, is less than one mile. (Insert map about here) The accompanying map of Newark shows the familiar patterns of the areas nearest the downtown suffering the most deterioration, but it also shows the unusual circumstance of almost no middle income neighborhoods. Neighborhoods are racially segregated. Black people live in all areas that are rated three or less and throughout the South Ward. Italians families live in the better sections of the North Ward while Puerto Ricans and black families live in the deteriorated section near the river. Vailsburg is in rapid transition from Irish, Italian, Polish, and Jewish families who have lived several generations in Newark to middle income black families. In the Ironbound district a mix of recent Portuguese and Spanish immigrants with Polish and Irish families make their old crowded neighborhood the most vital in the city.

- I. middle income, high % owner occupied, sound units, good services
- II. lower middle income, high % children, crowding, fair city services
- III. high % children, poor upkeep of units, some vacant units, declining city services
- IV. drop in population, low income, single parent homes, high % welfare, poor city services
- V. very sharp drop in population, very poor residents, buildings abandoned, city services almost nil



Source: Newark, Office of Newark Studies. (1976) Residential Mortgage Lending in the City of Newark, 1974-1975, p.42.

To understand this condition of Newark as an older central city closely crowded by suburbs, picture any large central city pared to a circle with a radius of three miles. The remaining core would have lost the middle class residential neighborhoods where the housing is newer, the property values are good, the parks larger, and in general the problems of urban living more manageable.

The economic and social burden which Newark carries can be summarized with six measures from the 1970 census shown in Table 1-2. (Insert Table 1-2 about here) In a very real sense suburbs compete with their central cities for residents, factories, retail stores and service industries. Of all metropolitan areas in America, Newark suffers most in the competition between central city and its suburbs. The vast economic and social differences between Newark and its suburbs shown in Table 1-2 have been summarized by Nathan and Adams into a hardship index. Where a city is as well off as its suburbs the index is 100. In 43 of the 55 metropolitan areas, the central city is worse off than its suburbs, indicated by an index score of over 100. Only two cities score in the 300s (Cleveland and Baltimore) and Newark is by itself in the 400s. Nathan and Adams conclude (p.49),

Where the city to suburb hardship ratio is high and no structural measures have been adopted to spread this burden, the flight to the suburbs can be expected to accelerate and the urban crisis will deepen.

An important difference between Newark and most central cities is that Newark is located next to a much larger central city. New York City casts a large shadow over Newark. Many more New Jersey residents work in Manhattan than in Newark. When New Jersey residents seek specialty shops, theaters, art galleries, concerts, ball games, they go to New York. Newark has never had its own ^{commercial} ~~own~~ ^A ~~own~~ television station. Specific ways in which New York television stations have influenced political events in Newark will be discussed in the chapter on the 1960s. What needs noting here is that Newark's suburbs are also suburbs of New York. These two central cities make possible the development of the suburban affluence that surrounds them.

The ending of two long term historical trends explains much of Newark's present difficult situation. Economically, the city's progression from trade to industry, to the provision of service has reached a dead end. From the 1920s blue collar jobs have declined as old industries moved out and new industries failed to move in. Newark's problems are larger than Newark itself. They are due in part to the national trend that

Table 1-2

COMPARISON OF THE HARDSHIP IN NEWARK AND ITS SUBURBS, 1970

	Newark	Suburbs in the Newark SMSA
Unemployment	6.4%	3.0%
Dependent Population	45%	42%
Low Education	67%	40%
Mean Family Income	\$8,637	\$15,068
Crowded Housing	15%	4%
Poverty	10.9%	3.0%

Unemployment is defined as the percent of the civilian labor force who have been actively looking for work. In cities such as Newark where chronic lack of jobs discourages people from looking for work, this definition underestimates the number of people who would accept work if it were offered to them.

Dependent Population is the percent of the total population who are under eighteen or over sixty-five years old.

Low Education is the percent of people at least 25 years old who have less than a twelfth grade education.

Mean Family Income is expressed in 1969 dollars. (This is a slightly different variable from per capita income used by Nathan and Adams.)

Crowded Housing is the percentage of occupied housing units with more than one person per room.

Poverty is the percentage of families below 125 percent of low-income level.

replaces labor with machinery and in part to the regional trend that loses industry to the South and West. White collar jobs have also moved out of the city. Prudential Insurance Company, Newark's leading firm, provides a striking example of how even a growing service firm can decentralize nationally to regional headquarters and then to suburbs surrounding Newark with a resulting cut in employees in the home office from about 14,000 in 1945 to about 4,000 in 1978. Accompanying the loss of jobs, Newark has lost population by every census count since 1940.

Demographically, the cycle in which waves of working class immigrants settled in cohesive neighborhoods, worked in the factories, and earned enough to move to the suburbs is not repeating itself with black and Puerto Rican immigrants. The greatest burst of immigration had taken place between 1880 and 1914 when the manufacturing was at its period of peak employment. However, the black and Puerto Rican migrants since the 1950s found that technological progress had eliminated many manual jobs and that discrimination and lack of skills prevented their taking white collar jobs. Thus, today more than half the people who work in Newark commute from the suburbs while unemployment among black Newark residents is 14%, with the figure reaching 40% for black teenage youths (Newark, Planning Office, 1978). The degree to which recent migrants are trapped in poverty is shown in Table 1-3. Black families are twice as likely as white to be living on income at less than poverty level, and Hispanic families are three times as likely. The racial and ethnic groups are somewhat more even in the proportion receiving public assistance, because white families include many elderly people who receive medicare or other assistance especially for the elderly.

Table 1-3

NEWARK POVERTY, 1970

	<u>White</u>	<u>Black</u>	<u>Puerto Rican</u>	<u>Total</u>
number of families	37,000	47,000	7,000	91,000
% below poverty level	9%	24%	33%	18%
% on public assistance	37%	56%	54%	48%
U.S. average below poverty line -- 11%				

The figures for white families were computed by subtracting the figures for black and Puerto Rican from the totals.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population and Housing for Newark SMSA.

The new migration has broken up old neighborhoods but did not replace them with new cohesive neighborhoods. A survey of poor residents in 1970 found that 42% of the white families had moved within the city three times or more and that 55% of the black and Puerto Rican families had moved three times or more (Kimball 1972, 43). The end of the process is residential abandonment. Unfortunately, a misguided and reputedly corrupt urban renewal program razed far more land than was rebuilt, leaving vast acres rubble-strewn, and built impersonal, high-rise apartments which were peopled on a segregated basis. Ever since they were built in the 1950s the five huge housing projects holding some 16,000 people have been centers of predatory crime.

The difference in racial composition between the suburbs and Newark has been described as a white noose around a black neck. The 1970 census data presented in Table 1-4 give precision to this metaphor. Note that (Insert Table 1-4 about here) the suburbs containing two-thirds of the SMSA population are 96% white, while Newark is 54% black and 12% Hispanic. The sharp differences in the racial composition of Newark and its suburbs is a pattern familiar across the country. The presence of low income housing only in the central city, racial prejudice, deliberate racial steering by the real estate industry, all combine to produce this stark black and white pattern.

Newark's boundaries are so narrow, black migration was so substantial and white flight has proceeded so rapidly that the city changed by the decade from 17% black in 1950 to 34% in 1960 to 55% in 1970 to in 1980. The riot of July 1967 marks a watershed in the racial transition. It dramatically called white attention to the spectrum of hardships that black residents of Newark were suffering, but it was also viewed as an explosion of criminality, thus fixing in many minds an image of Newark as

Table 1-4

DISPARITY IN RACIAL COMPOSITION BETWEEN NEWARK AND ITS SUBURBS IN 1970

	<u>Newark</u>	<u>4 racially mixed suburbs</u>	<u>all other suburbs in the SMSA</u>	<u>Elizabeth a sister city</u>	<u>SMSA average and totals</u>
% Black	54%	42%	2%	16%	19%
% Hispanic	12%	2%	2%	13%	5%
Total Population	382,417	198,475	1,163,010	112,654	1,856,556

The four racially mixed suburbs are East Orange, 53% black; Plainfield, 40%; Orange, 36%; and Montclair, 27%. Elizabeth is a sister city to Newark, not a suburb. Since the census includes Elizabeth in the Newark SMSA it is included as a separate column in this table. The percent Hispanic uses the census definition for persons of Spanish language.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population and Housing for Newark SMSA.

a crime-ridden city/. After the riots had released long pent up grievances among black people, black leaders no longer poured their energies into piecemeal solutions for specific problems but concentrated on seeking power. They achieved control of the city government in 1970 when a black mayor took office. A black majority on the city council followed only in 1978. Today and for the foreseeable future, the centrality of race in political affairs will continue to produce black mayors and black council majorities.

How has Newark's municipal government coped with street crime problems throughout the last three decades? Why has its performance been poor throughout almost the entire period? There are three reasons for Newark's poor performance. First, Newark's crime problems are particularly severe. Second, the art of crime reduction does not provide a set of sure techniques. Third, and the focus of this study, leaders in Newark have repeatedly made decisions in ways which do not produce effective policies. The rest of this chapter sketches out these three sets of reasons for the failure to reduce the city's crime rates to acceptable levels.

Severe Crime Problems

Newark's crime problems have been difficult for more than two decades. While the term "crime" covers a multitude of sins, street crimes are of central concern to this study. The muggings, pursesnatches and armed robberies, the burglaries and arsons are crimes which rend the fabric of civilized living. In Newark the high levels of these predatory attacks have created acute crime problems and have been compounded into collateral problems which arise from a fear of crime. People are afraid to use the streets after dark, afraid to venture far in daylight, afraid to shop downtown, afraid to go to the movies, afraid to commute to work. Life in the city has withered. Since 1967 virtually every aspect of

life in Newark has been affected by crime or by fear of crime.

The task of tracing the rising rates of various crimes over the last thirty years is hampered by lack of accurate data. Predatory crimes -- robberies, burglaries, thefts -- have increased markedly in Newark since 1948, but it is not possible to be precise in any given year about the upward slope of those curves. Appendix A discusses some of the difficulties in measuring crime and in assessing the effect of programs to cope with crime.

The National Crime Index

Let us begin with symbols. The Crime Index from the Uniform Crime Reports was developed by J. Edgar Hoover into a symbol of national degeneration. The New York Times sternly commented in a 1948 editorial, "It should be shocking to all of us to learn from this bulletin that serious crime occurred every 18.9 seconds during 1947." (New York Times, April 4, 1948, p. IV 8:2) The crime clock which appeared each year in Uniform Crime Reports added together the crime indexes from every police department and divided by the number of seconds in the year to reach a shocking frequency. Year by year the national crime totals went up (except for 1955, 1972 and 1978), rising inexorably. For the law enforcement field the Index was accepted as a measure of the performance of individual police departments, being taken as a measure of all the crimes which the police failed to prevent. Police and others simply assumed that citizens were reporting the vast majority of crimes, certainly of robberies and burglaries.

However, the victimization surveys suggest otherwise. Since 1973 the Census Bureau has been conducting continuous surveys of 10,000 households a year asking residents detailed questions about their experiences with crime in the past six months. People recall in the interviews a far larger number of criminal attacks than they have reported to the police. As a national average, people claim to have reported to the police only 52% of their robberies and 46% of their household burglaries. Larcenies, by far the

largest crime category in the Index, are reported to the police less than 25% of the time. (U.S., NCJISS, 1976, 41) The victimization surveys gave a new perspective on the ever rising Index. There is so much more unreported crime out there - think how improved reporting could push up the Index. From another perspective, the surveys provoked the thought of how much improved reporting over the last thirty years has already driven up the Index.

There are three striking features about Newark's crime Index shown as Chart 3-1. First, is the longterm rise of about six fold. Second, is the irregular plateau since 1968. Third, is the regularity of the small steps down which punctuate the rise. In January 1958 the Newark Star Ledger declared crime to be the city's most serious problem. After 1958, all of these levelings or small steps down precede a municipal election. The heavy line on the graph marks the change in the Index for the year immediately preceding a municipal election. In Newark, municipal elections were held in May for the commission government and in April for the mayor and council. Thus, politically relevant crime rates would be recorded for the year preceding the election rather than in the election year. Only one drop or plateau, 1957 - 1958, did not occur at the most auspicious time.

Explanations for some of the fluctuations in the overall trend, will be discussed in later chapters. Pointing to a series of coincidences does not constitute proof that the police department failed to count a few hundred or a few thousand crimes before an election. It should, however, raise serious doubts that the straight crime figures reported in the Uniform Crime Reports are an accurate measurement of yearly fluctuation in crime rates. In the case of Newark it appears that the pre-election dips and the irregular plateau after 1968 are examples of governmental response to crime problems by employing the stroke of a pen.


Number of Index Crimes
known to the police
in '000s

CHART 1-5

CRIME INDEX FOR NEWARK HIGHLIGHTING YEARS

PRIOR TO MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

The heavily shaded lines on the graph indicate the year preceding a municipal election.



Source: Uniform Crime Reports, 1948-78. From 1948 to 1972 the Crime Index excluded petty larcenies (defined as theft in which the value of the goods stolen is less than \$50. Since 1973 the Index has included petty larcenies. This graph follows the UCR definitions.


In 1972 there were 4358 petty larcenies known to the Newark police. If the 1973 Index has also excluded petty larcenies, the Index would have shown 4359 fewer crimes than the year before, not just one less.

Among officially reported crimes, homicide is the best indicator of general levels of social violence because it is the only type of crime which people report to the police at a rate anywhere near accuracy. Further, police themselves generally consider homicide too serious a crime for any tampering with the statistics. National studies which have compared police records with county medical records find almost complete agreement (Hindelang). Year to year fluctuations are accounted for by random variation when the total numbers are small; the trend is considered accurate. Chart 1-5 below shows that in the 1940s the rate of (Insert Chart 1-5 About here) homicide in Newark was consistently near the average for the largest cities and the national average. Homicide in Newark began a slow rise in 1952 which continued to pull away from both the rising national average and the more rapidly rising large city average. Almost every year the homicide rate in Newark grew faster than the large city rate. After 1965 the Newark rate was three times higher than the national rate. The peak year for homicides in Newark was 1973. Thereafter homicides dropped to a figure of over 30 per 100,000 population, with the large cities running at 20 and the nation at 10 per 100,000. In short, the chart shows that during the thirty years the national homicide rate doubled, the large city rate tripled, and the Newark rate increased five fold. Clearly, the city has had an exceptionally high homicide rate.

The forces which doubled the national homicide rate from 1963 to 1974 also were at work in Newark. This national rise appears shocking in contrast to the 1950s, a continuation of the period from the Depression when homicide rates fell and remained steady at half the level of the early 1930s. From a longitudinal perspective the rise in homicide in the 1960s can be seen as a return to a previous American pattern of homicide rates substantially higher than in other Western countries. (Graham, 1969, 365)

THE RISE IN NEWARK'S HOMICIDE RATE

number of
homicides per 100,000 pop.



These figures are from the F B.I. Uniform Crime Reports, 1948-1978. The data for total cities has been chosen rather than the national figures because the early years did not provide national figures. Seventy percent of the total U.S. population lives in the cities covered by this definition. For the years where the rates of homicide are available for both cities and nationally, the all-city rate has been about 11 point higher.

The 1960s have two important differences from earlier in the century which contribute substantially to the number of homicides. First, a sharp demographic shift greatly increased the proportion of the population between the ages of 14 to 24. This age group which was 15% of the population in 1960, accounts for 45 percent of all homicide arrests and for a higher proportion of arrests for other street crimes. The arrival of youths at the crime prone age of 14 has been compared to a perennial invasion of barbarians whom the adults must civilize. (Silberman, 1978, quoting Norman Ryder of Princeton University, p. 32) Between 1890 and 1960 the population between the ages of 14 and 24 increased more slowly, or at the same rate as the population aged 24 to 64, those who would civilize the newcomers. However, between 1960 and 1975 the growth of the youthful population outstripped the adult population, changing the ratio of youths to adults by 39%. (Silberman, 1979, 31-35)

The second difference of the 1960s and 1970s from the 1940s and 50s was the increase in the number of handguns owned by Americans.

By 1978 handguns were used in 49% of the murders. Guns of all types were the weapons in 63%. (United States, Uniform Crime Reports, 1979, 12)

Patterns of homicide have long been considered related to patterns of assault. (Wolfgang, 1958, 1967) The social setting in which interpersonal conflicts are carried out with fists and weapons is the social setting where the presence of a gun turns an assault into a homicide. Detailed studies of homicide trends in other large cities show that young men ages 25 to 34 were increasingly likely to be killed by other young men, and that the rates of death among black men grew much faster than among white men. (Rushforth, et.al. 1977, Block, 1976)

The best estimates for patterns of predatory crimes come from the victimization surveys since their beginning in 1973. The surveys show that the demographic characteristics of people most likely to become victims are characteristics shared by many residents in Newark. Table 1-6 shows that the chances of being robbed are very unevenly spread over the American population. (Insert Table 1-6 about here.) Poor people are twice as likely to be robbed as the average American. Black men are even more likely to be robbed. With a 19.8 rate they stand three times more likely to be robbed than the average American. Over the last thirty years the population of Newark has shifted to include more and more people who are likely robbery victims. Who, then, are committing these robberies? Historically, the answer has been that robbers are disproportionately young men from poor families in central cities. That is, people rob their neighbors.

Two elements may have had particularly strong influence in recruiting young black men into careers of predatory crime. They are heroin and jail. Research has shown that addicts commit a significant amount of predatory crime in order to get money (Weissman, 1979; Gettinger, 1979). Heroin addiction was noticed as a crime problem in the early 1950s. By the late 1960s the police director was blaming addicts for half the crime in the city.

Jails have long had the deserved reputation of being training schools for predatory crime. Essex County Jail was an ancient dungeon until replaced by a high rise with minimal facilities. Its inmates came from Newark and the two dozen towns which made up the county. Throughout the thirty years the vast majority of jail inmates had been sent there before trial. People with money or connections rarely were incarcerated before

Table 1-
ANNUAL CHANCES OF BECOMING A ROBBERY VICTIM, 1977

<u>Demographic Characteristic</u>	<u>Rates of being a robbery victim per 1,000 people over age 12</u>	
	Single Characteristic	Multiple Characteristics
<u>National Average - 1977</u>	6.2	
Hispanic	7.5	
Male	8.7	
Black	13.0	19.8
Black male, age 12-15		23.4
Unemployed	10.7	
Income less than \$3,000	13.7	
Black with income less than \$3,000		20.9
Live in central city in metropolitan area of over 1,000,000	17.9	
Black male in central cities		30.6

Source: U.S. Department of Justice, National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service. Criminal Victimization in the United States, 1977, Government Printing.

trial. Table 1-7 shows the higher the likelihood that black people had of being arrested and the higher likelihood of being jailed. Since the arrest figures are for Newark alone and the jail figures are for the whole county, the table does not show just how much more likely jailing was for a black person arrested than for a white person. The table clearly shows that compared to the population of the county, black people were heavily jailed.

Although criminological studies are not available for Newark, what is known for similar cities about the patterns of robbery, burglary and theft appears to apply to Newark. The most powerful explanations of high crime rates in central cities build connections between poverty, organized crime and predatory crime. Merton (1968) analyzed the American cultural emphasis on success and the lack of opportunity for poor people to attain the good education, good jobs, and goods which are defined as success. Racial barriers to equal opportunity compound the difficulties for black people. On the other hand, opportunities for illegal activities are plentiful in slum neighborhoods. Education for crime begins early as children find things to steal and bring them to adults who fence them. The stolen property system is an integral part of lower class neighborhoods by which people acquire goods they could not otherwise afford (Silberman, 1978; Walsh and Chappell, 1974). It is a vicious circle for the people of the neighborhood are more likely to be victims of theft than those who live in distant neighborhoods. Victimization surveys consistently show the highest burglary rates for the poorest households.

Table 1-8

BLACK PEOPLE INCARCERATED IN ESSEX COUNTY JAIL COMPARED
TO THEIR PROPORTION OF NEWARK ARRESTEES AND
TO THEIR PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION
OF CITY AND COUNTY

<u>Percentage of Black People Among --</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>
Newark Population	17%	34%	54%
Newark Arrestees	51%	65%	76%
Essex Jail Inmates	53%	71%	81%
Essex County Population	12%	20%	30%

Sources: Population figures come from the U.S. Census. Arrest figures for 1950 from the Newark Police Department Annual Report, for 1960 and 1970, from the annual returns for the Uniform Crime Reports. The figures from the registry book at the Essex County jail count all inmates who entered each year without distinguishing how long each stayed.

Organized crime is a loose term describing operations which range from the tight operations of the De Carlo family of the Mafia to any loose network that provides illegal goods or services. Studies of slums in Eastern cities find that the visibly successful local people are hustlers. These individuals are important as role models for ambitious youngsters (Ianni, 1974,). Young men develop friendships and working relationships with individuals in crime networks through a variety of avenues: childhood gangs, recruitment as youngster by an experienced criminal, and prison acquaintanceships. The profitable enterprises abound, including numbers, prostitution, stealing to order, car theft, loan sharking, and drug selling. Young men move among these lines as opportunities change. Generally speaking, the supply of illegal services provides a great many targets for robbery, from numbers runners and winners to the customers of prostitutes. The system persists as corrupt police officers and politicians take payments for ignoring the illegal operations.

There are several elements from this picture of slum crime which can be clearly seen in Newark during the last thirty years. There is the profound influence of bootlegged liquor which may well have been the major growth industry in Newark during the 1920s. Apparently, the business was controlled by two groups of racketeers, Jewish and Italian. Liquor was shipped down from Canada and transferred to small boats off the Jersey Shore. At night, bootleggers beached the boats, unloaded the liquor onto trucks, and headed for Newark. Many a building in the Central Ward had secret tunnels and basement storage areas. A truck could unload liquor into one building and it would be carried through a tunnel to be stored in another. From Newark a large proportion of Philadelphia's and New York's thirst was slaked.

Apparently, with the end of Prohibition most Jewish racketeers

stayed with their product to become legal importers and distributors. Abner Zwillman, the enforcer among the Jewish racketeers, stayed with his clients, the growing black population of the Central Ward. The Italian racketeers headed by Richard Boiardo, also stayed with their clients to provide a range of illegal services the most popular of which was numbers. Numbers is estimated to be the largest source of income to organized crime in Newark. Playing the numbers has been a widespread pasttime in Newark, popular with people of widely diverse backgrounds. So open was the numbers racket that from at least the early 1940s through the mid-1950s a numbers runner collected bets daily beneath the dome of City Hall (Kornkut, 3/10 80). Police have widely or selectively ignored gambling operations throughout the thirty years except for two brief periods of reform leadership.

Heroin addiction was noticed as a crime problem in the early 1950s. By the late 1960s the police director was blaming addicts for half the crime in the city. Research has shown that addicts commit a significant amount of predatory crime in order to get money to support their addiction (Weissman, 1979; Gettlinger, 1979). In sum, Newark's crime problems have become severe due to trends beyond the immediate control of Newark leaders.

Crime Problems in the Context of Other Problems

The more difficult the problems, the more crucial the decisions. By contrast, simple problems often go away as conditions change, regardless of what policy makers do. Problems have become difficult usually because a number of factors are causing the conditions. When leaders ignore difficult problems they persist and consequently the problems will become more severe. Policy makers have real choices. City agencies have the power to ameliorate crime problems through a wise choice of policies. Frequently, agencies choose to ignore crime problems. City agencies also have the power to

exacerbate crime problems, as has recently occurred in Newark.

Crime problems comprise several, but by no means most of the strands of the tangled web of issues in the hands of Newark policy makers. Over the last thirty years other problems competed for the attention of the decision makers. Financial woes have plagued decision makers throughout the period. During 1953-54 problems of incompetence and corruption by municipal government pushed all other issues aside during a fierce battle that succeeded in changing the city's form of government. During the 1960s race relations and maintaining order were the most important issues. In the 1970s crime became the most important issue.

Chart 1-8 is a graphic representation of the focus of this study in

(Insert Chart 1-8 about here)
relation to other political issues. The focus is on street crime issues

which are handled by city government by using the police department, labeled A on the chart. The top larger circle represents all issues handled by city government, from collecting garbage to building an art center. The large lower circle groups together all issues handled by federal, state and county governments. Police issues are addressed primarily by city governments, here indicated by a smaller circle located mostly within the city circle. Street crime issues are addressed by many levels of government, here represented by a smaller circle overlapping the two larger circles. It may come as a surprise to the reader that police issues other than crime usually take more attention of decision makers than crime issues. Indicated here by area B, this medley of issues includes maintaining order at demonstrations, reducing police use of excessive force, appointing a police chief, negotiating contracts. The few city policies on street crime which are not the immediate responsibility of the police, area C, include running the municipal court, amending the building code to require burglar proofing, establishing methadone maintenance centers, and creating crime prevention programs for youths. The street crime issues handled by other

CHART 1-9

ISSUES IN AMERICAN POLITICS

CIRCLES
represent

All issues
handled by
city government

Police issues

Street crime issues

All issues
handled by
federal, state
and county
governments

AREAS labeled with a letter
represent

A. The subject of this study.
Issues on how police shall deal
with street crime problems.
e.g. hiring more officers,
establishing special units.

B. All other issues concerning
the police department.
e.g. community relations.

C. Street crime issues handled
by cities through agencies
other than the police.
e.g. municipal code changes,
methadone programs.

D. Crime issues handled by
federal, state, and county
governments
e.g. prison construction,
victim assistance programs.

levels of government, area D, include changes in state and federal criminal codes, changing sentencing and parole policies, establishing victim assistance programs, and giving anti-crime grants to cities.

The Primitive Art of Crime Reduction

In times when politicians promise to "Stop Crime", as proclaimed in 1979 by posters in Newark of a candidate for county sheriff, it is useful to reflect on the impossibility of stopping crime. First, "stopping" is not achievable; a more modest goal of "reducing" is more realistic. Second, the term "crime" is vague and overly broad. Crimes are all human acts which have been considered sufficiently harmful or annoying to have been declared illegal. Crime is a highly abstract term which includes drunken driving and shoplifting, child abuse and drug abuse, auto theft and income tax evasion. These common crimes are committed by different people, in different circumstances, for different reasons. The tremendous variety of acts which are criminal makes futile the search for a few simple solutions to crime problems. Yet, the search for simple solutions continues, nurtured and promoted by thinking about "crime" as though it were a single specific category of social ills.

There is only one sure and fast way to reduce the amount of crime; that is to make illegal actions legal. In recent years state after state has repealed its laws against public intoxication, thereby greatly reducing the incidence of that crime and annually eliminating more than a million arrests. The frequency with which people are drunk in public probably has not changed much. The problems are being handled and ignored by a different set of agencies since they are no longer crime problems (Aaronsen, et.al., 1978).

The crime problems which disturb people most, the predatory attacks on people and property, have been summarized by the term street crime, but they also are a heterogeneous collection. The hijacking of a Brinks

truck and ripping of a purse from a woman's arm have little in common, yet both are robberies. Walking into an unlocked garage to steal a bicycle and breaking through the wall of a jewelry store are both burglaries, yet the circumstances, attackers and victims differ. Arson is committed for profit, by psychologically disturbed people, and by kids. Thus, the complexity of problems is hidden even by the specific crime labels we use. The complex realities entirely disappear when the single term "crime" is stretched to cover all these predatory actions.

Even if policy makers were to address specific crime issues, such as auto theft by teenagers, and even if they recognized that such a crime cannot be stopped entirely, but merely reduced, there is no coherent body of knowledge to provide a technology of crime reduction. Unlike municipal problems such as street maintenance, for crime problems there is no specific program of preventive maintenance at a specific cost that will produce a known level of results.

Typically, policy makers address crime problems with a focus on the individual offenders. "Lock 'em up" is the usual form of this approach. In fact, the approach often focuses on the police, alone, ignoring the fact that the police are only the capture point for a set of agencies which include prosecutors, courts, jails and prisons. Another form of the individual approach has resulted in the proliferation of diversion programs, halfway houses, and ex offender programs. Taken together, these policies comprise but one of four basic approaches to crime problems.

1. Deal specifically with the individual offender.
2. Deal generally with the factors which promote that type of criminal behavior.
3. Deal specifically with the individual victim.
4. Deal generally with the factors which make easy targets of victims or their property.

In order to appreciate how narrow was the range of alternatives considered by Newark's policy makers, it is useful to pause to look at an example where more than one approach has been applied, the problem of auto theft committed by teenagers as a form of recreation. One, the focus on the individual offender is carried out by youth service officers of the police department, probation officers, and judges of family court. Two, reducing the influence of social factors promoting theft includes school sponsored recreation programs but largely this approach is used outside the public policy realm, as when churches run youth groups and parents counsel their children not to hang out with bad kids. Three, victims of car theft have usually protected themselves by carrying insurance, and thus, the recent state programs of victim assistance do not include car theft. Four, technological change making cars harder to steal is the approach that appears to have brought about a large drop in theft by teenagers. Steering column locks, which have been required by federal regulations since 1969, are probably the major factor in the national downward trend of auto theft in the 1970s.

The diversity and complexity of crime problems and the absence of sure techniques for dealing with them have placed confused, emotional issues before policy makers. The only agencies which claim expertise in handling crime problems are the agencies which process criminals. When mayors, governors or presidents think in terms of doing something about "crime" in general, the logical conclusion is to improve the effectiveness of those agencies which specialize in "criminals". As the largest city agency aside from the school system, police have been thought of first for solutions to crime problems. The fact that police alone among criminal justice agencies have a much broader mandate than handling criminals does not detract from the public stereotype of police as crime fighters. When any problem is posed in vague and general terms the only obvious solution is more manpower

and larger budgets for the agencies which have the responsibility of dealing with the problem. Hence, a great deal of effort has gone into improving the agencies of the criminal justice system.¹

Crime problems, however, have not been solved by the upgrading of criminal justice agencies. To be blunt, policies resting on misconceptions as great as those held about crime are very unlikely to have success. Worse, political attention heightens discontent when it is long directed toward any important issue which is obviously not being resolved. Public discussion becomes emotionally charged.

Four Methods of Decision Making

The finding of this thirty year history is that crime problems have been handled so poorly in Newark because policy makers have used inappropriate methods of decision making. The literature on decision making puts forward three different models of how organizations such as a mayor's office or a police department make decisions. They are the well known analytical and political methods and a newly described approach, called the confluence or garbage can method. To these we add a fourth, the reflex method.

The analytic method of decision making was the only method recognized by the classical school of administration and contemporary management science. In the analytic approach the agency gathers considerable information about the specific problem, has a good technical understanding of what means will produce what results, assesses the benefits and costs of various alternatives, and selects the alternative which provides the best results for an affordable cost. Newark's postwar history provides a few examples of analytic decisions by police directors who had strong support from the mayor.

The political method of decision making assesses the desires of all the individuals and agencies which hold influence over the decision makers and selects an alternative which preserves or, preferably, increases

the power of the decision makers. Decision makers who use this approach address any one particular problem in the context of all the other problems for which they must gain the agreement of powerful people. A decision maker who operates entirely in the political mode gives precedence to satisfying important people over the solving of problems. Decision makers can weigh the same set of alternatives in both analytical and political modes because the analytic assessment concerns effectiveness and efficiency and the political assessment concerns acceptability (Banfield, 1968, ch.11). In Newark during this century decision makers have followed primarily the political method of selecting alternatives, not only concerning crime problems but for all problems.

The confluence model of decision making was developed to explain how contemporary universities make decisions (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972). The confluence metaphor pictures a stream of problems which face an agency and a stream of solutions which are being tried elsewhere. These two streams will go their separate ways unless a decision maker deliberately brings them together. A decision maker, as an irrigation engineer, merges the streams at appropriate points to bring pre-existing solutions to bear on local problems. The more a decision maker knows about current developments in his field, the wider his choice among available solutions. During the 1970s, funding provided by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) can be viewed as a mighty stream of solutions looking for problems. In fact, the easy availability of funds and equipment has in some cases distorted confluence decision making with the result that the solution dominates the problem. Cities have first looked to see what federal funds were available and then made an inventory of their problems in order to achieve a match. At the extreme, when the solution appears to be a free gift it may be adopted regardless of whether the problem exists. Newark had no need an armored

personnel carrier for \$1 to use in hostage situations, invested manpower in weekly practice runs, and found only one occasion to use it -- for removing snowbound cars.

These three approaches do not describe all the styles of decision making now in use. We find in police departments across the country a fourth approach, which we call reflex action. The reflex method of decision making is very simple and completely automatic. If the problem is "out there" the automatic solution is 'more manpower'. If the problem is "inside" the automatic solution is "tighten discipline". The reflex method is a continuation into the present of a standard solution adopted before an agency had analytic capability or a stream of solutions to draw upon. All the other methods of decision making involve conscious choice of means to achieve a variety of fairly specific ends. Let us be clear. A careful analysis of a specific crime problem might determine that more manpower is the solution and that a specific number of officers ought to be assigned to work on the problem. By contrast, the reflex approach starts with the vague notion that "crime has increased" and produces the vague response of providing more officers on patrol to do whatever it is they are supposed to do. When the problem "out there" is a homicide which must be solved, the reflex mode assigns more detectives to the case than there is work for.

Time and again Newark decision makers have made the reflex action of throwing manpower at crime problems. Adding manpower has the advantage of enhancing the political power of the police department. Historically, when a mayor or city council takes the reflex solution they allocate a larger share of the municipal budget to hire more police officers. When the head of the police department threw manpower at problems in the days prior to collective bargaining, he ordered officers to work unpaid overtime. For the last decade, union contracts have required paid overtime and, thus, cities give their police departments a generous overtime budget. When a

department applies manpower to a problem by transferring personnel, political leaders and members of the public consider it as a free good because they see the area which receives the additional manpower but remain ignorant of the geographic or functional areas from which officers are withdrawn. (Insert Table 1-9 about here)

These four types of decisions summarized in Table 1-9 are not watertight compartments. Decision makers can use the political method to supplement an analytic or confluence approach, testing whether a solution which promises to be effective for a specific crime problem will at least not erode the power of the decision maker and his agency. Policies adopted solely on the basis of either the reflex or the political method are quite unlikely to be effective in dealing with particular crime problems because they were adopted for other reasons and usually in ignorance of the nature of the crime problems.

Decision Making During the Four Periods of Recent Political Leadership

The thirty years of Newark history divide conveniently into segments eight years long, corresponding to the changes in political leadership. During the years prior to 1954 the city was governed by a five-man Commission which was incapable of formulating policy. The police department reacted sporadically to crime problems thrust upon it by ignoring them or by resorting to the reflex action of more manpower. Between 1954 and 1962 the city had a reform Mayor, Leo P. Carlin, whose third appointee as police director accomplished a basic departmental upgrading which thereafter made the department capable of employing an analytic approach to crime problems. From 1962 to 1970 Mayor Hugh J. Addonizio and his Police Director worked in harmony using a political approach to decision making. From 1970 to the present power had been so fragmented that the political approach to decision making has resulted in fierce struggles between Mayor Kenneth A. Gibson and the

Table 1-10

TYPES OF DECISION MAKING ABOUT CRIME PROBLEMS

<u>Type of Decision Making</u>	<u>Definition of the Problem</u>	<u>Nature of the Solution</u>
Analytic	A specific crime problem, e.g. arson for profit.	A specific policy or program, e.g. insurance investigations.
Political	Gain acceptance for policy while strengthening position of decision maker and agency, e.g. a neighborhood protests planned closing of a precinct station.	Satisfy powerful people and increase the power of the decision maker and the agency, e.g. keep the station open through a budget increase.
Confluence	Thinking about a specific crime problem and a possible solution occur together, e.g. the unwillingness of rape victims to testify in court is considered simultaneously with the nation- ally promoted program of psychological assistance for rape victims.	
Reflex	Vague, "crime".	More manpower.

Council and also between the Police Director and the police union. The availability of federal and state funds for specific anti-crime programs has produced some major decisions using the confluence method. In retrospect, it appears that the period when decision making produced policies most appropriate to the problems was 1949-62. Then an outside professional served as police director, was exempt from usual political pressures, and employed a mix of confluence and analytic approaches.

[The next page is 37.]

Chapter 2

Historical Background

Prior to the Twentieth Century

In 1966 Newark celebrated the 300th anniversary of its founding by a group of Puritans who came from Connecticut. Newark's development followed a pattern typical of Eastern cities. Beginning as a commercial center for the surrounding farms, the city had by the mid 1800s developed a diverse industrial base, and then in the twentieth century it became predominantly a corporation headquarters for service industries. The nineteenth century industrial development was based on leather goods, jewelry, breweries, spinning mills and chemical works. By the time of the Civil War industrial workers comprised 26% of the labor force, compared to 10% in New York and Philadelphia (Yatrakis, 1980, ch.2). A tide of European immigration brought the population of Newark up from 136,000 in 1880 to 347,000 in 1910. As the earlier immigration of Irish and Germans slowed, the new immigrants increased, Italian, Jewish, Polish (U.S. Census for the years 1890 to 1930). Each group settled in its own neighborhoods, providing a ready base for ethnic voting blocks. The black population grew from 17,000 in 1920 to 39,000 in 1930.

In the 1880s the wealthy families of Newark had vied with each other in building elaborately furnished mansions close to the heart of the city. These same business families shaped the city's policies, to provide a few high quality services. After cholera epidemics the city established its own excellent water system, which continues to supply surrounding communities as well, and set aside large city acreage for county parks.

The wealthy business leadership of Newark viewed a first rate public education system with strong technical training schools as the basis for providing skilled workers to industry. The school system they developed continued to attract teachers on a national basis into the 1920s. (Interview with Alan Lowenstein, February 25, 1980)

The growth spilled beyond the city's narrow borders. The first to leave for the suburbs were the upwardly mobile families. Excellent rail service enabled white collar workers and executives to commute into downtown Newark to work in the growing insurance and banking industries. The coming of the automobile in the 1920s sped migration to the suburbs. Whole sections of the city which had been white protestant, became Italian (Forest Hills) or Jewish (Weequahic).

The rapid growth of Newark occurred under a weak mayor form of government that lasted from 1857 to 1917. A board of 32 alderman, two from each ward, and a directly elected mayor shared power with two elected boards which controlled water, streets, sewers and docks and with numerous appointed boards which controlled health, welfare, police, fire, and assessments. (New Jersey, 1953, 14)

Commission Government

When efforts at the turn of the century to establish a strong mayor government were blocked by the New Jersey legislature, the business community spearheaded the adoption of a recent political innovation, a commission form of government. The commission concentrated executive and legislative power in five commissioners who were elected at large in elections which were officially nonpartisan. The mayor was selected by the commissioners from among themselves. This deceptively simple system promised to create a responsible governing body and to end the burgeoning ward

politics. During its life, 1917 to 1954, commission government filled neither promise. In fact, commission government had been in existence only two years when it was roundly criticized by Charles A. Beard.

The commission plan of municipal government as it exists in Newark, lacks unity, and confuses politics and administration..Multi-headed organization is bad organization -- extravagant, inefficient, and potentially vicious. (New Jersey, 1953, 16)

The basic operating principle of commission government was reciprocal non interference. (New Jersey, 1953, Each commissioner jockeyed with the others at the start of the four year term for the departments under his control. Within those departments he decided what jobs there would be and who should fill them. No commissioner inquired into the running of departments belonging to his fellow commissioners. There were five separate payrolls, and the position of budget director created in 1934 remained empty. Commissioners fought against the creation of any centralized agencies, such as a purchasing department, because its powers could cut into theirs. (Stellhorn 8/5/80) Commissioners rivaled each other in giving pay raises to employees. In 1942-43 they each adopted a different method of raising pay: bonuses, across-the board pay hikes, no raise, varying amounts, and pay increase through reclassification. (New Jersey, 1953, 22) The gradual extension of civil service protected incumbent employees from change in commissioner, but it did not prevent commissioners from creating positions to reward their political supporters.

A second operating principle of commission government was lack of city leadership. To a commissioner the running of his departments was more important than his legislative role in addressing city issues. (Heckel, 9/25/79) The election system which pitted all comers against each other for five at large seats meant that a commissioner could not afford to acknowledge the leadership of a fellow commissioner lest that

rival gain advantage in public recognition (New Jersey, 1953) The office of mayor, to which the commissioners elected one of their number, remained only a title. The strength of a particular mayor depended on his informal influence with the other commissioners.

During the period when commission government was strongest, 1924-1933, Mayor Raymond and his chosen successor, Coyleton, built unanimity among the five commissioners. Thereafter, the one or two men in the minority fueled with the majority making trouble as no member of the public or press could. The Meadowlands scandal, for example, was inadvertently exposed by Reginald Parnell, the flamboyant commissioner who was on the outs with the others. When a fatal illness forced the resignation of the Commissioner of Public Safety, Michael P. Daffy, in 1937, the evenly divided commission tried again and again but could not agree on a successor for the three years remaining in the term. The commissioners were able to unite only to protect their very system of government. In 1940, assisted by the chicanery of the City Clerk, they brought enough voters to the polls to soundly defeat the business sponsored referendum asking for adoption of a city manager form of government. (Dexter, 1959, ch.6)

The third operating principle was that candidates based their political appeals on ethnic and religious prejudice and drew support from ethnically based party organizations in each of the sixteen wards. The large field of candidates--twenty-five or more--confused voters who did not have party labels or platforms for guidance. Candidates distinguished themselves by blatant appeals to the voters of their own ethnic background and in different wards made different ad hoc alliances with candidates from different ethnic groups. There were dirty tricks such as "interjecting" a candidate with a name similar to a prominent

candidate in order to siphon off votes. Issues affecting the future of the city were lost in the shuffle.

The final operating principle was corruption. All commissioners were indicted and two tried in the Meadowlands scandal of 1936 in which the city purchased a large tract in the Meadows at a price much higher than its assessment a year earlier. (Stellhorn, 4/9/80) By 1945 there were seven more grand jury investigations of city affairs (Newark Evening News, hereafter NEN, "Commission Rule Five Headed Ogre", 5/4/58)

Campaign obligations...subject all city commissioners to strong and often irresistible pressures for patronage, political favors and special treatment...His department can be used as a political vehicle for the repayment of campaign obligations and to form the nucleus of a political organization for use in future campaigns. Payroll padding and the solicitation of political contributions from city employees have been the order of the day. (New Jersey, 1953, 30)

In the 1920s, '30s and '40s the two most powerful interest groups in Newark politics appear to have been the downtown business community, represented by the Chamber of Commerce, and organized crime, headed by Abner Zwillman. Neither interest group took a broad, long-term interest in the quality of city services. Rather, they both wanted to be left alone to pursue their business.

From 1924 to 1933 Progressive Republicans, led by Thomas L. Raymond and his hand-picked successor, Jerome T. Coqleton, had given stability to commission government. Their obvious support came from the business community and from a variety of ethnic neighborhoods which they wooed. On the surface, the early commission was respectable government. However, the scandal over the 1932 Presidential election revealed a huge corrupt network of buying and falsifying votes. (Stellhorn, 4/9/80) The official election results were so at variance with anticipated turnout and direction of the vote that a recount was ordered. While the ballot boxes were

awaiting the recount in the City Hall basement, under 24-hour police guard, many were stolen. Thieves also broke into the County Court House, stealing the poll books. A recount of the ballots in the remaining boxes showed no relationship between the ballots and the reported totals. Organized crime delivered the votes for the Republican ward organizations. Racketeers and the party ward organizers were apparently the same people both in the black community of the Central Ward and in the Italian community of the North Ward.

In 1933 angry voters turned out all incumbent commissioners, save Ellenstein, who had recently been appointed to a vacancy. The election marked the transition of the city from a Republican majority to a Democratic one. This Democratic coalition was built on ethnic votes.

Over the years, Zwillman changed from being a Republican to declaring himself neutral and delivering votes to the Democratic party. During the Depression, Republicans, Democrats, and racketeers ran soup kitchens. (Lowenstein, 2/25/80 and Stellhorn, 4/9/80)

The Depression hit Newark hard, much as it hit other Northeastern cities. Larger cities such as New York fared better because they took advantage of federal funds, but the business community in Newark prevented the city from accepting federal money for either WPA smaller projects or the larger projects of the Public Works Administration. The business interests saw direct federal assistance as a means for the city government to circumvent local and state controls on its pursestrings. (Stellhorn, 8/5/80)

The Depression brought the city to the verge of bankruptcy. When Ellenstein tried to form a majority of three commissioners to raise a real estate tax and to levy a personal property tax, the business community opposed him. After a two-year struggle, the commission imposed

a stiff tax on personal property. Personal property included cash and all assets (except real estate) physically within the city limits. From then on the business community aimed to discredit the commission, for which the commission gave ample opportunity with their corrupt land deal in the Meadows.

Under commission government the business community influenced decisions crucial to its interests through the identity of outlook with the Progressive Republicans until 1933, and then after 1941 it held influence over labor leader Murphy. When business could not prevail on fiscal matters at the municipal level it turned to other levels of government.

Business had both individual and collective modes for fighting the city on tax hikes. The simplest individual solution was to appeal the assessment by the city tax board to the county or state tax board.

The other individual alternative, exercised by some firms in the 1930s, was to relocate. There were many more threats than actual relocations, but the threats poisoned the atmosphere, creating a reputation that the city was bad for business.

The collective mode was to get the state to restrict municipal powers. Here are three instances of this approach taken in the period 1938-48. The Division of Local Government Services was established in 1938, through legislation supported by the Clean Government Republicans and based on recommendations from the Princeton Local Government Survey, funded by Johnson and Johnson. The new state agency had the power to review municipal budgets and to disapprove them if it appeared that the projected revenues would not reach the level of projected expenditures. On one occasion during the early years the Commissioner for Local Government Services refused to approve a Newark budget until the city cut the expenditures. (Stellhorn, 4/9/80 and 8/5/80)

An example of legislation is the Barton-Reiffin Act of 1945 by which the insurance industry obtained reduced personal property taxes after Prudential had threatened to move out. (New York Times, 2/17/45, 15:5; and 4/12/45, 27:7) Constitutional change took place with the adoption of the 1948 state constitution, which abolished municipal authority to levy any tax on personal property.

By 1948 Newark faced long-term economic and social problems made acute by the end of the prosperity of the war years. The government was incapable of addressing any of the city's major problems. Crime problems were not considered pressing until 1958 but the agencies with special responsibility for dealing with offenders did not offer particular promise for dealing effectively with mounting crime problems or justly with offenders.

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Chapter 3

The Police Department in 1948

Throughout the thirty year period Newark's major resource for dealing with its mounting crime problems has been its large police department. This chapter takes a close look at the roots of inadequacy of the department as a basis for understanding its continuing inadequacy.

The character of a specific city agency is usually similar to that of city agencies taken at large. In particular, a police department as a large and politically sensitive organization, can be expected to exhibit characteristics compatible with the rest of city government. Continuing inefficiency punctuated by scandals over corruption characterized both the Commission government and its police department.

Just as Newark was the last sizable city to abandon commission government, so its police department was slow to abandon outmoded practices. The department in 1948 was not significantly different from the department in 1938.

Police Jobs

By mid-century the major features of the police job had long ago been shaped by the reforms of 1912 and 1917. Both civil service and commission government were imposed from outside the police department as part of the Progressive reform movement. Both failed to achieve their goal of removing city departments from political interference.¹ Before the adoption of the state civil service system by popular referendum, police personnel decisions were made by a city appointed Police Board, and prior to that directly by the mayor and council. Then patrolmen and chiefs had gained and lost jobs as fast as their Democratic and Republican patrons won and lost office. (Weber, 1968) The civil service examinations determined who entered and provided job protection, but did not eliminate

political decisions on job assignments. Civil Service regulations were scenery upon the stage where powerful people rewarded their friends and punished their enemies.

The 1917 creation of nonpartisan commission government meant that each commissioner relied upon his departments as the backbone of his personal political organization. In 1938 when the post of Public Safety Director became vacant, four commissioners haggled three years over who should control the large vote-getting departments of police and fire. The election of 1941 brought in the next political head, John B. Keenan, who had been chief clerk in the fire department. He immediately transferred 262 officers to different assignments. (NEN, "City Clean as Any" 5/13/50) Like other commissioners he established a "civic" association named after himself, and used it to solicit money from the employees under him. Keenan continued to win re-election until the end of commission government in 1954.

Civil Service set the system of pay according to rank and the city government set the low pay scale. The entrance wage in 1948 was only \$2,400 (the equivalent of \$6,504 in 1978 dollars) while the top wage for the police officer rank was \$3,300 (\$8,943 in 1978 dollars). The increases for attaining higher rank were correspondingly small, with the chief of police earning only \$6,300 (less than \$17,000 in 1978 dollars).² Departments which provide meager salaries over prolonged periods usually provide ample opportunity for graft.

Civil Service slowed the pace of ethnic change within the department compared to the change in the city's population.³ In 1890 men of English ancestry had held 41% of the patrolmen positions and 62% of the superior officer positions. The English dropped steadily until by 1920 they held 25% of the patrolmen's positions and 20% of the superior officer positions.

The Irish had moved from 15% of the superior officer positions to the 35% before the civil service system was adopted, and then continued upward to 45% in 1920. Germans rose slightly from about 20% of the department to 30%. However, Italians and Jews who held less than 10% of the police jobs in 1890, held only 7% in 1920 when they formed over 20% of the population. The proportion of black people in Newark grew substantially in the 1930s and '40s, to comprise 17% of the population by 1950, but they had gained less than 2% of the police jobs. At ranks above the entry level, civil service regulations slow the ethnic change still more pronouncedly, since all promotions had to be made from among those who held the next rank.

By tradition promotions under the civil service system always came from the top of the list since at least 1933 although the rules permitted selection among the top three. Transfers among assignments were an entirely different story. Since a police department is a corps organization in which everyone joins as a generalist, the assumption is that everyone at a given rank is capable of holding any position at that rank. For the rank of police officer the choice jobs have been detective assignments and posts at City Hall. There were also punishment posts, the usual one being a footbeat at midnight.⁴ The power of assignment was used capriciously throughout most of this century. During at least two periods, the early 1910s and the early 1940s the fraternal organization controlled most assignments.

A final word on personnel. The department had entered the depression well staffed by the prevailing norms. The 1299 policemen in 1931 made a ratio of 2.9 officers per 1,000 population. At that time the ratio of police employees was 2.04 in cities with populations larger than 250,000. (U.S., F.B.I., 1932) This ample staffing permitted the department to slowly tighten its belt during the depression, slimming down to 1162

sworn personnel by 1938.⁵ The lack of hiring during the Depression deprived the Newark department of recruits in a buyers' market. Across the nation the Depression made the police job more desirable due to its job security and generally steady wage. A number of departments attracted talented individuals who otherwise would probably not have entered policing. In the 1950s and early 1960s they had reached the command levels of their departments where they spearheaded substantial upgrading of police service.

This discussion of the department has begun with the personnel system to convey the importance of the police department as a source of jobs. We turn next to the outmoded methods of work, then to the services the department provided and finally to abuses of power.

Methods of Work

The basic form of patrol used by the department at mid-century had been established in 1890, foot patrol monitored by a call box system. The department assigned 454 officers of all ranks to the precincts, of whom perhaps 70 might be on foot patrol of an evening. (Weber, 1968, 8 and Newark Police Department Annual Report, 1948) The foot patrolmen who worked out of six precinct stations had to report hourly by telephones located throughout the city inside large green boxes. The purpose of 'making a pull', as the system was called after an earlier alarm style system, was to show the supervisor that the officer was on duty. However, over the 60 years of operation, procedure had attained more importance than the substance of police work. Rookies quickly learned that the two duties of every patrolman were. 'Make your pull and meet the boss.' A patrolman had only three minutes during the hour that was his time for a pull. If he missed his pull, he was in great trouble with his bosses. Some officers joked that if a patrolman had to choose between chasing a robber and making his pull, he had better make his pull. Other officers

recollected sleeping at home to awaken from terrible nightmares of missing a pull.⁶

The department had grown by accretion without a coherent plan. Each new method was entrusted to a new unit which was fit into the organization so as to make minimum change in the existing structure. In 1936 when the first radio cars were adopted, there were 17 using one-way radios. By 1948 there were only 21 for the department of 1,236 sworn officers. All radio cars were staffed by two officers. By contrast, a national study of 840 cities found 150 departments using exclusively one-man cars, the most efficient mode of patrol, and 535 using a mix of one and two-man cars. (Walker, 1977, 145) The radio room and transmitter had been shunted around. In 1948 they were tucked upstairs at the south precinct station. The Radio Division included both communications personnel and the police officers who drove the radio cars. This total separation of radio patrol from the precinct based foot patrol promoted hard feelings and lack of cooperation between the two types of patrol officers. When an officer working foot patrol asked a dispatcher to send an ambulance or a paddy wagon, the dispatcher refused to trust the patrolman's judgment and instead sent a radio car to confirm the need.

The traffic division was huge, containing 290 officers. This emphasis on traffic dated from an era when automobile accidents occurred at a much higher rate than in the postwar years. About 170 of the officers served as school crossing guards. Each segment of the department retained all the resources and manpower that it could, and gave voice in its annual report about how understaffed it was.

An archaic and decentralized physical plant housed the department at mid-century, a heritage of past neglect. None of the six precinct stations had been built since 1921 and the badly crowded central headquarters

had been built in 1918. A number of services operated out of still different buildings: the training academy, traffic, and patrol headquarters. The scattered physical plant contributed to the poor coordination of the department.

In sum, the organization of the police department resembled commission government, a collection of separate agencies. Just as the Municipal budget was a paste-up of five separate budgets, so the police department annual report was a looseleaf collection of reports from more than a dozen units. The annual reports which ran several hundred pages contained no overall review from the police chief, no table of contents, and not even consecutive numbering of the pages.

Performance


The effectiveness of the police department was apparently not high. While this retrospective study cannot measure effectiveness directly, it can take two measures of the work performed. They are a count of the number of times a police car responded to a citizen call for service and the number of traffic tickets issued.

During 1948 the police department answered only 23 calls per 100 residents. In 1971, the year of peak workload, patrol cars answered about 100 calls per 100 residents. Comparison with other cities is possible in 1950 for two other departments, Minneapolis which recorded only 18 calls for service per 100 residents and Boston which recorded 49.

Dispatching a police car in response to a citizen call for service covers a very large set of services to victims of crime, disputing neighbors, injured accident victims and many others. In Newark the economic and social decline probably created each year more incidents where police were needed. In general the upper limit on the number of cars a department can dispatch is set by the efficiency of communications and

Chart 3 -1

NUMBER OF CALLS FOR SERVICE ANSWERED PER 100 RESIDENTS



See Appendix B for an explanation of the method used to estimate the number of dispatches in response to calls for service.

patrol. A telephone company, spot check of 100 calls to the police gave the department a perfect score for answering all rings within 10 seconds. (NEN, "Perfect Score, 4/24/49) However, the assignment of only twenty-one cars to cover the whole city resulted in the average car handling six calls during a typical 4:00 p.m. to midnight tour of duty. This was far too many to handle well.⁷

Police departments give tickets in order to encourage drivers to change their practices and to remove obviously dangerous drivers. While many factors are involved in the reduction of vehicle accidents, there is some evidence that one factor is the rate of issuing tickets for moving violations. (Joscelyn and Jones, 1977, 291-303)

Here issuing traffic tickets is regarded as a single measure of how much work an officer initiates. There are so many traffic violations which occur daily, that there is no shortage of occasions for issuing a ticket. In 1948 the 290 officers in the Traffic Division issued 64,000 parking tickets, each averaging one a day. They issued 1,397 moving violation tickets, averaging less than 1 in two months. Even if the traffic officers gave ten warnings for every ticket, these are abysmal figures considering that traffic was their sole responsibility. Each officer in the radio patrol cars averaged 1 ticket a month. The department rate of issuing tickets for moving violations, 12 per 1,000 population, places the department somewhere in the bottom tenth of police departments, if a 1964 standard is used.⁸

Abuses of Police Power

The broad legal authority of police has historically been subject to two major types of abuse: corruption and excessive use of force. Complaints about either type of abuse rarely come to light, because in corrupt dealings all participants are in collusion and because the victims of excessive force usually fear retaliation. Thus, either type of abuse

may be widespread without coming to public attention and, if they catch the public eye, accusations are difficult to prove. Since both police corruption and police brutality became important issues in the 1960s it is worthwhile glancing at the historical record.

Corruption in city government at large nurtures and, in turn, draws strength from a corruption in the police department.⁹ Scandals over police protection of gambling date back to at least 1907. The pattern exposed then has been repeated during this century; the most recent top indictments were in 1969. Law enforcement officials at a different level of government, in the 1907 case, the Essex County Sheriff, found a system of corruption stemming from the top of the department. Police ignored gambling houses which paid for protection, and made raids on gamblers who had not paid. Prohibition created a whole new illicit industry, while the end of Prohibition brought an expansion of the numbers racket. The police department had long kept a special squad with responsibility for gambling and other vice enforcement working directly for the Police Commissioner, an appointed deputy to the Public Safety Commissioner. The organizational placement under the top political appointee of a special squad with sole responsibility for vice enforcement insulated the rest of the department from opportunity to interfere. In 1946 Police Commissioner George Kaas was fined \$100 as a result of a lawsuit charging malicious prosecution and conspiracy in connection with a 1942 Chinese gamblers case. New York Times, 11/15/46, 48 1) In 1949 at the start of his third term, Public Safety Commissioner Keenan wrote to Police Commissioner Kaas, "My orders remain to raid everything raidable." (NEN, 'County Police Raids Invited', 5/24/49, 40) Members of the department understood his oft repeated command to mean, "Raid everything that is not protected."

Excessive use of force came to public attention less often than corruption. The Wickersham Commission of 1931 investigated Newark among other cities in its inquiry into the use of illegal methods to extract

confessions. The Wickersham Commission found that a suspect who did not immediately confess, was normally held incommunicado for 48 hours, questioned by relays of detectives and subjected to violence only if the detectives were convinced of his guilt. These illegal practices were relatively mild when judged against practices found in other major cities. The Commission concluded,

In Newark we have not found that the third degree has grown out of a tradition of brutality on the part of the police. On the contrary, it is agreed that the department is well disciplined, that severe brutality is rare, that orders are strictly against it, and are comparatively well obeyed. (United States, Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, 1931, 112)

During the postwar decades, the charges of police brutality were not directed against detectives for using force as a tool for extracting confessions, but against patrolmen for shooting fleeing suspects and for punishing black and Hispanic youths with beatings and arrest.

The Newark police department operated in the "watchman style," described by James Q. Wilson in his groundbreaking study, Varieties of Police Behavior. It kept a minimum of order and did not make any arrests. All in all, it was ill-equipped to handle all the problems which the deterioration of the city laid on its door step.

[The next page is 56.]

Chapter 4

Commission Government's Inattention to Crime Problems, 1948-53

Issues were not the stuff of politics under the last years of commission government. Crime was not prominent among the few issues which appeared in the 1949 and 1953 elections or which newspapers and interest groups forced upon the commission in intervening years. The heart of city politics was jobs and contracts. In early 1953 the single important issue of the period sprang to life, should commission government be terminated? This fight completely dominated city politics from May to November. The last eight months of commission government formed an interlude of transition to mayor and council government in July 1954.

Whenever a crime issue was forced upon city government, only the Public Safety Commissioner responded. His stock response was to give his blessing to whatever others were doing about crime problems.

The argument that will be developed in this chapter is that the sizable increases in the occurrences of robbery and burglary known to the police had the potential for being seen as crime problems, but were not. Gambling and narcotics, the two crime problems that outside governmental agencies threw in the city's face, were ignored as much as possible.

The inattention of elected city officials to crime problems was part of their inattention to a mass of interlocking problems which had grown more intractable over the years. At root was the disintegration of the economic base and the emigration of the middle class. The total number of jobs in the city was shrinking. Apartments built to accommodate the influx of immigrants at the turn of the century were dilapidated beyond repair. The real estate tax, mainstay of city finance, was at a

hardship level of \$6.50 per \$100 of assessed evaluation. The quality of most municipal services, from garbage collection to health care, was uneven and declining rapidly. The quality of the schools was declining. The neighborhood school system was highly segregated, but nobody considered that a problem. Racial discrimination was commonly practiced against black people in housing and employment, but government did not consider that as an issue. Even in the terms in which the commissioners thought, jobs for supporters, it was not considered a problem that black people were not employed by city government.

Election Campaigns

Election campaigns also did not contribute to a debate on issues. Several features of the election system for the Commission have been continued by the subsequent election system for Mayor and Council.

- 1) Their technically nonpartisan nature impedes the formation of slates which are committed on issues.
- 2) The lack of party primaries opens competition to a field so large as to confuse most voters who have not been brought to the polls by their ward leaders.
- 3) Putting all seats up for election once every four years encourages incumbents to take actions in the year before election which make them look good in the short run but increase long run problems.

An examination of the 1949 elections will illustrate how the system

worked. While technically nonpartisan, the commissioners needed backing from the county Party organizations. In 1949 the Essex County Chairman for the Republican Party, Becker, gave approval for individual ward chairmen and county committeemen to endorse whom they pleased. This hands-off stance was explicitly based on his public recognition that the 2 to 1 Republican strength in Essex County lay outside of the city. In fact, Becker did not control the ward chairmen, who were split between a faction supporting Villani, who wanted to control the Republican Party in Newark, and the Clean Government faction, which a week before the election declared for former Commissioner Pearce Franklin. (NEN, 1/30/49, "Essex GOP not in Race") Democratic Party Chairman, William Kelly, endorsed all incumbents, reportedly expecting a \$5,000 contribution each in return for the endorsement. (NEN, 2/20/49, "'Ins' Endorsed by Democrats".) Kelly was explicit that he was not only supporting the five Democrats, but also Villani, the Republican, who had served on the commission through the days of the Meadowlands scandal.

The incumbent Commissioner of Public Safety, John Keenan ran for re-election. His background as a clerk in the fire department had not given him the competence to run the police department, which he left to his appointed deputy. By 1948 he had built his position on the commission so that in addition to the usual linking of fire and police, he also had responsibility for the municipal courts and a string of minor regulatory bureaus: weights and measures, dog control, smoke abatement, parking meters, the excise board, building inspection, electrical inspection, and three bureaus concerned with traffic. (NEN 5/17/49, "New Rule Takes over in Newark") During the 1945-49 Commission, Keenan had joined the other two Irish commissioners to make a three-man majority. He had begun the election campaign running independently.

His support came from his own political organization, which, following standard practice, he names after himself. There is no information on whether he followed the standard practice of systematically soliciting dues from his employees in 1949, but in 1951 desk lieutenants distributed at rollo call prepared membership cards in the John B. Keenan Ward Clubs giving each officer's name, address, age, assignment, and ward, and requiring \$1 dues. (NEN, 2/5/49, "Hits Keenan Cop 'Dues'")

Keenan's major statement on the eve of the election was that he had not made "a single political commitment" and that the police department would be "permitted to perform its duties without fear of political reprisal." (NEN, 5/6/49, "What Candidates Say") However, at a private meeting in City Hall on the previous day the directors of Keenan's campaign had sought and won support from the two other Irish incumbents. (NEN, 5/6/49, "Eleventh Hour Moves Step Up City Race") The campaign turned vicious in that closing week. The Friday before the election someone mailed 500 postcards urging citizens to "Vote the straight Irish ticket". Penciled on many postcards were, "no niggers, no Poles, no Jews". Commissioner Keenan immediately obtained the agreement of the Newark Postmaster to impound another 1,200 postcards, offered a \$100 reward and had Police Commissioner Kaas take out several "John Doe" warrants. The three Irish incumbents issued a denial of any connection with the postcards as did their major opponents, the slate of Villani, Ellenstein, and Moran. An astute observation by the Newark Evening News on this chicanery questioned why an Irish slate would mail such postcards to Italian wards? (NEN, 5/7/49, "Post Office Halts Delivery of Vicious Campaign Cards", p.1.) Commissioner Keenan publicly

blamed the mailing on Arthur A. Lyons, publisher of Spotlight, one of the many political papers which appear at election time. Lyons had used the Spotlight to urge voters to reject Keenan because of the 'sordid crime record of Newark'. According to Lyons' attorney, Keenan became livid at a campaign rally and threatened that "he would fix him if it's the last thing he did in his life". Lyons denied involvement with the postcards and no one was ever indicted. (NEN, 5/10/49, "Clearing Skies Spur Ballotting")

When the slate of Villani, Ellenstein and Moran squeezed to a victory they stripped Keenan, the only winner among the Irish incumbents, of his authority over the municipal court and seven bureaus, leaving only his core responsibilities of police and fire plus three traffic bureaus. (NEN, 5/17/49, "New Rule Takes over in Newark")

The removal of the power to appoint municipal judges from the hands of the police commissioner was a step forward for due process, but was not taken for that reason. Keenan's last act as the official responsible for the municipal courts was to appoint to judgeships his deputy and his secretary.

Villani became mayor after a bitter fight with his running mate, Ellenstein. The only newcomer to the commission was Leo Carlin, the head of the Teamsters' local who promised to make city government honest and efficient. By 1953 he kept that promise by sparking a reform movement to end the commission form of government.

Police officers on leave from the Newark department have served on every commission and every city council since 1941 except for the years 1949 to 1954 and 1966-68. John Brady, on leave from the department had been an incumbent commissioner since 1941. In his position as Commissioner of Public Affairs his responsibilities were health questions unrelated to his police background, and he did not take up police issues or crime problems in the campaign. In 1949 he trailed the last of the winning five candidates by 6,000 votes, but made a comeback in 1954 as councilman and served three more terms.

The only candidate to raise police issues in the campaign suffered for it. Patrolman Edward Ward, had run in 1945, finished 17th, and four years later obtained a leave of absence to try again. (NEN, 12/30/48, "Ward Given Leave for City Election") In three radio addresses he asserted that corruption and misconduct took place in the department with the knowledge and participation of superior officers. During the campaign the Chief of Police ordered him to make his charges specific, but he refused. When he returned to duty after coming in 12th, Commissioner Keenan served six disciplinary charges on him for willful disobedience of the Chief's order to substantiate his charges and for public disparagement. Ward won in Superior Court that he was not subject to departmental regulations while on leave of absence, but he lost in the Supreme Court of New Jersey. The opinion ruled that a leave of absence "is analogous to the off-duty period enjoyed daily by every police officer, except that it extends for longer periods, subjecting him to liability for his misconduct or for his breach of rules and regulations." (NEN, 12/5/49, "Court Directs Ward Face Police Charge", p.

Officer Ward was punished with a six months' suspension. (NEN, 4/2/50 and 10/6/50) This strange decision has not been applied to the next six officers of the Newark police department elected to city council.

The 1953 battle of 26 candidates for the 5 commission seats again featured a fight among the incumbents. A sample of the repartee of the leading candidates suggests the essence of the election.

* * * *

Ellenstein: [T]here are 21 relatives of Mayor Villani listed on the city payroll.

Villani: [Admitting kinship with 14] Let me add that I have hundreds of relatives and in the last 12 years could have appointed a great many of them but didn't. (NEN, 5/6/53, 1)

Ellenstein I suppose the City of Newark owes him a vote of thanks for this. (NEN, 5/7/53, 8)

* * * *

Keenan: [Ellenstein] digs deep in the barrel when he criticizes my language as a campaign issue. It is true that I don't have his vocabulary. I don't have his college degree. By the same token, I wasn't smart enough to win myself a subpoena from the Kefauver Committee or become involved in a land scandal. (NEN, 5/7/53, 8)

* * * *

Waldor: [teamed with Villani attacked Ellenstein as Revenue and Finance Director] [T]ax favoritism [is] the most deadly evil in the city's sinful fiscal policy. Anheuser Busch has a) ridiculously low assessment on the grounds that a brewery is a specialized building and is subject to special treatment... [In keeping with] Newark's current policy of taxing breweries on a per barrel formula ... why not assess gasoline stations on a per gallon basis and dairies on a per quart basis? (NEN, 5/8/53, 1)

* * * *

A crucial vote was in the making that May, but all commissioners save one, ignored it. The movement to abolish commission government had been sparked on January 16th when Commissioner Carlin announced he favored creating a Charter Study Commission (Bureau of Municipal Research, ^(an off-shoot of the Chamber of Commerce) 1954; New Jersey, 1953, NEN, 5/4-10, 58; Dexter, 1959;

The reform effort called the Citizens Committee for Municipal Government was mounted by a large coalition including the downtown business community, both the AFL and the CIO, churches, the League of Women Voters and the Newark Evening News. By the end of February the Citizens Committee had collected 25,000 signatures to place a referendum on the May ballot. The proposal passed overwhelmingly, spurred by public anger at recent convictions of city officials for corruption. The Charter Commission, composed of five people active in civic affairs who had no ambitions for office, labored all summer to produce a well reasoned indictment of Commission Government and a recommendation for adoption of a strong mayor government.

Allied against charter reform were three commissioners, many of their city employees, and the county Democratic Party. In August, the business community became divided over the wisdom of pursuing the reform. By this time it had become clear that the Charter Commission would advocate a strong mayor government and that Carlin would be their nominee for mayor. Businesses had worked out accommodations with commission government which allowed them to do business cheaply. Although the extent of business influence since 1945 on city taxation policy and other matters important to business has not been traced, there are obvious ways in which individual commissioners were beholden to large businesses. Prudential Insurance Company, for instance, placed the brother-in-law of Mayor Villani on their legal staff and paid \$10,000 for a year to retain Commissioner Ellerstein as a labor relations consultant. (NEN, 5/6/53, 3)

Business leaders apparently did not trust a strong mayor because he might raise their taxes, and Carlin had gone on record against the Barton Reiffin Act of 1945 which had cut the taxes of insurance companies. (NEN, 2/13/49 "Carlin Enters City Contest") His background as a Teamster leader did not suggest that he would adopt pro-business policies. A divided business community backed off, withholding promised funds for the operation of the Charter Commission. The President of Fidelity Union Bank called to his office the chairman of the Charter Commission, Alan Lowenstein, who was a lawyer in the firm that handled the bank's legal business. The bank president attempted to persuade Lowenstein to postpone putting the Charter on the ballot with the gubernatorial race, and, instead, to hold a special election later. Lowenstein recognized that a low turnout would kill the charter reform because the commissioners could rally enough supporters to win in a low turnout. Lowenstein's refusal to postpone the referendum cost him his job. (Interview, Lowenstein 2/25/80)

The fight looked close, but the City Charter won handily in November, 53,000 to 28,000. The reform was possible in 1953 although it had proved impossible earlier because in 1950 the state legislature had passed the Faulkner Act permitting cities to choose by referendum among 14 types of governments and because a series of corruption scandals during the last three years had soured the voters, extortion from city milk suppliers, extortion by the Board of Adjustment, and kickbacks from Commissioner Villani's employees. After the referendum, the last round of the fight took place in April 1954 as Villani lost to Carlin

for the mayor's office, but five of the men connected with the old government won seats on the nine member city council.

A police issue was on the ballot in the 1953 campaign, a referendum to raise the pay of police and fire employees. At that time the top salary for the police officer rank was \$4,400 (equivalent to \$10,800 in 1978 dollars). The employees gathered twice as many petition signatures as they needed, campaigned vigorously, maintained neutrality on the Charter referendum and won their \$500 across the board raise by a slightly larger margin than the Charter victory. (NEN, 8/25, 9/21, 10/4 and 11/4/53)

The only police issue raised in 1954 was a suggestion by John Brady, the retired police inspector who had served two terms as a Commissioner. He wanted to meet the shortage of police officers by temporarily rehiring retired officers. He won re-election but nothing came of his idea.

No crime issues were brought up in either the 1953 or the 1954 campaigns.

Police Inattention to Crime Problems

From 1950 to 1953 the number of robberies known to police more than doubled and the number of known burglaries rose 75% between 1950 and 1952. The actual number of offenses probably rose substantially, although no precision should be attached to the figures. Table 4-1 shows the rising trends in these key crimes.

The one new program to deal with street crime was proposed by outsiders, began ineptly and faded quickly. In July 1949, the president of the Red Top Cab company suggested to Commissioner Keenan that the police department send his cab company bulletins on people wanted for arrest. His suggestion grew out of the recent capture of the "Baby Faced Bandit" by a cab driver who had heard the bandit described by

Table 4-1

RISE IN ROBBERIES AND BURGLARIES KNOWN TO THE POLICE

	<u>1948</u>	<u>1949</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1954</u>
Number of Robberies	273	322	282	409	426	628	608
Number of Burglaries	1,882	1,806	1,869	2,462	3,344	3,270	3,366

Source: Uniform Crime Reports

fellow drivers. Keenan expanded the plan and met the leaders of eight taxi fleets. However, the first two bulletins on wanted individuals fed totally inappropriate cases into the promising new network. One was a man who passed bad checks and the other was man who had beaten his wife to death two years previously. (NEN, 7/24 and 9/2/49)

Mass raids on taverns and pool halls were a technique which the department used occasionally. The purpose was to limit the number of dangerous weapons on the street by arresting possessors and confiscating the weapons. The two nights of raids in January 1952 are an example. Several hundred officers, including many brought in from the Traffic Division for this assignment, raided a total of 235 bars and other night spots. They confiscated 101 weapons and made 19 arrests. No questions were raised about the legality of this practice or its appropriateness to a free society. (NEN, 1/27/52)

In February, 1954 the police department was prodded into action by an Essex County Judge who lashed out at the mounting number of violent crimes. The policy decision of Public Safety Commissioner Keenan and Police Commissioner Weller was a reflex action. They threw manpower at the problem by increasing the number of officers on night foot patrol from about 100 to 272. These officers were drawn from inside duties or worked overtime, unpaid. After six weeks Commissioner Keenan announced success in cutting the amount of six types of predatory crime: pursesnatching, outdoor and indoor robbery, and burglary from dwellings, stores, and other buildings. "There is no doubt that working our men many hours overtime is producing good results, but no fair-minded person would expect us to continue this policy indefinitely." His conclusion was the same one drawn by many a police chief, they required more police officers. (NEN, 2/16/54, 4/4/54)

Gambling was the crime problem which the Newark Commissioner of Public Safety particularly did not want brought to his attention. There was the embarrassment in 1948 when a precinct captain was shot in the precinct station by his girlfriend after a night on the town in bars frequented by gamblers. (NEN, 2/25/48) In 1949 Manhattan's District Attorney, Hogan, raided the New Jersey headquarters of a multi-million dollar policy ring, a house in the South Ward of Newark. (NEN, 7/29/49) Nobody in the police department claimed to have the slightest idea that such an operation existed. At least twice in 1950 Commissioner Keenan defended the city's record on gambling. (NEN, 3/13, 10/6/50) The 1951 revelation was the most damaging. The U.S. Senate Crime Committee chaired by Senator Kefauver heard testimony from a Jersey City detective that an Italian lottery had been running for years at 211 Littleton Avenue, with protection. Essex County Prosecutor Conqleton, who was attending the Senate hearing, immediately telephoned the Newark police department, but the police did not manage to get to the house before its occupants had disappeared. The letter describing the gambling headquarters which the Jersey City Chief of Police had sent a year before to the Newark Chief of Police, had never been seen by anyone. The whole embarrassing matter was resolved by the resignation of Police Director Kaas and a musical chairs of departmental commanders. (NEN, 5/21/51)

State Attention to Crime


The crime problem in Newark which aroused serious concern and action was heroin. Federal and state authorities were the ones most involved in coping with Newark's role as the center of increasing heroin traffic. Addiction and heroin trafficking existed in Newark in 1948, but it is not possible to trace the growth of the incidence of addiction and the expansion of the drug traffic. The rough outlines of the problem

appear to be that organized crime was importing heroin and marijuana. Newark was a distribution point for northern New Jersey as part of an East Coast drug network. In Newark the drugs were sold primarily to black young men in the Central Ward. These were the residents of the slum neighborhoods where the world of work offered no jobs or menial jobs at low pay. It may be that there was a growth of heroin addiction in between 1950 and 1952, the years that robberies and burglaries known to the police rose sharply.

Governmental actions to deal with the heroin problem are traced by the newspaper reports. They show little attention in 1948 and 1949, perception of a substantial problem in 1950, a climax at the state level in 1951 and a tapering off of interest in 1952 and 1953. The governmental response to the drug problem is an example of a sequence of involvement. First, the agencies which had regular jurisdiction acted in a routine manner to meet the problem. Their actions then created new problems for other agencies of the criminal justice system, but meanwhile did not reduce the original drug problem. The next stage was for special efforts taken by the level of government where the next election was scheduled.

In an early step taken at the suggestion of federal narcotics authorities, the State made it a crime to be an addict. (NEN, 3/5/48) Under this disorderly persons' offense an addict could be fined \$175 or sentenced up to one year in jail. This was the primary tool which the Newark police department used against the drug problem, as shown in the graph 4-2 below. In the early 1950s more than 150 people were arrested annually for addiction, but the numbers who were arrested for sale of narcotics declined from 45 a year to 5.

THE CONCENTRATION OF DRUG ARRESTS ON USERS NOT PUSHERS



Figures provided by the Newark police department do not distinguish the drug of abuse.



Arrests for sale of illegal drugs



Arrests for possession of illegal drugs



Arrests for being an addict.

Federal narcotics agents made arrests in June, 1949 of members of a narcotics ring which specialized in heroin and cocaine. (NEN, 6/25/49) A federal grand jury probe in December held in Newark to investigate East coast smuggling and domestic traffic was followed in April 1950 by arrests of a ring with connections in Miami. (NEN, 12/15/49, 12/29/49 and 4/25/50) That year the Newark police department made a large increase in the number of drug users arrested and continued at this level of about 200 addicts a year through 1953. The police court magistrate, who a decade later won election as the first Democratic sheriff, refused to send addicts to the Federal treatment center in Lexington, Kentucky, because he feared their escaping. (NEN, 5/10/50) Young men found guilty of addiction went in increasing numbers to the County Penitentiary at Caldwell. The warden protested that he had no facilities for treating addicts and no way to prevent drugs from being smuggled into the penitentiary. (NEN, 7/16/50 and 1/28/51)

The Democratic members of the State Assembly and the Republican Governor sparred during 1951, each side showing how seriously it would deal with the addiction problem. The exchanges took place before the November elections for the State Assembly and Senate. An Essex county assemblyman proposed a special New Jersey drug commission. (NEN, 3/22/51) Within two months the legislature had passed a bill creating a drug racket study commission and three bills dealing with narcotics addiction, all of which the Governor signed. (NEN, 5/5 and 5/22/51) During the spring a great number of state agencies and citizens groups gave their opinions about what should be done. The director of the Motor Vehicle Bureau considered suspending the drivers' licenses of addicts. (NEN, 4/6/51) a member of the State Health Council wanted a hospitalization plan for high school students who took marijuana. (NEN, 4/9/51) Advice was offered by the Newark Community Civic League (2/22/51)

a women's group called Contemporary (NEN, 4/15/51) and Narcotics Anonymous (3/23/51). Only after the elections were over did the voice of fiscal prudence speak out -- perhaps the state should not adopt the recommendation of the New Jersey Supreme Court committee to establish a hospital to treat young narcotics addicts. Such a move would be intruding into the responsibilities of the federal government and would be very costly. (NEN, 11/20/51)

In 1952 the State legislature passed stiffer drug laws, but found no money for addict treatment facilities. Meanwhile more addicts were sent to Caldwell Penitentiary. (NEN, 2/27, 2/10, 3/25 and 4/27/52) 1953 saw another state law, this time requiring physicians who treat addicts to report. (NEN, 3/31/53). In January 1954 a Democratic Governor pledged in his inaugural address that his main aim was to strengthen law enforcement. (NEN, 1/17/54)

During the whole crime fighting effort, Newark was the city in the State with by far the most serious drug addiction problems, yet the political leaders of Newark were not involved beyond one acknowledgment by Commissioner Keenan that narcotics were a serious problem.

Chapter 5

Eventual Police Upgrading, 1954-62

An enthusiastic, upbeat mood has twice in thirty years swept over the majority of Newark residents. The first celebrated Leo Carlin's election as mayor in 1954 and the second rejoiced over Kenneth Gibson's election in 1970. Meanwhile the demographic transition in Newark has replaced a white majority with a black majority. The political dynamics were similar: a very frustrated majority voted for a man who was untainted by the evils of the prevailing city government. His trouncing of those who had used city government to serve their personal and parochial ends gave rise to a spirit of optimism. Inside government and out, many people set to work with a will to overcome the city's onerous economic and social problems. Carlin attracted major investment from the private sector; Gibson gained massive funding from the federal government. In both periods the concerted efforts slowed, but did not reverse, the erosion of the economic base.

This chapter begins with a sketch of the city power structure which endured through to the end of the thirty year period. The many pressing problems of Mayor Carlin's two terms are briefly described in order to give a sense of the whole political agenda on which crime problems occupied a small space. Then the chapter assesses the changing rates at which crimes were occurring, showing that predatory street crimes were increasing markedly. The next section describes how crime became a political issue. Following that, the chapter dwells on reforms in the police department. The final section glances briefly at an issue which was not permitted to arise and which became urgent in the 1960s -- police brutality.

The New Politics

The new city charter was a ready-made structure, one of sixteen models that the New Jersey legislature made available to municipalities with the passage of the Faulkner Act in 1950. Since 1954 Newark has been governed under Form C. This charter gives the power of appointment to the mayor with the proviso that the city council concur. During the first two decades of the charter, the city council used its power to block appointments in order to wage two brief battles and two long struggles with the mayor over appointment of a Police Director. The budget was the mayor's responsibility to draft, but the city council's word on amendments was final. Over the years, city councils used their power to nibble into the mayor's budget requests in order to show the taxpayers that they were economizing. They rarely made changes from the mayor's budget in order to spend the money differently. Portions of the budget for police were hardly ever cut, and when they were, the council was economizing, not mandating different programs. The reasons are clear. Over 90% of police expenditures were for salaries, where savings could be made by a job freeze or a layoff. Both actions were within the powers of the mayor, not of the council. The council members lacked the resources for close examination of the budget, since their positions were parttime and they had no staff.

When Mayor Carlin swept into office with a large majority he did not bring with him the council candidates supported by the charter reform movement. Runoff elections were necessary for all nine city council seats, the four at large seats and the five for the wards. Among the winners were only three councilmen initially endorsed by the charter reform movement, two lawyers and a labor leader -- Callaghan, a CIO leader, and Gordon and Cooper, lawyers. Other members of the council included two members of the police department, Brady and

Bontempo. The first black man elected to office in Newark was Irving Turner, a former neighborhood hustler who was close with the Jewish controlled underworld. (Curvin, 1975, 154)

During Carlin's first term, he consulted very little with the council, which they resented. Carlin's background as a teamster who had risen in rough and tumble union politics had taught him to trust few. While their desires were to be as powerful as their predecessors, the Commissioners, they were constrained by the recognition that as councilmen they needed Carlin's support for re-election. Carlin's decision just before the 1958 election not to form a slate among his council supporters had the consequence of defeating his strongest supporters on the council and driving all councilmen to build their own political organizations, a reversion to the personal politics of Commission days. (Kaplan, 1963, 53) When Carlin tried but failed to abolish the Passaic Valley Sewerage Commission, a source of county patronage, Dennis Carey who had just won control of the county for the Democrats responded by giving county positions to Carlin's opponents on the city council. (Kaplan, 54)

The City Clerk, Harry Reichenstein, was an independent power center because he controlled the city budget and was keeper of the laws. Until his retirement in the 1970s Reichenstein was very influential with the city council because he knew thoroughly both the laws and the administrative code. He could make city councilmen reverse their stands by scaring them with the suggestion that their course of action would get them in legal trouble. (Arch Kornblit, 3/10/80) Two other powerful men were outside the control of the mayor, Louis Danzig, Executive Director of the Newark Housing Authority from 1948 to 1969 and Arnold Hess, the Secretary of the Board of Education, from 1945 to 1972. (Newark Public Library, New Jersey Reference Room, Clipping Files)

The Issues

Carlin had come to office with a substantial popular mandate to clean house. His first priority was to create a centralized, efficient, honest administration. His aim was not only to provide a dollar's worth of services for each dollar of taxes, but also to restore business confidence in Newark and attract business investment. (Lowenstein, 1/25/80)

Visible improvements and successes took place quickly during Carlin's first term. Newark won acclaim as All American City in 1955 in recognition of the achievement of charter reform. (NEN, "First Phase" editorial, 4/16/55) Through the new position of business administrator, the city developed a single budget to replace the five under the Commission, created a central purchasing system, and developed consistent personnel procedures. His reform of the municipal courts is covered in Appendix C on p. 221. During Carlin's eight years no city employees were prosecuted for corrupt activities. Opponents of the mayor and council system brought a referendum in January 1960 asking for a return to Commission Government. This attempt was soundly defeated. (NEN, "Move to Change Rule Gets Crushing Defeat", 1/13/60)

Downtown revitalization began in December 1954 with the commitment of Newark's leading economic sector. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company decided to replace its existing headquarters with a new building in Newark. Prudential Insurance Company followed suit, making the commitment to a new \$20 million corporate headquarters. Civic leaders hailed the construction by the Newark Housing Authority in November 1955 when residents began to move into Columbus Homes, a 1500-unit highrise housing project. Other new building and rehabilitation included the downtown YMCA, a state office building, and the \$13 million Martland Medical Center. The Port Authority of New York and

New Jersey expanded its construction at the port and airport. Within the first three years of Carlin's administration nearly \$250 million in new private and public funds had been committed to Newark. (Cunningham, 1966, 308) However, these efforts pushed in divergent directions. The \$136 million committed to urban renewal provided housing for low income families, but the new downtown offices provided jobs for skilled clerks and college educated professionals. The Newark public schools did not graduate sufficient numbers of individuals with sufficient skills to fill the white collar jobs.

Mayor Carlin took the initiative in race relations by establishing the Mayor's commission on Group Relations which later changed its name to the Newark Human Rights Commission. Their first annual report frankly assessed the city's problem and was widely distributed through doctor's offices, barber shops and beauty parlors. In 1957 the city commissioned a research project on the scope of racial problems and followed this by a high quality survey of 4,000 households to determine the extent of

racial transition and attitudes of white and black residents toward each other. This and other efforts of the Carlin administration in race relations were taken by white people on behalf of black people, with no expectation that black people would speak and act for themselves.

The survey jolted Newark residents by revealing how large had been the influx of black people and how substantial the white flight. The survey estimates, later confirmed as accurate by the 1960 census, were that there had been a growth of the black population by over 100% an addition of some 70,000 people, and a decline of the white population by over 25%, a loss of some 90,000 people. (Market Planning Corporation, I, 14)

The survey revealed the pervasive pattern of housing discrimination, rent gouging, and employment discrimination against black people. Police brutality was a widely shared concern among black residents, but outside the ken of white residents. The survey documented strong prejudices against blacks and Puerto Ricans as shown in Table 5-1 below.

[There is no page 78.]

Table 5-1

PREJUDICE AGAINST BLACKS AND PUERTO RICANS, 1950

PROPORTIONS OF HEADS OF WHITE HOUSEHOLDS WHO AGREE

WITH EACH STATEMENT CALLING FOR ACTS OF DISCRIMINATION

<u>Statement:</u>	Agree when the statement applies to:	
	<u>Negroes</u>	<u>Puerto Ricans</u>
It would be a good idea if the number of Puerto Ricans who come to this country would be limited by the government.	NA	68%
In general, it would be a good idea to keep Negroes/Puerto Ricans from moving into white neighborhoods.	64%	63%
It would be a good idea if Negroes/Puerto Ricans were prevented from getting more political power than they have now.	38%	49%
In general, Negroes/Puerto Ricans should not be allowed to hold high political offices.	33%	47%
It would be a good idea if business concerns would limit the number of Negroes/Puerto Ricans they hire.	25%	39%
<u>Agree with one or more of above</u>	69%	76%
<u>Agree with none of the above</u>	31%	24%
Base	(5,517)	(5,517)

The percentage who refused to answer or did not know was omitted from the table by the authors.

Source: Market Planning Corporation, Newark, A City in Transition, II, 22

The Rising Rates of Serious Street Crimes

Year after year from 1954 to 1961 Newark's homicide rate ran at about twice the national rate, shown previously in Chart 1 5 on page 52. Although in 1948 the level of homicide had been close to the national rate, only three years after Carlin left office homicide rates rose to and stayed at triple the national average. The numbers of robberies and burglaries known to the police continued their rapid rise, doubling during Carlin's eight years. Improved police record keeping accounted for part of these rises, but it is clear that behind the improved accuracy of the figures was a sharp upward trend in crimes committed.

Table 5-2

RISE IN ROBBERIES AND BURGLARIES RECORDED BY THE NEWARK POLICE DEPARTMENT

	<u>1957</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>
No. of Robberies	885	914	748	1,300	1,138	1,328
No. of Burglaries	5,158	4,935	5,022	7,023	7,509	7,582

At the beginning of 1960 the department overhauled its crime recording system.

Source: Uniform Crime Reports

Statistical totals are abstractions from a sum of misery which people in Newark have suffered. By 1958 many individuals engaged in exposed occupations had been victims time and again. A cab driver quit after being held up four times in a year, the last two times within two days (SL, 1/20/58). A grocer in the heart of the Central Ward was the victim of armed robbers, burglars and window smashing thieves, fourteen times in three years (SL, 1/22/58).

Given the rapid rise from 1952 in serious crimes such as robbery and burglary, it is worth asking why crime did not emerge as an important public problem until 1958. Three factors appear to explain the inattention. First, as we have seen, the elected political officials were preoccupied with charter change and economic revitalization. Even after crime and police protection emerged as issues in 1958 they were over shadowed by more important issues. High taxes and alleged tax favoritism were the focus of attack in the 1958 election campaign, while Carlin pointed in defense to his whole record. Secondly, criminal justice agencies might have drawn attention to crime problems, but they were too incompetent to exploit the issue. Third, the citizens who were most often victims were neither politically organized nor politically powerful. The fact that many of the victims were poor and from minority groups further undercut their ability to command attention to their problem.

Crime Becomes One of Many Issues

Residents of Newark recognized their crime problems and their police problem in January 1958, an election year, through a five-part series in the Star Ledger. "CRIME RAMPANT IN NEWARK" shouted the four column headline, while the three photographs below showed three different bar scenes of patrolmen in uniform drinking at the bar. (Star Ledger, "Crime Rampant in Newark", 1/19/58) The series amply documented this double assertion that street crimes were a serious menace and that the police department was ineffective. The rhetoric was passionate: "Lawlessness in this city has become a chronic malignancy eating at the very vitals..." (1/19/58, 1:1) Crime statistics were abused: "Since 1952 more than half the families of Newark have been victims of lawlessness." (1/20 58, 1:1) (Actually, the reporter had

added the total number of index crimes which occurred during a six-year period and assumed that they were evenly spread over a population where the average household size was 4.) The criticisms of police officers included the trivial with the serious: "Patrolmen (in and out of uniform) openly drink at bars and fraternize with bar patrons, smoke while on duty, drive their personal cars to assigned posts, disappear into "the hole" while on patrol, hold dual jobs, and ignore many provisions of the police manual which is 'obsolete'." (1/19/58, 1:2) Taken as a whole, however, the thrust of the series was correct, street crime was rampant and the police department was ill-managed and ridden with shirkers.

That spring the League of Women Voters selected the issue of police protection as the first of two questions they posed to mayoral candidates. "What steps would you take to provide good police protection in Newark?" (League of Women Voters of Newark, 1958, 1). The Mayor's written reply began:

The question as posed presupposes that police protection is not good in the City of Newark. This, of course, is not true. The City of Newark during my administration has provided the best possible police service to its citizens in the use of its manpower, equipment and supplies.

The Star Ledger series prompted the leaders of the Citizens Committee for Municipal Government, who had led the charter change four years earlier, to include in their quiet conversation with Mayor Carlin the stipulation that one of five conditions for their support would be his commitment to appoint a professional police administrator. At that time, Mayor Carlin had been satisfied with the police department's performance, but after listening to their arguments agreed to appoint a new Police Director. (Alan Lowenstein, 2/27/80, who led the Citizens Committee.) This early commitment never became public knowledge. Only on June 22nd after Carlin had won the runoff election did the newspapers

report that the Citizens' Committee had just requested that the Mayor attend to five matters in his new administration. Number one was appointing a professional business administrator; two, the experienced police administrator, three, the building of downtown parking; four, the reorganization of Meritland Medical Center; and five, completion of reorganization in the municipal courts. (NEN, "Two Experts Urged for City Jobs", 6/22/58, 1:1)

This episode may be abstractly described as elites influencing each other. The decision of the newspaper as an elite organization to run a series on crime and police problems influenced by key members of the professional and business elite to influence the mayor to appoint a capable police director. The decision to bring in outside talent set the stage for the changes which have had the most lasting influence on police operations during this thirty year period.

The tremendous improvement of the police department's ability to deal with crime problems should not lead to the conclusion that tremendous public attention to crime problems instigated the changes. Far from it. Crime and police problems played a secondary role in the election campaign. Carlin was running on his whole record of clean government and his opponents were attacking him on high taxes and tax favoritism. The FBI press release on crime rates never made the front page of the Newark Evening News during any year of Carlin's two terms. During the forty years prior to 1954 for which there is a record, crime rates became front page news only in 1952. After the Carlin years, the FBI press release returned to the front page only in 1965.

Difficulties in Directing the Police Department

The police budget grew at the same rate as the total city budget from 1948 to 1953, but then in 1954 it spurted ahead, showing a 50% growth in constant dollars since 1948 compared to the city's 30% growth. During Carlin's two terms the police department continued to receive a larger proportion of the city budget than it had under Commission Government.

Additional resources did not bring more than minor repairs to a basically unsound structure until the issue of police protection was forced upon Mayor Carlin in 1958. From the outset, his approach to controlling the department was basically sound, to select an outsider as the top administrator. However, his first and second appointees could not control it, due in part to their unfamiliarity with police organization. The department came under control once Carlin appointed an experienced police administrator as Police Director.

The single most important decision that elected city officials can make concerning the police department is the selection of the head. Between 1954 and 1974 the Mayor and City Council fought over the appointments of three of the six Police Directors. The Director is the appointee of the Mayor, who serves at his pleasure and has overall responsibility for the police department. The Police Chief is the highest ranking sworn officer who attained his position through successive civil service promotions up the ranks and holds his position through civil service tenure. This awkward arrangement of an appointed head over a tenured head of the department occurs in the largest cities of New Jersey and New York where state law makes the Police Chief a civil service position. Some cities have created the appointed position of Public Safety Director with authority over both fire and police departments, but the primary

function of that position is identical with that of the Police Director, to make the head of the police department accountable to the Mayor.

During the first year of its existence the City Council thwarted Mayor Carlin on three central police management issues: selection of the Director, barring the police associations from lobbying, and the length of the work week.

Carlin's choice for Police Director was Mariano Rinaldi, an attorney who served in the State Assembly with Carlin in the 1930s and who had been his key aide since 1949 in the Public Works Department. Carlin announced his choice on August 5th, but could not obtain a city council majority to confirm the appointment until January 19th. In Rinaldi, the Mayor had a man who would be beholden to neither fellow police officers nor city councilmen. The councilmen's voiced objection was that Rinaldi was an outsider and the unvoiced objection was that they obtained no favors from his appointment. As may be supposed, this prolonged suspension in limbo as acting director coupled with an ignorance of police organizations and his Italian background prevented Rinaldi from controlling the department. Irish officers, still dominating the department membership, made no bones about preferring an Irishman as Police Director. In November 1955, Carlin elevated Rinaldi to city Business Administrator and appointed as Police Director, Joseph B. Sugrue, whom the council immediately confirmed. Sugrue satisfied the powerful members of the department by his Irish background and his failure to exert control.

The city council adopted a new municipal administrative code as one of its first acts. The code submitted to the Mayor for his review contained a stiff section forbidding police officers and firemen from lobbying on behalf of their departments.

"No person in the police force shall be permitted to contribute any monies, directly or indirectly, to any

political club or association or any club or association intended to affect legislation for or on behalf of the department or any member thereof, or to contribute any funds for such purpose."

However, on the last reading this section was dropped. City council members would not restore the section after a nine-hour conference with the Mayor. Council President Brady, a police inspector on leave, explained that the council had made no major revisions in the code. (NEN, 7/19/54 and "Lobby Rule is Cancelled", 7/21/54)

The Patrolmen's Benevolent Association and the Superior Officer's Association fought Mayor Carlin during most of 1955 in order to reduce the workweek from forty-eight hours to forty. At that time about half the departments serving cities of 300,000 to 1,000,000 population were working a forty hour week and less than 20% had the forty-eight hour week. (Kansas City Police Department, "1956 Survey of Municipal Police Departments") The Mayor correctly held that such a cut in the workweek would be the equivalent of stripping over 100 positions from the department. He opposed cutting the hours before additional officers were available. Talks stalled in April, and dragged through the summer. On September 7th the City Council passed legislation mandating the start of the forty-hour week by November 1. Mayor Carlin vetoed it as irresponsible unless more officers were hired. (NEN, 9/8 and 9/17/55) At the next meeting the City Council overrode the Mayor's veto. (New York Times, 9/28/55, 71.1) Only at the end of October did the Council agree to hire 130 more officers. (NEN, 10/28/55) The Police Director announced on November 1st that it would be impossible to meet the Council's deadline set for that very day. The 215 officers quickly hired in 1955 were the largest number during the thirty-year period, although in the aftermath of the 1967 riots the department recruited almost as many officers. By January 1956, the units with the longest hours

had been cut back to forty, and by July the whole department was on a forty-hour week. (1/1/56)

The presence of two police officers on the City Council pushed that body toward support of a police empire but their views were not always influential. On May 1955 the House Un-American Activities Committee held hearings in Newark to investigate the loyalty of three school teachers. (Newark Public Library, New Jersey Room, "Three Teachers Loyalty Case") In the local enthusiasm for eradicating possible communist influences the City Council required a loyalty oath of all city employees. Councilman Bontempo asked the police department to help investigate city employees. (NEN, 6/5/55) In the end moderation prevailed, the Council rescinded its oath requirement and the police department never embarked upon loyalty investigations.

The police unions also went to the voters to seek what they could not get through the City Council. In November 1959, all the city employee associations sponsored a referendum for a 15% across-the-board pay raise. The Mayor opposed it as beyond what the city could afford. After a fierce campaign the referendum lost heavily. (NEN, "Size of Vote May Decide City Fight", 11/1/59, "Pay Raise Beaten", 11/4/59; Star Ledger, 10/25/59)

One might suppose that if the City Council, the Mayor, and the Police Director would cooperate, the department would be under control. Not so. An incident from June, 1956 illustrates both how incompetently the department responded to an emergency and how difficult it was to hold members responsible for their mistakes.

On Friday, June 8th, Dr. Harry Lowenstein called the police at 10:34 P.M. to report that he spotted a prowler at the home of his neighbor, Councilman Jack Waldor. Ten minutes later, when Waldor returned home with his wife and granddaughter, the surprised burglar shot at

Waldor, hitting him twice. Again Lowenstein called the police. At their departmental trial the two police telephone operators denied that they had been called, even in the face of a written record and testimony from the Bell Telephone operator that she had placed the two calls for Dr. Lowenstein. Police Director Sugrue found both operators not guilty because he could not determine which one had failed to dispatch a patrol car. (NEN, "Police Operators Cleared in Trial", 7/9/56) The Newark Evening News correctly pointed out that if the Newark department had had a tape recording system as did neighboring Jersey City, then the mystery would have been immediately solved. (NEN, "Tape Would Have Prevented Waldor Telephone Mystery", 6/13/56) The department did not acquire a taping system until 1961. (Newark Police Department, Annual Report for 1961, Staff Services Section, 4)

During Carlin's first term the police department did make some improvements in dealing with the mounting crime problem. Shortly after his inauguration, Carlin asked Chief Frederick R. Lacey to increase as much as possible the number of officers on night foot patrol. Here the Mayor had initiated a reflex action, rather than asking the Chief what should be done. Lacey returned with a plan to transfer 130 officers, selected strictly on the basis of low seniority, which more than doubled the currently 102 officers on night patrol. Lacey's reallocation of manpower put extra night patrol on a regular basis, a contrast with the temporary assignments Police Director Keenan had used that February and March to combat an increase in muggings which a judge and the newspapers had identified as a crime wave. (NEN, 2/16 and 4/4/54) The Presidents of the PBA and the SOA met with Mayor Carlin to protest that they had not been consulted in the personnel transfers, but Carlin strongly backed Lacey's decision. (NEN, "OKs Shift of Police", 8/3/54)

Problems of juvenile delinquency were troubling cities across the state in 1955, bringing forth a wide range of official concern. Governor Meyner took note in his annual message to the legislature of continuing efforts to curb juvenile delinquency. (New York Times, 1/2/55, 18:2) The State Juvenile Delinquency Study Committee (Shershin Committee) recommended new legislation, new programs by localities and a permanent State Juvenile Protection Committee. (New York Times, 7/3/55, 26:4) The New Jersey Bar Association Committee (Raiferty Committee) asserted that the juvenile delinquency problem was more severe than the lawlessness of the Prohibition era. They recommended that schools practice corporal punishment and that counties build better facilities for youthful offenders. (New York Times, 12/11/55, 56:3)

In this context the police department established a Youth Aid Bureau on April 16, 1955. (NEN, "Lt. Krah to Head Youth Aid Bureau", 4/17/55) This decision is an example of a confluence approach to decision making since in the preceeding years departments in a great many cities had created specialized units to deal with youths. Like its counterparts elsewhere, the Newark unit had responsibility for bringing youths to court and for delinquency prevention work with them. To head the unit Police Director Rinaldi selected a lieutenant who had served as a social worker before joining the department. During its first year the unit showed a saving of 1,600 manhours by giving all testimony in family court in place of the individual officers who had placed the charges against the youths. (Newark Police Department, Annual Report for 1955)

The police department took other steps to catch up with the rest of the police field. In 1955 it merged two precincts where the stations were within a mile of each other. (Weber, 1965, 68) The department

stopped providing escort service for merchants going to the bank. It set up a planning unit which, in November 1956, began a massive workload survey, the first in the history of the department. Misguided in design, the survey ran 14 months, and the analysis had not been completed by the end of 1958. In 1956 the department started a radar squad and in 1957 installed photocopy machines in all of the precincts. (Newark Police Department, Annual Reports, 1955, 1956, and 1957) These small improvements might have continued for years in a department which did not know if it answered the telephone, kept more officers on walking posts than in radio cars, did not keep accurate count of the crimes which occurred, and did nothing about officers who drank on duty.

An Outsider Upgrades the Department.

Real improvements occurred in the working of the department after a professional police administrator took charge. After Carlin had decided to find a new Police Director he kept the selection process quiet until he brought his nomination to the City Council. The position became open in July, 1958 when Governor Meyner, a Democrat, acted on the Mayor's request to offer Sugrue a judgeship in Essex County Court. On August 10th, Mayor Carlin announced that he was seeking a professional police administrator from outside the department. Chief Lacey knew and respected Joseph Weldon, an assistant chief inspector in the New York Police Department. Mayor Carlin sent Alan Lowenstein, who continued to advise the Mayor informally, to see Commissioner Murphy of the N.Y.P.D. When Murphy recommended Weldon, Carlin apparently did not look farther. The Mayor announced his selection to the City Council on October 11th.

During the next four weeks the two police associations, the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association (PBA) and the SOA (Superior Officers' Association) put pressure on the City Council to reject Weldon in order

to appoint someone from within the department. They hinted that if Weldon were rejected, the North Ward could get a precinct station, a possibility that the associations were in no position to bring about. The City Council interviewed Weldon in an uneventful meeting on October 20th where Councilman Brady, who had retired with the rank of police inspector, asked most of the questions. At PBA prompting on October 24th, the Council asked to see the personnel jackets of four ranking officers, including Brady, in order to consider them as well for the Director's position. City Council President Bontempo, a police officer on leave of absence, brought the appointment to a vote on November 5th. Weldon received confirmation, 5-3 with Councilman Turner abstaining after urging his fellow councilmen to reject the nomination.

Weldon brought up-to-date administrative practices to the Newark Police Department during his leadership from November 1958 to June 1962. His reforms reached throughout the department, with the most important ones in patrol, support services and personnel management. The impact of his administrative reforms produced measurably better police service in a number of areas.

In April 1959, after six months with the department, Weldon performed an overhaul on patrol. He abolished the separate division which had kept the precincts apart from the radio cars since 1936, when they were first introduced. He used the data from the manpower survey started in 1956 to reallocate manpower among the precincts and raised the number of cars in the day from 15 to 20 and in the evening from 15 to 25 plus 5 station wagons. (Newark, City Budget 1960, 1A) In 1960 he added civilians to carry the brunt of the routine job of issuing parking tickets. In April 1961 Weldon established a pro-active unit of uniformed personnel driving unmarked cars, called the crime prevention

unit. The unit saturated high crime areas, moving on after a period of weeks. The second pro-active unit established in 1961 was the crash unit, created to deal with the rising problem of auto accidents, but its existence was brief because the next Police Director disbanded it.

A number of major administrative systems established by Weldon continue in use today. The central complaint number provided a record of work by the Patrol Division as well as making more accurate the recording of crimes, mentioned earlier in this chapter. The department adopted a basic offense report form, started a common filing system, expanded the planning unit, and created the position of police statistical analyst, to analyze and interpret the reams of data which the department produced. In 1961 Weldon introduced the first computer.

In personnel management Weldon made a number of lasting changes. The educational requirement for joining the department had been completion of tenth grade, which Weldon raised to a high school diploma or equivalency certificate. He expanded the recruit training from seven weeks to twelve weeks. In a sharp break with the past he appointed officers to the Detective Division on the basis of recommendations of a departmental board and performance on a test the department developed. (NEN, 4/10/60) He established the internal affairs unit to investigate possible cases of misconduct, an administrative reform long recommended by the leaders in the police field.

This coordinated departmental upgrading resulted in better departmental performance, but there are difficulties in measuring the improvements in a retrospective study. The most general measure of performance was introduced in Chapter 3. Chart 3-1 on page 52 shows that calls for service had dropped below the 1953 level under Police Directors Rinaldi and Suqrue to less than 30 calls per 100 residents. Under Waldon the calls rose 50% in three years, so that by 1961 the roughly 181,000 calls amounted to 45 per 100 residents.

In issuing tickets for moving violations the department continued an upswing which began when the department acquired radar in 1956. The surge in the number of parking tickets from 1960 was due both to the work of patrol and to the hiring of civilians as metermaids. Chart 5-3 shows that the early 1960s marked a high in both types of tickets to which the department did not return until 1973.


(Insert Chart 5-3 about here)

However, when compared nationally, the 95 tickets per 1,000 population placed the department at the national median by 1964 standards (Gardiner, 1969).

The performance of the department in coping with street crimes cannot be measured for the crimes which were prevented, but can be measured by arrests made. Chart 5-4 shows the annual number of arrests for robbery and burglary for the thirty years.

(Insert Chart 5-4 about here)

It is worth examining these serious street crimes separately because robbery arrests are usually made on the basis of investigative work and burglary arrests are usually made at the time of or shortly after the burglary. Hence, robbery arrests result from good work by patrol officers and detectives; burglary arrests from good work by patrol. Graph 5-4 is drawn to a semi-log scale in order to show the rate of growth of arrests. Note that the two




The names of the Police Directors are given next to the years of their leadership. No data are available for 1954 because no annual report was issued. From 1956 the breakdowns are given by type of ticket issued.

Table 5-4

DEPARTMENTAL PERFORMANCE IN ROBBERY AND BURGLARY ARRESTS

Annual Totals of Arrests

Drawn on a logrhythmic scale



The names of the police directors are given next to the years of their leadership.

lines ran generally parallel with burglary arrests reaching a rough plateau after 1967 and robbery reaching a plateau in 1971 and trenddropping after 1974. The Weldon years do not stand out. Robbery arrests were growing rapidly since 1960 and burglary arrests climbed rapidly since 1966. Thus, the reforms which Weldon initiated did not show in dramatically higher arrests. The continued growth of both types of arrest after Weldon was fired is consistent with the interpretation that the department retained some new competence.

Gambling enforcement is an area where the department made pronounced gains under Weldon. Three days after Weldon took office U.S. Treasury agents raided a multi-million dollar lottery operation. Immediately, Weldon transferred to foot patrol elsewhere the six plain-clothesmen from the precinct and ordered a thorough investigation. (NEN, "Transfer 6 Cops After U.S. Raid", 11/5/58) Weldon apparently succeeded in his aim of eliminating police protection for gamblers. The number of gambling arrests rose to their highest levels ever in 1960 and 1961. After Weldon's first week no other police agencies raided Newark.

In covert enterprises like gambling and its protection, the production of arrests may be a sideshow to divert attention from the protected gambling operations. Such a situation in Philadelphia is analyzed by Jonathan Rubenstein (1973). In Newark interviews with a number of older officers provide the unanimous judgment that the department was most serious about gambling enforcement under Weldon.

Mayor Carlin was entirely satisfied with the performance of the department and called his appointment of Weldon one of his finest acts as mayor.

Foreshadowing the Alienation of the 1960s: Policing by Strangers

American policing, like its British inspiration, has been the responsibility of each locality and has drawn its recruits from the classes and ethnic groups which most required police attention. Americans have been policed by their own. Although the theory of democratic policing is in infancy, American and British thinkers agree that police crime control is more likely to be successful when the police have developed a broad base of public involvement and support for their operations (O'Connor, 1976; Goldstein, 1977; Mark, 1977; Alderson, 1979). However, in Newark three profound shifts had been taking place during the 1950s which reduced public involvement and support. Newark had become policed by strangers.

First, the deliberate and most obvious change was Weldon's transformation of the department from one which basically provided foot patrol to one which patrolled in radio cars. Second thoughts now question whether the field's technological progress in responding swiftly to citizen calls for service has not carried the hidden price of officers not knowing the people where they work (Murphy, 1977, ch.9). Without painting a roseate picture of the old days, the time of Commissioner Keenan, one may point out that when officers on foot had slack time or were shirking they conversed with the people of the neighborhood, typically with merchants. When officers in radio cars pass the time of day they talk with their partners. The wealth of information which good officers picked up on the street enabled them to prevent crimes as well as to solve them. Second, and more profound, the racial composition of the city changed without an accompanying change in the racial composition of the police department. Table 5-4 shows how rapidly the black population of the city surged ahead of the black membership of the police department.

Table 5-5

RACIAL TRANSITION OF THE CITY OUTPACED
THE TRANSITION IN THE POLICE DEPARTMENT

	1950	1960	1970	1978
Percentage of sworn personnel who are black	2%	7%	NA	20%
Percentage of city population who are black	17%	34%	55%	58%

Sources: The departmental figures for 1950 and 1960 were calculated from personnel rosters by Wayne Fisher, 'Race and Ethnicity: The Newark Police Department' Graduate paper at the Graduate Center, City University of New York, 1976. The 1978 departmental figures were provided by the Director's Office of the Newark Police Department.

No special efforts were made to attract black men into police work until 1968. Nor was the department integrated. Black officers were almost entirely restricted to patrol where they had other black officers as partners. Thus, white officers lacked a crucial avenue for learning about the ways and outlooks of the growing black population of the city.

A third change was that fewer and fewer police officers lived in the city they served. In the old days, an applicant had to have lived in the city two years before he could join and thereafter had to be a city resident (Bureau of Municipal Research, 1942). It was considered natural for sons to follow their fathers into the department. However, in the 1950s police officers began participating in the general white emigration from Newark, despite the law which required residency. Mayor Carlin became quite concerned, and the department developed a policy not to promote anyone living outside the city. A few superior officers moved back into the city, and the threat was never carried out. By 1962 the PBA had won a court decision that a second address maintained in Newark met the legal requirements for city residency. That decision marked the beginning of a substantial drain. Less than a decade later the PBA, together with the two other powerful municipal unions, fire fighters' and teachers' obtained state legislation forbidding cities to require their members' residency.

Foreshadowing the 1960s: Perception of Racial Injustice

As far back as the statistics in Newark reach, black people have been more frequently arrested and much more frequently jailed than white people. After arrest in Newark, people who were poor or without connections awaited trial in an ancient dungeon before 1971, and afterwards in a highrise with minimal facilities. Throughout the thirty years the vast majority of inmates at Essex County Jail have been sent there without trial. By the time they appear for trial and plead guilty, the judge sentences them to the time

they have already served. Table 1-7 on page 18 shows that black people formed half of those in jail, when they were only 12% of the County residents. The trend since 1950 has reduced somewhat the disproportion between the race of the County population and the race of the jail population.

Of more concern to black people than the official operations of the courts and jails was mistreatment by police officers. There is an instructive contrast between how crime became an issue and police mistreatment remained ignored.

Early in his first term, Irvine Turner, the only black councilman from 1954 to 1966, had called for the City Council to conduct a 'full scale investigation of the conduct of some policemen who seem to have a sadistic desire to beat citizens of minority groups when making an arrest' (NN, 8/25/54). The timing of this call for an investigation was in a pattern that became familiar in Newark over the next two decades and has been common among cities across the country. The pattern began when a violent incident triggered a call for an investigation. Some official body, usually the police department itself, investigated the incident, sometimes thoroughly, sometimes not, and the individual officers were disciplined or not in accordance with the findings of the investigation. The problem solved, policy makers and that fraction of the public who were even aware of the case shifted their attention to other matters.

In Newark, the 1954 problem was not solved because the City Council majority turned a deaf ear. The person arrested in the incident was the director of the New Jersey Negro Labor Council. Under the Commission government, such complaints by anyone, however educated, had been very rare, probably not because beatings were less frequent, but because no was trusted to do anything about the complaint.

The problem was not solved when Weldon established the department's internal affairs unit in 1959. In Newark incidents where officers beat a man they arrested appear to have been part of a long-established pattern in which some officers on the street considered robbing up and beating justified under a variety of circumstances. Victims were often too scared to complain. Supervisory and management personnel of the department did not place high priority on limiting excessive use of force. No agency outside the police department had any on-going responsibility for monitoring police use of force.

The problem of beating prisoners did not become an issue by itself but arrived as the core of an ugly set of practices blandly called unfair treatment in the 1958 assessment of race relations that Mayor Carlin sponsored and called "brutality" by black people. The survey found widespread belief among black people that police officers mistreat black people and found widespread unconcern among white people. Table 5-6 below shows the vastly different views among black and white heads of household over whether mistreatment occurs.

(Insert Table 5-6 about here)

It is not necessary to look far to explain the white ignorance of the issue of police mistreatment of black people. On Sunday afternoon, February 8, 1959, a citizens' committee composed of black pastors and business people sponsored a forum on Newark police brutality attended by 250 people. The spark for the forum was the arrest of a black man for traffic violations. During the arrest he suffered injuries which required 37 stitches and several days in the hospital while the arresting officers were also cut and bruised. The guest speaker, a former counsel to the Jersey City Department of Public Safety, Louis E. Saunders, declared, "We must make the Newark Police Department understand that we are not

Table 5-6

DOES POLICE BRUTALITY OCCUR IN NEWARK?

TO EXTENT TO WHICH WHITE AND NEGRO HEADS OF
HOUSEHOLDS HAVE HEARD AND BELIEVE STORIES OF
UNFAIR TREATMENT OF NEGROES (PUERTO RICANS)
AT THE HANDS OF THE POLICE

1958

	<u>Whites</u>	<u>Negroes</u>
Heard stories of mistreatment of Negroes (Puerto Ricans) at the <u>hands of the police</u>	<u>8%</u>	<u>47%</u>
Believe they are entirely true	3	15
Believe they have some truth	3	26
Don't believe them	1	4
No answer	1	2
Not heard such stories	65	32
Don't know, no answer	27	21
	—	—
Total	100%	100%
Base	(5,517)	(2,595)

Source: Market Planning Corporation, Newark, A City in Transition, II, 98)

second class citizens.' He charged that the officers 'took the law into their own hands because he was a Negro and they thought they could get away with it.' Irvine Turner, predicting that he would someday be mayor, declared, "When I get through, police brutality will be a thing of the past."

The description of the meeting and the quotes from the speakers are from a draft of an even-toned news story written by a seasoned reporter for the Newark Evening News. His editor refused to print the story on the grounds that it was too inflammatory. (Elderidge, the reporter, 2/20/80)

The 1958 survey had recommended a thorough study of what, if any, mistreatment black people received from the police. However, if there recommendation was followed, it never left a trace (NN, 7/26/59 and 7/27/59). Neither the Newark News files nor the police department Annual Report mention such a study. In 1961 the department did provide a well designed course in community relations for police officers conducted by the National Conference of Christians and Jews. However, in 1962 the new Police Director canceled the course (NN, 6/13, 9/14 to 9/18 and 9/26).

During the 1960s and 1970s poor relations persisted between police officers and members of minority groups. Many of Newark's black and Puerto Rican residents believed that police officers mistreat people of their race. During the 1960s the magnitude of the problem grew. The very belief that brutality is practiced, is a problem, since those who turn to the police for protection must wonder whether they will need protection from the police. The occurrence of incidents in which officers have abused their office is a separate problem. Both problems plagued Newark during the next two decades.

Chapter 6

Crisis Upon Crisis, 1962-1970

The 1967 riots mark a watershed in Newark's history. Before the riots Newark looked to the past, a white man's town for 300 years; afterwards Newark looked to the future, a black man's town.

The Press of Issues

The businesslike Carlin years ended in 1962 in a campaign that turned bitter as Hugh Addonizio, the Congressman since 1948 whose constituency centered on Newark's by now black Central Ward, trounced Carlin. Addonizio's recurrent theme was that taxes were too high. He also charged that the City Hall payroll was padded, businesses received tax favoritism, the city hospital was a disgrace, the crime rate was too high and Carlin was controlled by the county Democratic boss. The irony of the last charge is that the county boss was strongly but covertly supporting Addonizio in order to end Carlin's rivalry for power in the county. At the League of Women Voters' meeting the Thursday before the election, Carlin warned that the "invisible hand" of the same people who opposed the charter reform was behind Addonizio's candidacy. An outraged Addonizio charged Carlin with imputing that he had Mafia connections. Addonizio swept to victory without a run-off, based on Italian and black votes.

While the quietude of the Carlin years paralleled the normalcy of the Eisenhower years, the turbulence of the Addonizio years rose with the nationwide turbulence. The problems which had plagued Newark in the 1940s and '50s became more acute during the 1960s: the shrinking economic base, high taxes, deteriorated housing, urban redevelopment, poor quality municipal services. In 1968 the Governor's Commission on Civil Disorder drew up a picture of contemporary Newark that showed intractable problems

in every sector and a pattern of governmental negligence in attending to those problems.

Race relations as an issue in the 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s was the concern of black people and some white liberals about the myriad acts of discrimination against black people. Black people also held next to no positions in city government at any level. Carlin, after much prodding, had finally appointed a black man as municipal court judge. Addonizio, in contrast, quickly appointed a number of black people to positions of responsibility.

Race relations entered a new phase in July 1963 when CORE picketed the construction at Barringer High School. The Newark Human Rights Commission had found the contractors engaging in patterns of discrimination. (Newark, Human Rights Commission, Eleventh Annual Report, 1963) From then on, race relations also included white unease over black demands. Following the Harlem riots of July 1964, the concern arose that riots might occur in Newark. By 1966, the 100th anniversary of the founding of Newark, city leaders were congratulating themselves on their success in preventing riots.

Addonizio aimed to develop Newark economically and to promote racial harmony. Eventually he saw himself as moving on to the Governor's office and leaving the city in the hands of a black mayor he could trust. Addonizio promoted a variety of developments and region shaping forces. Since private business was not eager to establish in Newark, he attracted public investment. He fought for the expansion of Newark airport and the port. He promoted the building of the Newark campus of Rutgers University on land cleared through urban renewal. He bargained hard to get the College of Medicine and Dentistry to locate in the heart of the Central Ward. These region shaping forces did not pay taxes but Addonizio and his advisers believed that they would benefit the city by producing a more integrated society both at the workplace and through the employees taking up residence in Newark. (Interview with a key aide, 1/24/80)

The Mayor was skillful in political dealings. He had learned in 14 years in Congress how to persuade and compromise and accommodate. From the perspective of the City Clerk's office he was the only mayor of Newark's three who had good working relations with city council members. (Interview with Arch Korngut, 1/10/80) On a number of occasions he was able to reach a resolution through forcing a compromise on groups which

were bitter enemies. Always ready to talk with groups and representatives, he often deflected protest with promises.

The new force in city politics was a black leadership that no longer depended upon City Hall for favors and jobs. (Curvin, 1975, ch.3) The leading group in Newark was CORE, founded in 1961, for the NAACP was captured and retained as an Addonizio ally. The federal anti-poverty program provided funding outside of City Hall's control to locally based groups via the United Community Corporation. Over the decade more militant groups arrived on the scene. The Addonizio administration lost an ongoing struggle to wrest control of the federal funds from the United Community Corporation. (Interview with a key aide of Mayor Addonizio, 1/24/80) Tom Hayden and some others from the Students for a Democratic Society moved into the Clinton Hill section of the South Ward and from there made prolonged attempts to correct basic social injustices through fighting for housing code enforcement and to mobilize black votes. (Parenti, 1970) In 1967 Imam Baraka (né LeRoi Jones) organized the United Brothers dedicated to realizing a Black Society.

The rise of black nationalism was not understood by the white liberals who had been working for racial equality. On reflection, one of the key makers of policy in City Hall during this period, commented:

"...some long-term notion of how that city would go, which was to make some sort of successful integrated city with a transfer to ...a nice, pleasant black mayor who would be very agreeable to white interests. That would just come to pass naturally sometime when the black population reached a voting majority."

"There was a liberal notion that we were the patrons and blacks were supposed to be grateful. Instead, liberals were being kicked in the face all over the country and they didn't like it. They were being confronted with the fact that blacks didn't want to be grateful, they wanted to be equal. That might have exceeded what the liberals had in mind. They were for equality and gratitude and the blacks were for equality, period."

The Rise in Serious Street Crimes

The homicide rate in Newark rose from double to triple the national rate as shown in Chart 6-1 on the next page. The number of robberies reported in the police department records rose over 300% during the Addonizio years. The reported burglaries rose and fell with the election cycle, but the overall trend was up, as shown in Table 6-2.

The predatory attacks summarized in these statistics hit hardest the residents of the Central Ward. One couple's tragedy conveys the oppressive nature of the crime problem.

Donald Greene and his brother Hensley, both in their fifties, walked down Springfield Avenue at 9:00 P.M. on Friday, April 19, 1964. Donald Greene, a black man, was a welder who had been working for the past ten years at the General Motors plant in Linden, a 95 % white suburb. Donald Greene's home was half a mile from downtown Newark, just off Springfield Avenue, the major artery that cuts through the Central Ward. This heavily trafficked avenue runs past the City's concentration of highrise housing projects. Recently new fluorescent lights had been installed on Springfield Avenue, but law abiding people were afraid to walk there at night. When four youths age somewhere between 16 and 21 demanded the money of the two brothers, Donald Greene tried to fight them off and was killed. No one came to the brothers aid and the youths fled with \$65.

Afterwards, Mrs. Pauline Greene spoke with reporters. She described how her husband had been beaten and robbed only three weeks earlier near the same spot. "It was the same thing three months ago," she added, "When my husband and I went into the tavern so I could make a phone call to my sister...It was 1:00 P.M. -- in the daytime -- and I was mugged in the phone booth. When my husband tried to help me, somebody held him back. No one paid any attention to my yells for help." Shortly afterwards Mrs. Greene brought a lawsuit against the tavern.

Table 6-1

RISE IN HOMICIDES DURING ADDONIZIO'S ADMINISTRATION

Number of Homicides per 100,000 Residents



TABLE 6-2

RISE IN ROBBERIES AND BURGLARIES KNOWN TO THE POLICE

	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
No. of Robberies	1,328	1,493	1,654	1,515	1,699	2,278	3,958	3,888	4,666
No. of Burglaries	7,582	7,602	8,004	7,719	10,121	11,880	13,085	10,884	11,375

Source: FBI, Uniform Crime Reports.

1965 and 1969 are the years prior to general municipal elections. 1967 is the year of the Newark riots.

She concluded, 'Something should be done...It's just a jungle, that's what it is. There is nothing here but dope fiends all around' (NN, 4/20/64 and NYT, 4/20/64).

NEWARK'S RESPONSES TO CRIME PROBLEMS

When decision makers face a problem they may choose to address the patterns of behavior which people label as the problem or they may address the perceptions people have of the problem. Mayor Addonizio and Police Director Spina took actions along both lines. First, we will turn to a simple method of attempting to shape perceptions by using statistics.

The Stroke of the Pen

Addonizio and Spina had an identical interest in keeping the crime rates down. Columnist Lee Johnson observed in 1963,

How Mayor Hugh J. Addonizio used the crime rate to embarrass the Carlin administration in his campaign for election in 1962. It would be equally embarrassing to Mayor Addonizio if his administration was open to the same charges in 1966... The city must find a way to cut crime. (Afro American "Inside Newark, 12/14/63)

Lee Johnson perceptively concluded,

The trouble is, the new tactics are going to be no more successful than the old ones. There may be some lulls and temporary successes, but the forces which encourage crime will continue to grow.

The high crime rate was one among many charges which Addonizio had hurled in the 1962 campaign. The particular way in which he developed the crime issue suggests that he was using it primarily to justify firing Weldon rather than to condemn a widely recognized problem. Addonizio was a police buff. His best friend among the ranking officers of the department was Dominick A. Spina, an Inspector. Spina campaigned actively for Addonizio without taking a leave of absence. Previously, Spina had been active politically in the North Ward where he lived and had built his own civic association. On April 26th, Addonizio promised to fire Weldon, if elected. (NEN, 4/27/62) Carlin replied, that appointing Weldon was 'one of the proudest things I've done'. (NEN, 5/1/62, 12) Addonizio then

attacked Carlin and Weldon for the high crime rates. (NEN, 5/4 and 5/6/62) While conceding that Newark's crime rate had dropped 2 1/2% in the last year, Addonizio concluded "I am concerned that Newark has twice as many crimes as other cities."

The shoe was on the other foot in 1966 when Carlin, as challenger, blamed Addonizio for the city's crime problems. Addonizio counter-attacked sharply, "Now he talks about crime when his administration watched a crime rise of 10% under the bungling of an out-of-town police director." (NEN, "Addonizio in Bitter Attack on Four Rivals", 5/3/66) Addonizio claimed credit that since the end of 1962 crime in Newark "inched up" 2.3% in contrast to the skyrocketing national increase of 28%. (NEN, "Addonizio Labels Crime Charge Hoax", 5/6/66)

From his first days as Police Director, Spina let his department know his displeasure at seeing crime rates rise. His directive concerning auto theft shows Spina's concern for the wronged car owners, the youthful thieves and the departmental crime rate. The body of text of Executive Order 62-284 is given below.

1. Auto thefts have been skyrocketing beyond all former statistics. Over 95% are used for joy-riding and are abandoned by youths on the streets after being used.
2. However, they are still being charged as Part I Crimes and therefore are causing a large increase in our Crime Index.
3. It is therefore important that all personnel stop more automobiles for routine checks. This is particularly true when two or more youths sometimes in the company of girls are riding around haphazardly.
4. Our records indicate that an extremely disproportionate number of Oldsmobile automobiles are being stolen every day. All personnel are directed to pay particular attention to Oldsmobile automobiles. Remember that every time there is an increase in our Crime Index, it is not only a reflection on our Police Department but on each and every one of us.


The crucial crime rates for election purposes are the calendar year which is completed before the election. This lead time allows the FBI to publish local police figures, and thus transform any local figure fudging into what Mayor Addonizio called, "the FBI records, which are irrevocable" (NEN, "Addonizio Labels Crime Charge Hoax", 5/6/66). During 1965 the Newark figures fell for every crime in the Part I index except rape and murder. Robbery fell by 100, burglary by 300 and the least serious crime of larceny fell by 800. The net result was to bring down the index for 1965 to only 2% higher than the index had been for 1962. Meanwhile, murder, the only crime which is accurately reported and counted rose 19% for the year. Table 6-1, a few pages earlier, shows now markedly the homicide rate rose. As has been argued in chapter 1, it is reasonable to assume that other violent street crimes rose roughly parallel to homicide.

In 1968 the Part I index rose to over 34,000 crimes, far above the 19,000 which were recorded for 1962. In 1969 the index took a dive of 4,000 crimes, most propitiously for the Police Director and Mayor. Comparing the 1969 reports with the 1968 reports shows 2,200 fewer burglaries, 900 fewer larcenies and 900 fewer auto thefts. Chart 6-3 is a set up to emphasize by plotting each year's percentage of growth or decline, the yearly fluctuations. It clearly shows the magnitude of the 1969 drop in contrast to the acceleration of the growth of reported crime between 1965 and 1968.

The breaking and looting which occurred during the 1967 riots are examples of crimes which never appeared in Newark's Uniform Crime Reports. Presented in Table 6-4 are the burglary figures for July during three consecutive years. They show an even upward trend that belies the occurrence of \$8,000,000 in looting. To check the possibility that the department was downgrading the looting to larceny, these figures are presented as well. July 1967 appears in those figures that count politically to have been a quiet month

CHART 6-3

CHANGES IN THE CRIME INDEX PREPARATORY TO ELECTION YEAR



Percentage of growth or decline in the Crime Index by year. Note the cycle of a decline occurring every 4th year.

Table 6-4

IMPACT OF THE 1967 RIOTS ON NEWARK'S REPORTED BURGLARY RATES

	July, 1966	July 1967	July 1968
Total Burglaries Known to the Police	1,000	1,199	1,406
Total Larcenies Known to the Police	891	634	1,279

Source: Monthly Return A to the FBI, Uniform Crime Reports

Note: The Supplement to Return A, figures which are entirely separate from the crime index, show a marked rise in the value of property taken in burglary. In July 1967 \$2,000,000 in property was reported stolen in burglaries compared to \$200,000 in July 1966 and \$330,000 in July 1968.

The Decision-Making Approaches of Addonizio and Spina

Within a city government the units which make most of the decisions on how to cope with crime problems are the mayor, the city council and the police department. During the Addonizio years decisions made by city agencies on how to respond to crime problems were more like the decisions taken under Mayor Gibson than they were like the decisions under the Commission Government or Mayor Carlin. This shift resulted from changes in the city's decision-making ability, in the importance of political considerations and in the availability of federal funds.

Under the Commission government the last decisive Commissioner of Public Safety had been Michael Duffy, who died in 1938. Commissioner Joseph Keenan, 1941-1954, never took initiative in dealing with crime problems and when problems were thrust under his nose he tried to deny them. Keenan did not even have a political calculus by which he gauged how to get political mileage out of crime issues either for himself or for the police department.

The four other Commissioners never interfered. This, under Commission government there was no central agency which made policy concerning crime problems. When the new City Charter of 1954 separated the head of the police department from the Mayor and council, it created three bodies to make policy concerning crime. Most specific policies to deal with crime problems originated in the police department, some originated in the Mayor's office, and in later years during the most hostile period of city politics, a few originated with the city council.

Both Mayor Carlin and Police Director Weldon had taken an analytic approach to decision making. Carlin often refused to make political concessions to city councilmen, in his commitment to a professional administration. Both Carlin and Weldon put their energies into administrative upgrading. When they first took charge of their organizations, it was impossible for the head to know what the organization was doing. At the close of their terms, Carlin and Weldon both left organizations where accountability was established and management information systems brought some essential information to the top. Mayor Addonizio and Police Director Spina thus inherited agencies which had some experience with performance standards and some organizational coherence so that a new directive was likely to be carried out.

Addonizio and Spina brought political skills to their offices which they used to build personal support. Since city agencies had just experienced eight years of administrative leadership which downplayed political considerations, the old political networks were probably attenuated through retirements. Addonizio brought some highly capable people into his administration. He held the office of mayor at the period of Newark's history when groups were pressing the most vociferous demands. To be effective, and to build a reputation on which to run for Governor, he made decisions based on a political calculus of what could be obtained in each bargain at what price. Police Director Spina had become thoroughly conversant with and skilled at

departmental politics during his 22 years of service before gaining the top job.

Dominick Spina was a tough cop in more ways than one. In control of himself under stress, when he took charge at street scenes he won the admiration of others for his presence of mind and ability to command. (New Jersey, Governor's Select Commission, 1968, 136) He ordered his officers to 'get tough' with youths. In his initial reorganization of the department, Spina set up a seven man intelligence office reporting directly to him on its investigations of racial strife, subversives and organized crime. (Newark, Operating Budget, 2D) He deplored Supreme Court expansions of constitutional rights, condemning the Miranda decision in his department's official newsletter with these words:

"The law is now squarely on the side of the criminal. Innocent victims have been sidetracked. Society has been left helpless during a soaring crime rate." (Siren, June 1966, 5)

Departmental Competence

Before looking at the major programs and projects which the police department launched over the eight years of Spina's leadership, it is first useful to assess the department's general level of competence. The standard applied in chapter 3, number of calls for service per capita, shows that under Spina's leadership the department performed better than before or since. Since police administrators do not consider the number of calls for service a performance measure, there is no incentive to inflate them.

The argument here is that people who live in a city in the advanced stages of deterioration have so many problems of crime and disorder that one could expect people to average more than one situation per year where they would like police assistance. A growth in the number of times a police car is sent shows a growth in the department's response to need. In a city where the problems continue to worsen, a decline in the number of calls for

service shows a decline in people's trust that police will help them or a decline in the administrative ability of the department to answer calls for help, or both. Table 8-5 shows that calls for service grew from 23 per 100 residents to 30 between 1948 and 1958. During Welton's four years they substantially grew from 30 to 45 per 100 residents. During Spina's years the demands which the department met increased 100%, from 45 calls to 93 calls per 100 residents. If the department had not had a deserved reputation for abusing black and Hispanic people, the number of calls for service might have been much higher. The calls for service reached 100 in the early 1970s but fell to the 80s for most of the decade. The conclusion drawn from the calls for service figures is supported by recollections of older department members, that the department ran fairly efficiently during the Spina years.

The Mayor's Initiatives against Crime

Since Addonizio strongly supported Spina, one would not expect him to adopt any independent approach to crime fighting, and this was true with two exceptions. Addonizio threw his own body into the battle against crime. As a police buff he had a police radio installed in his official limousine and often went on calls. On the morning of Friday, December 17, 1965 the Mayor happened upon five black men shooting a police officer as they fled from a bank. The Mayor ordered his driver to give chase. One of the gunmen fired five shots at the Mayor's car, narrowly missing the driver. The bank robbers' car smashed into a tree and the Mayor held two robbers until the police arrived. Afterwards the Mayor honored the patrol sergeant who had attempted to stop the robbers. At the hospital, the Mayor promoted the paralyzed officer to the rank of lieutenant. (NEW, "Mayor Now a Lieutenant" 12/21/65)

The other initiative from the Mayor's office came in 1968 through the Administrative Assistant for Intergovernmental Affairs, Donald Malaironte. A member of his staff quickly became very adept at criminal justice planning and drafted many sound projects. Some of them were funded in the last two years of the Mayor's term and many more were implemented under Mayor Gibson.

Police Initiatives against Street Crime

Roadblocks were one of Spina's preferred techniques for cutting down on auto theft, issuing summons for motor vehicle violations, and generally catching criminals. To man the roadblocks Spina used the Crime Prevention Unit created by Weldon. (Newark Police Department, Annual Report, 1965) The department started roadblocks in December 1962 and ran them on a routine basis six nights a week from January 15th. Eight or more officers operated the roadblock, stopping all cars on a heavily traveled street from 8:00 P.M. and running a roadblock in a second location after midnight. After the first month of operation, Spina credited the roadblocks with cutting auto theft 15%. (NEN, "City Shows Rise in Major Crime", 2/12/63) During the first eleven months, the operation had issued 5,617 summons and made 469 arrests for offenses ranging from drunken driving to possession of narcotics and robbery. Spina referred to the roadblocks as "the first ever" but in 1956 the department had created a roadblock detail composed of officers known for their courtesy. (NEN, 12 20 and 12/21/62 and 6/27/56)

When questioned Spina declared the roadblock perfectly legal, but Chief Magistrate Nicholas Castellano considered this deprivation of liberty to be illegal. As a city magistrate Castellano believed he did not have standing to rule on the constitutionality of the roadblock. Few people opposed the policy, and while the ACLU had written Spina in protest, it had not brought a case during the first year of operation. By 1966, Spina had discontinued the roadblocks. (NEN, "Roadblock Argument: Crime Deterrent vs. Civil Liberty", 12/26/63, 26)

Later Spina circulated within his department the decision of a superior court judge in a nearby county who found that roadblocks did not invade constitutional rights. (Newark Police Department, Memorandum 67-237, "Recent Court Decision Re: Road Blocks", State v. Kabayoma - N J Super. /Morris County App. 116-65, February 7, 1967)

In the first chapter we referred to a narrow view that governmental response to crime is limited to catching criminals, while in fact responses can range across three other categories: reducing the conditions which promote criminal behavior, assisting the individual victims, and preventing crime by reducing conditions which make victimization likely.

Spina made two early crime prevention efforts. His campaign to fight crime with lights was the most far-reaching. The Junior Chamber of Commerce and the Mayor cooperated with him in urging residents to turn on front and back outside lights and businesses to leave their buildings lit. The Mayor asked all city employees to leave lights on. The Weequahic section at the far south end of town cooperated in spirited fashion. Less than one week into the program Spina commented that Weequahic which had been badly hit by pursesnatchings and burglaries in the past year had reported no pursesnatchings and a drop in burglary since the start of the campaign. (NEN

"Crime Fight Lights up City", 12/4/63)

Director Spina also promoted crime prevention and citizen cooperation through creating the Junior Crime Fighters. This volunteer association for youngsters distributed leaflets in 1963 informing people about narcotics and advising them how to prevent the theft of their cars. (Newark Police Department, Annual Report, 1963) Neither citizen involvement effort lasted long.

During the 1960s the police department did not again launch a crime prevention effort to involve the general public, but it was open to assistance from specific occupational groups. In the summer of 1964 the Newark Human Rights Commission asked bartenders to notify the police at the first sign of racial disorder. The police department and later the Secretary of the Alcoholic Beverages Commission assured tavern owners that they would not risk losing their license for calling the police. Spina was critical of absentee bar owners whose places were trouble spots. (NEN, "Police Urge Calls at Sign of Trouble", 8/22/64, and NEN, "Spina Raps 'Laxity' on Tavern Penalties", 10/9/64) The department developed a plan to organize an auxiliary police unit from among taxi drivers, but nothing more was heard of it. (NEN, "Cabbie Police", 4/11/63)

"Go-it-alone" was a more characteristic department response to crime problems. After a rash of pursesnatches and pickpocketing downtown, Spina began the summer of 1964 ordering his department to "get tough" and increasing the number of juvenile officers to 40. (NEN, "Notice to Hoodlums", 6/7/64)

"I have ordered a strict lookout for loitering and hangouts... These kids are going to be kept on the move. And if they don't move in a hurry they will be hauled off to the station house. Citizens of this city are sick and tired of being molested by young bullies. I have issued a stern warning to all police personnel to remove the shackles and get tough."

Police Brutality -- The Issue Arrived

Among all the issues over which contending sides clashed none was more bitterly fought than police brutality and the proposed solution of a civilian review board. Police brutality was an emotion-laden term which became the currency of political debate. However, just as crime is not a thing, so police brutality is not a thing. Beatings are at the core of this broad set of objectionable practices, but the term covered unjustified shootings. Brutality also came to mean officious acts by policemen such as stopping someone without probable cause and even covered making racial slurs. In a word, police brutality meant any act by a police officer which others considered unjustified. Moreover, the term had a built-in racial connotation, that white officers were inflicting brutality on members of minority groups. In fact, the great proportion of cases in the newspapers, where police officers were accused of mistreatment had precisely this racial casting.

As the decade wore on and the incidents of police abuse of power recurred, the term "police brutality" may have acquired a yet larger set of meanings, to stand for the many abuses which poor black people suffer at the hands of white people. It may be that when black people were protesting police brutality, they felt they were taking a stand against the white system which discriminated in employment, housing, education. If this is so, "police brutality" was a code word for black people that served a parallel function to "crime in the streets" as a code word for many white people. The emotional load carried by the term, "crime in the streets", included colored people not knowing their place and unruly, long haired youths offending respectable people.

During the 1960s there were three rounds in which black community groups fought and lost over a civilian review board as the answer to police brutality. With the benefit of two decades of hindsight, we can note that few cities in America have tried a review board and none have succeeded in using it to correct patterns of police abuse. Not only were attempts sabotaged by police opposition, the concept is misguided. A review board separates one management function, the investigation of complaints, from the many which need to be brought together to correct patterns of excessive use of force and other abuses. Correction of long standing patterns of police misconduct has succeeded when strong management attacked the problem from many sides: through recruitment, training, day to day supervision, rewards and recognition, and stimulation of peer pressure, in addition to investigation after the fact, correction and separation.

The first round went from February 22nd to April 7, 1963. Assemblyman George C. Richardson, a Democrat, brought together 19 religious, political, civic and ethnic organizations to hear the executive director of the Philadelphia Police Advisory Board. (NEN, "Need for Newark Police Review Board", 2/23/63) Initially Mayor Addonizio said he would consider a review board, pointing out that not one case of police brutality had been charged so far during his administration. The PBA, the SOA, the FOP, and the Police Director were unanimous in their opposition. (NEN, 3/3 and 3/3/63) Police Director Spina stated:

Such a board would ruin the police force and lead directly to an increase in crime. We can't under any circumstances accept such a proposal...A policeman must be free to do his duty without fear he will be unjustly brought before a group that acts outside the framework of the police force and the law. (SL, 12/24/63, 5)

The first compromise, suggested by the corporation counsel, was that the Newark Human Rights Commission create a subcommittee to hear complaints against police officers. (NEN, 3/16 and 4/7/63) The Mayor ended the matter by pointing out that the police department was forming councils of neighborhood leaders in each precinct who would work to improve community relations and advise the precinct captain in these matters. (NEN, "Review Board Out", 4/7/63)

Defeated, Richardson brought together several ministers to establish an unofficial watchdog committee to look into brutality complaints. (NEN, 4/12/63 and 5/3/63) The committee disappeared almost immediately, when one of its members, Bernard Moore, on the NAACP staff in New York was arrested for interfering with an officer. He pleaded guilty to the charge over an incident where he insisted on talking at the scene with an arrested couple who were passengers in a car stopped after a chase. The municipal judge

fined him \$250 with the admonition,

I hope this case will serve as a warning to all citizens that this court will not tolerate any interference with the enforcement of the law. (NEN, "Interference Fine Levied", 5/14/63)

The county Democratic Party dropped Richardson from their slate when he was due for re-election that November.

Between rounds, in 1964, Richardson again advocated a civilian review board. (NEN, 7/22/64) The second round lasted from June 17th to September 15, 1965. The triggering incident was Police Officer Martinez's fatal shooting of a black driver whom he and his partner stopped for traffic violations and who, according to the officers, then slashed the partner and fled. Mayor Addonizio suspended Officer Martinez, but police officers picketed City Hall to protest the suspension and obtained a court order for the City to show cause why Officer Martinez should not be reinstated. The City Human Rights Commission found no racial bias. The ACLU criticized them for dismissing the case so quickly. The picketing intensified, augmented by 300 officers from New York City. On June 21, Mayor Addonizio lifted Martinez's suspension, the PBA stopped its picketing and on June 28th sent 100 members to New York to join their anti-review board rally. CORE staged rallies in favor of a review board and picketed. On July 17th, the two camps each staged a march, giving city officials considerable worry about keeping the peace. Into August the review board issue kept hot. Finally, on September 15th, the Mayor announced his alternative, that the FBI would investigate all charges of police brutality. PBA President Guiliano hailed the plan and an FBI spokesman said the Bureau had not heard of it. (NEN articles, 6/18-7 30/65 and NYT, 6/21, 14, 6/22, 55; 7/30, 26, 8/8, 60 and 9/16/65, 1)

The FBI received its first case on September 29th. (NEN, 9/30/65)

A year later a three article series in the Newark Evening News showed that the system had not worked. The city had sent seven cases to the FBI, which had closed five after finding no basis for federal action. A Washington spokesman and the U.S. Attorney for the Newark area emphasized that the Justice Department was concerned only with federal offenses and could not make judgments on whether police conduct in a case was entirely proper. Both the FBI and the Essex county prosecutor said that no special attention was given to Newark cases, no separate records were kept, and no reports were sent to the city or the complainants. (NEN, "Complaints Heard under Novel Plan," 12/13/66)

The third round on the civilian review board was short. The issue re-emerged on February 10, 1968 as a recommendation contained in the report of the Governor's riot commission. The commission had received a great deal of eye witness testimony from citizens stating they saw police officers beat black prisoners. Eight months later when the report came out there were other dominant issues -- political ascendancy for black leaders, political survival for Addonizio, adequate salaries for police officers -- so that no one gave high priority to a review board. The only reason that it re-emerged as an issue is that Mayor Addonizio had adopted a superficially cooperative approach to all the commission's recommendations. The Mayor announced that he was studying the possibility of naming a civilian review board; the PBA protested this shifted position and demonstrated in front of City Hall. (NYT, 2/15/68, 1) A review board was opposed even by the highest ranking black officer, Captain Williams, who had just been appointed commander of the precinct in the Central Ward on the strength of the commission's recommendations. The review board issue was again laid to rest when the corporation counsel

recommended the creation of an official ombudsman (NYT, 4/28/68, 44)
That solution, too died.

The three episodes illustrate the political approach that Mayor Addonizio took to decision making. The length of time he took in each instance before coming up with an alternative depended upon the strength of opposing forces. The idea of a civilian review board as the solution to the problem of police brutality arrived in Newark as an example of the confluence approach -- the streams of problems and the streams of solutions come together in particular ways depending upon timing and terrain. The double reason why the 1963 episode was low keyed is that no police abuses had appeared in the press recently and that the militant groups had not yet gained strength. In 1965 the issue came back to life over an incident where the quick reinstatement of the officer involved showed a tremendous unwillingness of the department to conduct a thorough and fair investigation. Again, in 1968, the timing of the issue was extraneous to local events and so the issue did not rally support.

Thus, Police Director Spina successfully avoided any outside influence on the central issue of policing in the 1960s -- police abuse of citizens. Around the periphery he performed a series of conjuror's tricks to dazzle the public with the department's fine community relations.

Police programs, perhaps more than in most fields, depend for their meaning on the nature of the organization which runs them. Each of the programs listed below would add to the understanding between officers and citizens if adopted by a department where officers and citizens basically respected each other. Absent this respect, the programs have very little impact on what police-citizen relations is about, on what police office and citizens do to each other every time they meet.

The list below covering Addonizio's first term is a reorganization,

with a few additions, of a list published in December, 1966 in the Newark Evening News. (NEN, 12/12 and 12/13/66)

To Change the Attitude and Behavior of Officers

Community relations training project of 150 officers and 150 citizens, financed by the Justice Department, first in the country.

Sixty officers awarded college scholarships, funded by the city and businesses. Thirty-five officers currently attending college courses.

Human relations, an 18-hour course by the N J. Civil Rights Division. Training taken by more than 900 officers. Begun in 1961, it was the first in the state.

Recruits received 12 hours of training in human relations.

Course in police practices and human relations given to 90 housing project guards and special police officers. Began in 1966.

Increased participation by police department members in meetings by the Human Rights Commission, the National Conference of Christians and Jews, and various civic groups.

Departmental rules revised to forbid ethnic slurs.

To Resolve Police Community Problems

Community relations squad, headed by a captain and staffed by lieutenants at each precinct worked to resolve problems. Begun in March 1966 after passage of a city ordinance creating it.

Part-time bureau of 30 officers worked behind the scenes to avert disorder. Established in July 1963.

Police Director held an open house one evening a week to hear whatever problems people wanted to bring him. Began when he took office.

To Increase Citizen Understanding of Police Work

Clergymen and other community leaders have ridden in patrol cars. Started in 1964 and occurs irregularly

Law school students have ridden in patrol cars started in 1965.

To Integrate the Department

Assignment of black and white officers to work together as partners, a new practice in 1962.

Promoted more black officers to detective and supervisory positions.

Attempts through churches and civic groups to recruit more black officers, not successful.

Cadet program for 45 young men, mostly black, to assist officers with clerical and traffic duties. Funded through the Neighborhood Youth Corps.

To Provide Friendly Contacts with Children

Cooperation with neighborhood groups in two summer play street programs.

Expansion of the Police Athletic League.

Creation of the Junior Crime Fighters.

Creation of precinct Scout Troups.

To Investigate Charges of Police Misconduct

Brutality cases sent to the FBI.

Complaints of minor abuse handled by the Police Director and the Newark Human Rights Commission.

The three problems remained. One, incidents continued to recur from time to time in which officers shot those who fled and beat those they arrested. Two, the department made superficial investigations and exonerated the officers involved. Three, many law abiding people feared the police.

The 1967 Riots as a Watershed

On the night of Wednesday, July 12th, police officers beat a taxi driver they had arrested, sparking a five-day riot in the Central and South Wards. Looting was extensive, later estimated to total \$8,020,310 including damaged goods. Relatively little damage was done to buildings, with fire and vandalism together accounting for \$1,708,240 in damage. (New Jersey Governor's Commission, 1968, 125.) The Newark Police Department counted 79 sniping incidents. (United States, 1968, 37) At Mayor Addonizio's request about 600 State Troopers and over 5,000 National Guardsmen began entering Newark early Friday. They were unprepared to maintain order, lacked radio communication with each other and with the police, and engaged in indiscriminate shooting. One example: at 6.00 P.M. on Saturday two columns of state troopers and national guardsmen were directing mass fire into Hayes Homes housing Project in response to what they believed to be snipers, killing a woman in her own apartment.

Another example: between one and four o'clock on Sunday morning some state troopers and national guardsmen went around shooting into stores which had "Soul Brother" written on the windows. (New Jersey, 1968, 120-123) State Police fired an estimated 3,000 rounds of ammunition and National Guardsmen, 10,000. No estimate has been made of the shots fired by Newark Police. Twenty three people were fatally shot, (New Jersey, Governor's Commission, 1968, 135 and 138-9)

The city leadership determined to prevent a recurrence of rioting but, failing that, to prevent loss of life. The assassination of Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. in April 1968 set off widespread rioting and burning. A quick series of decisions reduced the likelihood of deaths. Addonezio met all night on April 5th with black leaders in the heart of the black ward. They hammered out a plan for young black people to go out on community patrols from the network of offices which the United Urban Corporation had established all over the city in channeling federal funds for the poverty programs. Police officers more than doubled their street presence through working twelve hour shifts, but kept a low profile. State troopers, who had been responsible for most of the deaths in 1967, were not called out. The policy succeeded in that no one was killed in this riot of several days' duration.

The scarring experience of the riots gave impetus to the transition of leadership from an older generation who had accepted the places permitted them by white power holder to young, militant black leaders whom drew their support directly from black people. In 1966 a second Negro, Calvin West, had been elected to the city council, also with the blessing of Addonizio. They appeared on a documentary "New Jersey Illustrated", asserting that "Black Power doesn't mean a thing." In 1969, however, the black people in the South Ward organized a recall election against Lee Bernstein, a slum landlord, and replaced him with a black minister, Horace Sharper. In November 1969, a broad spectrum of minority groups united to hold a convention open only to blacks and Puerto Ricans. They endorsed Kenneth Gibson for mayor, a slate of nine delegates for city council and initiated a massive voter registration drive. (NEN, "Non Whites to Convene to Pick Newark Candidates", 11/9/69)

On the white side, the riots brought forth a vigilante as leader. Anthony Imperiale, a former marine and black belt in karate, organized the North Ward Citizen's Committee to patrol nightly to keep black people out of the neighborhood. His simplistic explanations that the riots were communist inspired were what his followers wanted to hear. Within a year he had 200 dues paying members, claimed thousands of enthusiastic followers, and claimed to field 10 radio patrol cars a night and 17 on weekends. The
A

young men in fatigues who drove them went to police calls and stopped black people on the streets. (Goldberger, 1968) Imperiale appealed to a segment of Newark residents who wanted to fight back against urban decay and saw this fight as one against black people who committed crimes and lowered standards. Imperiale won election to the city council in 1968 where he vociferously presented his views. In 1970 he placed a strong third in a seven way race for mayor.

The riot gave impetus to long term social and demographic changes detrimental to the city. The riot frightened many middle-class white people into fleeing the city. The exodus was most rapid from the Weequahic section of the South Ward where looting and fires had frightened a transitional neighborhood. Jewish people fled, leaving behind a synagogue they had completed the year before. The census takes snapshots of an area ten years apart, 1960 -- 70% white, 1970 -- 80% black. Estimates are that most of the change occurred after the riots.

The riots confirmed for suburbanites their worst suspicions about Newark, described here by a key member of Addonizio's administration.

The riot was a disaster which affects the city even now, 12 years later. For instance, ever since the riots, it's hard for health centers in the city to attract suburbanites regardless of how good the care. More than one person has told me that he never set foot in Newark again after the riots.

During the riot we were in our own world of combat and confrontation without the time for the idea that the country was looking on. It never occurred to us then that 6,000,000 people in New Jersey and the millions in the rest of the country were forming a lasting image of Newark.

Today, it is as if Newark were on another planet. Many people look on Newark as if everyone black had participated in the riots, and that these black people are waiting today to kill anyone who ventures into Newark. What a tragedy.

Prudential, the leading insurance company, recognized immediately the devastating psychological impact of the riots. Two weeks after the riots Prudential committed an \$18,000,000 mortgage for the \$24,000,000 Gateway redevelopment project adjacent to Pennsylvania Railroad Station, (New York Times, 8/2/67, 56)

Blue ribbon commissions to investigate the causes and to recommend a course of action were immediately created by Trenton and Washington. The Governor's commission also covered Plainfield and Englewood, while the national commission covered thirty-eight cities where riots occurred in 1967 with special attention to Detroit and Newark. The New Jersey commission published first, realizing that it was in a race for attention with the national commission (Olson, 1971, 116-119). Some of the Governor's commission's recommendations for correcting the social ills of Newark were sweeping: the state should take over Newark's public schools, unions should stop all discrimination; the municipal courts should be abolished. These recommendations were ignored. About one-fourth of the recommendations were acted upon, mostly minor ones, such as placing a black captain in charge of the precinct in the Central Ward. The one recommendation which attracted most attention and which was carried out most thoroughly was peripheral to the riots. This was the call for 'a special grand jury to investigate allegations of corruption in Newark' since there is "a widespread belief that Newark's government is corrupt" (New Jersey, 1968, 20-21, 162.

Diminished Concern over Crime by the Mayor and the Police Director

The primary reason why the Police Director and the Mayor were doing less about crime after 1967 when the need was greater can be summed in a phrase, "the ruler's imperative" (Wriggins, 1961). The imperative is to survive. In 1965 Spina had easily survived a direct demand by CORE, stemming from the police brutality controversy, that the Mayor fire him.

(NEN, "Plea to Oust Spina Rejected by Mayor", 12/11/65 and Star Ledger, "Spina... Jeers Turn to Cheers", 2/6/66) the 1966 election Addonizio had outdistanced, Carlin, his major contender, but out of nowhere a black engineer named Kenneth Gibson who worked for the city drew enough votes to deny Addonizio the 50% he needed to avoid a run-off election. Addonizio was shocked, and according to a close aide it shook the Mayor's confidence in his ability to deal with the black community. Some of his closest political allies in the Central Ward, Timothy Stall and Eulis Ward told him that it would be difficult to stand up for a white candidate in another campaign. Looking at the election blow, the aide saw it affecting a whole range of the Mayor's decisions. (Interview, 1/24/80)

After the riots the pressures working against the mayor and police director greatly intensified. Spina's was the first indictment stemming from the investigations launched on the recommendation of the Governor's riot study. At that time he was also threatened with assassination. The Mayor stood by Spina and did not even request that he take a leave of absence during his trial. One of the specific charges against Spina was that in response to pressure he had set up a gambling investigation squad under the direction of John Redden, an honest commander, and then summarily disbanded it. The judge dismissed the case for lack of evidence after hearing the prosecution (NN, 1/26 and 10/28/68). In November 1968 when 75% of the police officers and firemen went out on a sick call over a pay dispute, Addonizio's aides urged him to dump Spina, whose recent acquittal had not cleared his name. In 1969 Spina was again the target of a grand jury presentment that called for his dismissal (NYT, 1/11/69, 94:2). To the end, Addonizio consistently treated Spina with respect, although the Mayor's practice was to ride rough shod over his other department heads (A close aide to the Mayor, 1/24/80). When the 1970 election campaign got underway, one of Gibson's few precise promises was to fire Spina.

In these circumstances the city's initiatives against crime were primarily confluence decisions based on the work of a member of the Mayor's staff who became adept at criminal justice planning and drafted many sound projects. Some of them were funded in the last two years of Mayor Addonizio's term and many more were implemented under Mayor Gibson. In 1968 the department created a federally funded downtown squad to meet the rising problems of purse snatching. During its first fifteen months of operation the squad made 887 arrests for a variety of crimes Newark Police Department, Annual Report, 1969). The Tactical Unit came into existence in 1969, also

with federal funds. Spina appointed a heavy portion of Italians to this special unit, as he had over the years to other special assignments. This later had serious consequences for the next police director's ability to control the men in a showdown between Imperiale and Baraka.

The City Council's Initiatives against Crime

During the Addonizio years the City Council was more supportive of the Mayor than at any time before or since. The fact that the Mayor supported the policies^{of} his Police Director left little room for the City Council to make policy. There is one issue they became embroiled in that had great symbolic meaning -- should the police use dogs?

At a stormy meeting in City Hall on September 8, 1967, shortly after the riots, the City Council debated whether to vote a new allocation of \$220,000 for the police department which would cover heavy equipment and a canine corps. (NEN, 9/9/67) Ten days later, Director Spina repeated his need for police dogs and at their next meeting the city council passed the measure. (NEN, 9/18/67) The United Community Corporation, Newark's anti-poverty agency, charged that the decision would exacerbate the tense racial situation. (New York Times, 9/23/67, 14) At their next meeting the City Council again reversed itself, refusing to allow dogs on even a trial basis. (New York Times, 10/5/67, 24) The release of the Governor's Commission report on the riots added strong voice to the opposition. (New Jersey, 1968, 164)

The proposal to provide the Police Department with a canine corps should be abandoned on the ground that the technical benefits such a corps might yield are far outweighed by the hostile response this proposal has evoked in a large sector of the community.

On April 3, 1968 the City Council banned the canine corps. (NEN, 4/4/68) Its

ghost lingered. In March 1975 the police department barred all dogs from precinct stations lest their presence give rise to rumors that the department was using dogs. (Star Ledger, 3/6/75)

Governmental Responses to Citizen Responses to Crime

A new level of response to crime problems occurred after the 1967 riots brought forward a vigilante leader, Anthony Imperiale, and brought more followers to the militant black leader, Imamu Baraka. The whole atmosphere of violence, and the threat of violence was one which Newark had not experienced before or since. On both sides young men trooped about wearing uniforms and carrying weapons. Imperiale's following was explicitly concerned with keeping crime out of the North Ward. Nightly the North Ward Citizen's Committee sent out more patrols in their area than the police department. Imperiale's followers also picketed meetings of groups opposed to them.

Governor Hughes took a dim view. He considered the North Ward Committee to be similar to Nazi groups in Germany of the early 1930s. The Governor asked Imperiale to disband his group but he refused. The Governor then obtained legislation making it illegal to belong to an organization "with two or more persons who assemble as a paramilitary or parapolice organization" (Goldberger, 1968). However, Imperiale thwarted the Governor's intentions by transforming his following into an ambulance corps which continued to ride around on patrol.

The End of Addonizio's Term

Newark's municipal life stood in disarray by the last year of Addonizio's term. Police officers of one precinct went out on a brief wildcat strike and firemen throughout the city engaged in a brief strike in

July 1969 (NYT 7/4/69, 25:6, 7/11/69, 37:8; 7/12/69, 1:2, and 7/12/69, 33:1). The Labor Department withdrew its poverty program on the grounds of fiscal mismanagement, and a grand jury found that Addonizio and Spina had used the program as a "vehicle of political influence" (NYT, 7/30/69, 24:1). The school system was in shambles, marked by a sixteen day teachers' strike in February, 1970. Garbage removal was unsatisfactory and abandoned cars were abundant. The long term problems continued to grow more intense: housing stock deteriorated, infant mortality rose, industries closed.

Addonizio ended his term of office ignominiously. Separate county and then federal investigations led to the resignation of the Chief Magistrate of the Municipal Court and the Corporation Counsel. In December 1969 U.S. Attorney Frederick Lacey subpoenaed Addonizio and eight councilmen to appear before the federal grand jury which was probing organized crime and official corruption in New Jersey (NYT, 12/8/69, 1:4). When Addonizio refused to testify on the basis of his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination, the New Jersey Attorney General considered invoking a state law to remove him from office. Indicted on December 17th for extortion involving firms doing business with the city and for income tax evasion, Addonizio pleaded not guilty. Among the five non-officials indicted was Anthony (Tony Boy) Bolardo, a key Mafia figure.

On election day, his trial still in the future, Addonizio polled a solid second place. He failed in his legal maneuvers to have the charges dismissed, and so the trial of the Mayor, and his associates began on June 2nd, at the midst of the runoff campaign.

The anomaly continued for two weeks; Addonizio on trial by day and on the campaign trail by night. Thus, he closed his turbulent eight years as Mayor. The trial closed with his conviction for conspiring to extort

more than \$1.4 million and actually extorting \$253,000 since 1965 from contractors doing business with the city (Olson, 1971, 290). He was sentenced to 10 years in prison.

The Addonizio Period in Retrospect

During the 1960s the issue of crime grew from one among many to prominence as the incidence of serious street crimes continued to rise. The city's policies in response to crime were developed by the Police Director, fully supported by the Mayor. The fact that the City Council did not participate in decisions on crime policy or police policy was unique in Newark's recent history. The unimpeded cooperation of Police Director and Mayor in making crime policy did not, however, produce policies which were effective. As discussed in Chapter 1 the objective facts of Newark's crime patterns and the rudimentary state of the art of crime reduction both have bearing on the leadership's lack of success. These considerations aside, the conclusion drawn here is that the reliance of the Mayor and Police Director on a political approach to decision making produced ineffective policies.

As defined earlier, a political decision is one taken in order to satisfy powerful people. Since the Mayor maintained excellent working relations with the City Council and kept them from involvement in administration, councilmen were not the powerful people whose approbation he sought. The voters, once every four years, were the powerful who needed to be satisfied. However, fundamental public ignorance of the nature of crime problems and of what police can reasonably be expected to do about crime put the Mayor and the Police Director in an automatic losing situation. Incumbents are invariably hurt by a crime issue. Since the occurrence of even a few crimes is too many, the incumbents can never claim untarnished success. In fact, if sound policies result in substantial crime reduction, the incumbents have nothing to point to. How can they perform a ribbon

cutting ceremony for an absence of crime?

The need of incumbents for something to display proudly, prompts them to use the Crime Index, the very ammunition which is as useful to their opponents as if it had been made to order. The Index, is completely useless as a performance measure. The only large scale short term change in the Index which can be predicted with regularity is that a reform police administration will boost it. Newspaper editors and reporters, governors, mayors, and councilmen look to the Index as a rating of performance. There may be an irony here in that apparently most voters do not know of the Index but rather hold still vaguer notions that "crime is up". Thus, the four year election cycle in Newark appears to have produced a dip in the Index as the consistent response to crime.

Chapter 7

PERVASIVE FEAR OF CRIME, 1970-76

A bitter, racially divisive run-off campaign of 1970 marked the election of Newark's first black mayor. Addonizio accused Gibson of being part of a "raw and violent conspiracy to turn this city over to LeRoi Jones and his extremist followers" (Newark Evening News 6/4/70). Addonizio proclaimed Gibson and Jones as a 'dangerous pair of characters who will bring chaos to the Newark public school system, also to the urban renewal program and to the police department' (Newark Evening News 6/5/70). He called Gibson 'one of the most radical individuals I have ever seen in politics...a wild desperate man.' (Newark Evening News 6/10/70). Police Director Spina described the election as a 'black versus white situation.. This is no longer a political battle but a battle of survival.' (Newark Evening News 6/8/70). One inflammatory prediction made by the deputy mayor was not repudiated by Addonizio until three weeks later, '[if Addonizio does not win] blood will run in the streets.' (Newark Evening News "Mayor Disavows Perkins' Remark" 5/31/70). Toward the end of the campaign threats became more immediate.

In the last week the campaign turned particularly ugly. Addonizio supporters picketed the homes of Newark's two Congressional representatives to force them to endorse their man. Gibson announced that he had received bomb threats and asked for police protection. (New York Times 6/9/70, 30:3 and 6/10/70, 50:3). A black minister supporting Addonizio was the target of a shot gun blast at his home, which Gibson claimed as a hoax staged by Addonizio supporters in an attempt to discredit Gibson. In the same vein, Gibson also claimed that the young black men who threatened to break up some of Addonizio's campaign appearances were a 'black noon squad' hired by

Addonizio. (New York Times 6/10/70, 50:3 and 6/11/70, 48:1) Rumors in the white community prophesied that a Gibson victory would result in rioting similar to 1967. Gibson warned that an Addonizio victory could leave the city in racial shambles. (New York Times 6/13/70, 43:5 and 6/14/70, 77:1)

Generally, Gibson tried to steer the campaign discussion away from racial issues while by his campaign actions he showed his intense concern for the black community. Gibson repeatedly stressed that he was not running to be a black mayor but a mayor of all the people. He kept pointing to the miserable city services and proclaiming that the city needed a new administration. Gibson tirelessly campaigned in black neighborhoods where his supporters had mounted an intensive and prolonged voter registration drive. The flavor of people's response to Gibson's campaign was captured by Douglas Eldridge, a reporter who had covered the civil rights movement for a decade. (Newark Evening News, 6/17/70, 11)

[Before the election] he was already a hero to the city's black masses. Parents held up children to point out Gibson as he passed. Young men came out of taverns to take pictures of each other shaking hands with Gibson. And many hosts at house parties greeted him respectfully as "Mr. Mayor" or "Your Honor". Never in Newark's history had so many black people--especially young ones--banded together with white allies to work for a change within the political system.

Great enthusiasm poured forth at Gibson's election victory of 55,000 votes to Addonizio's 43,000. There was immense symbolic importance to this victory of black man over a corrupt regime. For black people, Newark government instantly became their government.

This symbolic satisfaction should not be discounted as any less powerful than material satisfactions. A central part of the black experience in America through the 1940s was that black men did not give orders to white men. Historically, segregation and occupations typically filled by black men gave them no opportunity to have white subordinates. When segregation was breached white people in traditional areas invented elaborate arrangements

by which white people would not be in positions to take orders directly from black people. In Newark most black residents were only one generation away from the South, where the tradition of black subordination was not greatly eroded before the 1960s.

Struggle to achieve black power was the response of a younger generation to the subordination of their parents and forefathers. In Newark the militants worked in uneasy alliance with the moderate Gibson after he surprised everyone in 1966 by a last minute campaign which captured 16,000 votes to Carlin's 18,000 and Addonizio's 45,000. His 1970 election victory was not due to white men giving the nod to their black man. It was due to the efforts of a Newark based movement led by black people who had grown up in Newark. First, in November 1969 a Black and Puerto Rican convention, at which white people had no vote, endorsed Gibson and nine black or Puerto Rican candidates for all City Council seats. Second, as the result of a registration drive the number of black voters greatly increased. Third, the support of Imamu Baraka eliminated the threat of a black candidate to the left of Gibson, and he far outdistanced the two other moderate black candidates in the seven-way general election. Fourth, Gibson concentrated his campaign in the black area even during the run off and rejected advice to disown Baraka in order to attract white votes. As the result of this campaign Gibson won virtually all of the black and Puerto Rican votes and about 15% of the white votes. Thus, he became Mayor not beholden to the county Democratic party, organized crime, or any other white men.

Gibson took office in an atmosphere of enthusiastic belief by his supporters that his leadership would overcome the ills suffered most severely by the poor black people of Newark. The turmoil of city politics continued, but the anger was no longer vented on the Mayor. Both the City

Council meetings and the School Board meetings presented targets at which various racial and political groups directed their anger. Rarely did these meetings go smoothly, without the rise of tempers, shouting matches, uproar and confusion, despite the presence of police officers from the community relations unit (Newark Police Department, Annual Reports, 1970-74).

Crime Problems

We turn first to the crime problems which faced the new black administration during the 1970s. We then will take up fear of crime, which became so pronounced that it had far reaching consequences on economic and social life in the city. The following section will describe how these problems became issues forced upon the attention of the city government.

The upward trend of homicide from the 1960s continued into the 1970s, peaking in 1973 at 42 deaths per 100,000 people -- over four times as high as the national average of 9.4. Among the fifty largest American cities Newark's homicide rate was exceeded only by Atlanta, Detroit and Cleveland. Newark's homicide rate averaged 36 during 1970-78, far above the average rate of 20 set during the previous eight years. Most of these deaths took place between acquaintances who were black, and knives were the most common murder weapon. (Newark Police Department homicide summaries for 1974) This high number of murders between acquaintances continued to be regarded as private matters and the pattern as a fact of life. Elsewhere during the 1970s some police departments with the assistance of LEAA began to view homicides between family members as the final act in a long series of domestic disputes which were threatening to the safety of officers who intervene. The domestic crisis intervention program aimed at having police officers defuse immediate disputes and refer them to appropriate social agencies in order to


interrupt cycles of conflict leading toward serious injury. Police Director Redoen judged early that such a program would be valuable in Newark but felt that he could not spare the manpower to provide the extensive required training. The fact was that all inservice training had been halted after the riots in order to avoid taking manpower from the street.

Muggings, armed robberies of stores, residential and commercial burglaries continued to occur frequently and to be regarded as serious problems which were within the power of police to ameliorate. It is not possible to identify whether the incidence of robbery and burglary became more frequent as the 1970s progressed or whether they reached a plateau and declined somewhat.

Arson became very frequent in Newark after the riots sparked by the murder of Martin Luther King, Jr. Back in 1964 the fire department arson squad had investigated 520 fires and found 110 to be arson or started in suspicious circumstances. In 1969 the squad investigated 1,217, finding 804 to be arson or with suspicious circumstances. From 1964 through 1967 the number of reported fires in abandoned buildings had averaged 144 per year, then jumped to 436 in 1968, and reached a high of 1,135 in 1971. Table 7-1 shows the swift climb during the 1960s, the slowed climb during the early 1970s and the high plateau maintained during Gibson's second term of four different measures of fire problems. The table clearly shows how false alarms continued to rise as a proportion of total fire alarms. Sending false alarms via corner call boxes is a species of anti-social behavior particularly attractive to young boys.

Abandoned buildings were a favorite target for arson. Table 7-2 shows on an expanded scale the annual number of all fires in abandoned buildings and the total number of arsons and suspicious fires. For residents of decaying


THE RISE OF FIRES IN NEWARK, 1948-1976



Source: Newark Fire Department, annual reports and arson squad summary sheet.
 Since the total number of alarms includes the number of false alarms, the number of fires is the distance between the top solid line and the dashed line.

Table 7-2

ARSON OR SUSPICIOUS FIRES AND FIRES IN
ABANDONED BUILDINGS, 1948-78



Source: Newark Fire Department Annual reports and arson squad summary sheet.
In some years there was no report on the number of arsons.

neighborhoods the abandoned building next door poses a real threat that any fire there might also ignite one's own home.

By 1970 heroin addiction had reached epidemic proportions. In the absence of consistent estimates of how many heroin addicts there were, and in the absence of a time series of the number of deaths due to heroin overdose, the isolated facts are that there were 42 reported deaths in 1971 due to heroin and other narcotics and 8 due to overdoses of barbituates. (Newark Evening News "Drug Toll Increasing in Essex", 4/18/72) Some notion of the magnitude of Newark's problem comes from a study in Boston finding that this city twice the size of Newark averaged 12 heroin deaths a year in the mid 1970s. (Krantz, et.al. 1979, 275)

Fear of Crime

on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice
Ever since the President's Commission, in 1967, fear of crime has been recognized as a problem separate from crime itself. A large survey conducted in Newark in 1972 showed that 50% of white residents and 64% of black residents felt unsafe or very unsafe when out alone at night in their own neighborhoods. A comparison with other cities is shown in Table 7-3.

The strong feeling of being very unsafe was held by 41% of black people interviewed while only 9% felt very safe. Black Newark residents felt less safe than black residents of the seven other cities that were studied. White residents of Newark did not feel as unsafe as black residents, and likewise felt less safe than white residents in any of the seven other cities studied.

An individual's sense of safety from criminal attack may be viewed as a balance between his estimation of the presence of attackers and his estimation of the presence of protection. People who do not feel safe when out at night refer to many dangerous people out on the streets. (Guyot, 1979) The high rates of predatory crimes committed in the black neighborhoods of Newark

Table 7-3

PERSONAL FEELING OF LACK OF SAFETY WHEN OUT ALONE IN
OWN NEIGHBORHOOD AT NIGHT, 1972

<u>Feeling</u>	<u>Newark Black Residents</u>	<u>Newark White Residents</u>	<u>Eight City Average for White Residents</u>
Very Unsafe	41	26	20
Somewhat Unsafe	23	24	20
Reasonably Safe	27	35	39
Very Safe	9	15	21
Don't Know	0	1	1

Source: Garofalo, 1977, pp. 58, 252 and 253. The eight city average includes all eight cities which received High Impact Anti-Crime grants: Atlanta, Baltimore, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Portland and St. Louis. Garofalo, James (1977) Public Opinion About Crime: The Attitudes of Victims and Nonvictims in Selected Cities. Washington: LEAA, NCJISS.

form a basis in reality upon which such fears play. Further, in the early 1970s Newark suffered some bizarre and horrible crimes which could feed the fearful imagination.

People who feel safe remark on the presence of protection. In a survey of a small Eastern city, the most frequently mentioned source of protection was neighbors. (Guyot, 1979) In a three city study of public housing projects, a resident's estimate that neighbors would not intervene in suspicious circumstances or when a crime is being committed was correlated with his fear of being attacked and fear of his apartment being burglarized. (Newman, 1980) In Newark, however, many people do not believe their neighbors would help protect them. A survey of a cross section of Newark residents in 1977 found a range of feelings, from 58% of the residents who believed that neighbors would be very likely to call the police for a robbery in progress, down to 32% who expected calls for a suspicious stranger at night. (Guyot, 1977)

(Table 7-4 insert here.)

Fear has the power to empty a city's streets. Indeed, the streets of downtown Newark and all neighborhoods except Ironbound have been empty at dusk for the last decade. In the 1972 survey, 64% of the women and 45% of the men reported that they have limited or changed their activities in the past few years because of crime. (Garofalo, 1977, 258) These figures are about ten percentage points higher than the averages for the eight cities and thus do not convey the extensive and deep rooted fear of crime. Fear of crime has made some people change their habits so drastically that they are virtual prisoners in their homes. (Interviewer reports, 1977 survey) They have good reason to be afraid. Over one fourth of the residents have witnessed a crime within the last year. In the Central Ward about 35% have watched while a crime was committed. Only about 10% of the watchers called the police and over half believed no one called the police. (Guyot, 1977, 5-6)

Table 7-4

CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN NEWARK RESIDENTS THINK THEIR
NEIGHBORS WILL CALL THE POLICE, 1977

	Robbery at gun point	Breaking into an apartment or house	Kids smashing the window of a new car	Suspicious stranger at night
Very likely	58%	58%	40%	32%
Would intervene directly	10	0	5	1
Somewhat likely	24	24	28	23
Not likely	12	13	21	37
Don't Know	6	5	6	8
	100%	100%	100%	101%

n = 499

Source: Dorothy Guyot (1977)

"Views of Newark Resident Before the Start of the Police Accountability Project." an interim report on the survey of attitudes toward police service. Newark: Rutgers School of Justice, mimeographed.

People who live in Newark adapt to living in fearful surroundings and cope with the danger and the fear. In the crime ridden Central and South Wards most of these fearful people are poor and black. The choice of moving out of Newark is not an open choice due to their poverty and discrimination in housing. Apparently for many people street crimes are a fact of life, rather than a problem which they demand be solved.

Suburbanites have also grown more fearful and changed their activities to avoid going into Newark. In 1972 the Federal Executive Board conducted a study to determine why the Newark regional offices were experiencing a critical shortage of secretaries and other employees. The study found cases of women who had accepted positions but found that their husbands or parents would not let them work in Newark. A common reply to recruitment queries was 'Yes, I'm interested in working for the federal government but not in Newark.' Current employees were fearful to walk the few blocks to the train station. (Star Ledger 11/26/72, 28)

The large insurance companies were experiencing the same problems in keeping a clerical and secretarial work force. Prudential, for instance, which had since 1945 been following a policy of decentralizing to regional offices across the country, began in the early 1970s to decentralize its headquarters functions to the suburbs. (Interview with a Prudential executive, 6/80)

Newark continued to lose population during the 1970s. Where the population had been 382,000 in 1970, the 1980 census shows slightly over 329,000, a drop of 13% from 1970. Fewer families moved into Newark than in the 1960s, and the exodus was propelled by an across the board decline in city services, white prejudice against living next to black neighbors and fear of crime. The weight of each of these factors has not been separately assessed. The focus of this study on crime problems should not be taken as evidence that crime was the major factor driving people out

of town. A study of race problems would probably effectively demonstrate that racial prejudice drove people out of town. A study of the decline in municipal services would likewise raise questions of why anyone with choices would remain in town.

Crime as an issue

After the national declaration of the war on crime in the 1960s, in many people's minds concern about rising crime was tied to an opposition to the advances which black people were making. Frank Furstenberg (1971) was the first researcher to recognize that surveys on public attitudes toward crime were tapping two different perceptions. In making a reanalysis of the 1969 Harris poll from Baltimore that appeared in Life Magazine (Rosenthal), Furstenberg separated out concern about crime as a social and political issue from perception of the risk of becoming a victim. Furstenberg showed that the two dimensions are unrelated, that a person's assessment of his risk has no influence on the importance he attaches to crime as an issue. He found risk related to the perceived character of the neighborhood and to neighborhood rates of reported crime. Concern about crime was positively correlated with opposition to racial change.

Similar findings come from a careful study in Portland. (Schneider, 1978) The people, white and black, who live in the neighborhoods with the highest reported crime rates do not name crime as one of their prime concerns. They name unemployment, poor housing, poor street repair and garbage service as their concerns. By contrast, people who live in relatively crime free areas, name crime as a high concern.

Two public opinion polls in Newark, just prior to the 1970 and the 1974 elections found that crime was the most important issue for white residents. In 1974 black people also named crime as the most important issue, a rise from 1970 when they viewed housing as the most pressing municipal problem. (Kirball, 48-49) The table below shows the strong degree to which police protection and crime

Table 7-5
 PERCENTAGE OF NEWARK RESIDENTS IDENTIFYING MAJOR ISSUES
 FACING THE CITY, 1974

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Black Residents</u>	<u>White Residents</u>
Police protection and crime	27%	54%
Low income housing	25	8
Adequacy of welfare payments	21	14
Health care	14	8
Elementary education	11	18
Secondary education	8	14
Control of welfare payments	8	8
Recreation and parks	7	2
Fire protection	6	10
Street cleaning	6	6
Street maintenance	3	3
Garbage collection	3	3
Water and air pollution		
Don't know	<u>17</u>	<u>19</u>
Total	157%	174%

Source. Yatrakis (1980) citing the poll conducted for the Star Ledger by the Quayle Organization carried in the Star Ledger from 4/7 to 4/17/74.

were the most important problems for white people and now they were closely followed by housing and welfare for black people.

In the 1974 election campaign Imperiale seized upon the crime issue with more vigor than Gibson had in 1970. "I want to make sure that anyone can walk into the city and walk out safe." (Star Ledger, 1/17/74, 1:1) As the campaign drew toward a close, Imperiale became more vociferous.

In reality, Newark ranks first in the entire United States in the rate of vicious crime, according to the latest figures compiled by the FBI. (Star Ledger, "Imperiale assails mayor on crime claims", 4/23/74)

Imperiale lost the campaign, but many voters agreed with him when he challenged Mayor Gibson's campaign slogan, 'Continued Progress' with the remark, "You can't have 'continued progress' if you didn't have any progress to begin with." (Star Ledger, "Imperiale puts emphasis on city's 'survival'" 4/16/74)

Coping with Problems on Every Side

The context in which the city faced its crime problems has become more grim with the passing years as the trends which had been established in the 1950s and before continued their relentless downward course. The Gibson administration's efforts to cope with those problems are sketched here as background for a more detailed consideration of coping with crime.

The Long Honeymoon with the Voters

The turmoil, the rhetoric of impending disaster, came to an end. Black people expressed a great deal of good will toward Mayor Gibson giving him credit for being honest and well motivated. They did not demand quick results. A honeymoon period which is natural for any newly elected official, is naturally longer when an ethnic group has to fight against an entrenched system and great prejudice to get one of its members into the key leadership position. When he fails to exercise leadership, and the high hopes of the campaign are turned to dust, the natural reaction is apathy. Gus Henningburg, who was the co-leader of

Gibson's election campaign, reflected on Gibson's failure to make substantial improvements in the quality of life in Newark and on the larger dilemma of black people not holding a black mayor accountable. (Interview of Henningburg by Yatrakis 12/17/78)

When blacks are elected to office, the people around them become paranoid to any challenge, any criticism, any attack. If another black comes along who is a serious candidate, capable of running, the attack they make on him is that he is disunifying blacks. He can't run on the issues. He has to run [against the accusation that] he is messing around and splitting the black vote, and then somebody white is going to get elected.

The honeymoon between Mayor Gibson and the black residents of Newark lasted through the 1974 and the 1978 campaigns. No black candidates of consequence ran against him either year. As a result, the voter turnout resumed its decline, from which the 1970 election had been an exception. While the decline in the 1950s and 60s had been only somewhat faster than the decline in population, the decline in the 1970s was much faster, as shown in Table 7-6.

At the beginning of his administration Gibson set up offices throughout the city to receive complaints and to help people in their problems of getting service from the municipal ^{NOW} bureaucracy. These ACTION offices funded under a federal grant did not have much effect on city services.

The major efforts by community groups to improve living conditions have taken place apart from the Mayor's office. Since the 1967 riots there have been four. a successful plan pushed by church groups for apprentices in the construction industry, called the Newark plan; an unsuccessful attempt by Imam Baraka and his followers to build a housing and cultural center, Kawaida Towers, adjacent to the neighborhood of Anthony Imperiale; a successful rent strike by the tenant of the Stella Wright public housing project; and an unsuccessful attempt by church groups to establish a police accountability project.

Table 7-6

THE DECLINE IN TURNOUT FOR MAYORAL ELECTIONS

<u>Election</u>	<u>Voter Registration</u>	<u>Voter Turnout</u>	<u>Percentage of Voting Age Actually Voting</u>
1954 general		123	
1958 general		106	
1962 general	153	106	
1966 general	154	95	
1970 general	134	92	
1970 run-off	134	101	49%
1974 general	118	81	
1978 general	119	56	27%

Source: Computed from census estimates and voting records in the New Jersey Room of the Newark Public Library.

Number of voters is given in thousands.

Gibson's leadership style was to stay clear of issues and controversies wherever possible, not to commit the immense local prestige which he had on assuming office and the national prestige which he soon attained. Gibson was not publically criticized by any, except Baraka for his failure to assist projects aimed at bettering the conditions of poor black people.

The first march on City Hall by black residents took place on August 15, 1973. In sharp contrast to the frequent marches of black people on City Hall during Addonizio's second term, the streets were quiet for more than two years. Councilman Dennis Westbrook of the Central Ward led more than two hundred of his constituents in a march to City Hall to protest living conditions. To make their point dramatically some lugged bags of uncollected garbage with the intention of dumping them on the steps of City Hall. Officers were posted at City Hall to prevent the dumping. Fighting broke out between the demonstrators and the police officers. A black officer active in community relations was beaten by white officers. Afterwards black leaders wanted to know why neither the mayor nor the black Police Director was there to talk with the demonstrators. Gibson charged that Baraka was behind the demonstration for the purpose of embarrassing his administration. Baraka retorted with a threat of backing a different black candidate for Mayor. (New York Times 8/17/73, 35:3; 8/18/73, 55:1)

Mayor-Council Hostility

The City Council gave Gibson not one minute's honeymoon. The Council unanimously refused to confirm his appointment of John Redden, a deputy chief, as Police Director. The three black councilmen wanted a black Police Director and the white councilmen were aligned with the PBA in their opposition to Redden. Mayor Gibson faced them down by threatening to tell the huge crowd that was at the moment gathered for his inauguration. The Council buckled, and approved Redden by a 7 to 2 vote. (Corvin, 197, 111 and an interview with a top police administrator, 9,12/80) Gibson has had difficulty with his City Council during

all three terms, but his problems were most pronounced during his first term. Gibson's troubles were similar to Carlin's. Like him, Gibson did not consult with the Council and tried to keep to a minimum the information he gave them. The Council accumulated quite a backlog of unanswered written queries to the mayor. On the rarest occasions when he badly needed some legislation he met informally with Council members.

Gibson also consistently made his own decisions on non-civil service appointments, much to the chagrin of councilmen, who want to share in the patronage. Important differences in this regard between Carlin and Gibson are that Gibson used his power of appointment to build a basis of electoral support and he had much greater resources in the flow of federal funds. Gibson channeled all federal funds through the Mayor's Policy and Development Office, thus shielding thousands of positions from any influence of the Council. He had retained Donald Malafroste, Addonizio's top administrator for intergovernmental affairs, to develop the manpower office against the bitter complaints of black advisers who wanted nothing to do with the old regime.

Gibson also set up the Kenneth A. Gibson civic society, a fund raising organization modeled on those from the days of Commission Government. Department heads were expected to sell picnic and banquet tickets to their employees. Thus, Gibson had vastly more electoral resources than the councilmen, which fed their hostility. Often a majority of the Council united across racial lines against Gibson.

Racial considerations influenced the Council handling of many issues during Gibson's first term. Even the struggle to raise taxes became a racial

issue between Italians and blacks. Since Gibson had proposed the taxes on business, white owners of small businesses charged that he was trying to drive them out of town (Curvin, 9/79) with six white councilmen, Gibson faced an automatic opposition that particular efforts could overcome. One factor which somewhat blurred the racial cleavages in the Council was the fact that five council members had constituencies which had about equal numbers of black and white voters. They were the four members elected at large, only one of whom was black, and the representative from the West Ward. (Gwyn, 1974, 24-25) When Gibson ran for re-election, like Carlin, he did not form a slate of supportive councilmen and thus when black members were elected, Gibson could not count on their support. Finally in 1978, the proportions of black and white council members reached 5 to 4 and thus fairly closely reflected the black and white division of the city.

Gibson's Administration

Observers of Newark politics agree that Mayor Gibson is a pragmatic leader who lives one day at a time. His engineering background shows in the methodical way he analyzes problems as though when he thinks of a bridge he must think of every little part. Robert Curvin, who organized the Black and Puerto Rican Convention and then coordinated Gibson's election campaign, recounts this conversation.

A few days after Gibson was elected in 1970 we were just talking about what we thought was going to happen. I asked Elton Hill... a guy he grew up with, one of his best buddies,... "What do you think Gibson really wants to do more than anything? What do you think is his major objective? What would he like to accomplish that would leave his mark on Newark?" He said, "Well, Ken really would like to build a new city hall." (Curvin Interview 9/79)

Gibson's experiences in his first years in office further strengthened his passive approach. He reacted to crises rather than leading in bold directions. Not only did the mood of the City Council fluctuate from reluctant to intensely hostile, Gibson also faced a number of overwhelming problems

which exploded into crises: the fiscal plight included a hidden deficit of up to \$60,000,000 the deteriorating school system suffered a three month teachers' strike; the Kawaida Towers project became a racial struggle.

Gibson inherited a city administration less efficient than Addonizio had found it. Since the pool of executives who are skilled in municipal administration is heavily populated by white men, so Gibson's first cabinet of seven were white men, with the exception of his corporation counsel. Gibson particularly disappointed his followers by not appointing a black man as his Police Director. Gibson then recruited several department heads through a national search, obtaining some highly skilled administrators and specialists in their fields. The individuals recruited nationally were generally frustrated with the way the city conducted business and did not stay more than a few years. The business administrator left with a public blast at the Gibson administration. Gradually, by 1978 when Gibson began his third term most of his agency heads were black and from Newark. Observers of Newark politics see a pattern of Gibson's unwillingness to recruit and retain capable black administrators. Since the Mayor did not prod his department heads, lethargy prevailed except in rare pockets where a forceful administrator shaped his staff. When Gibson had been in office a little over a year the state task force on urban programs charged in its report that his administration was riddled with inefficiency, no show jobs, wasteful duplication, bad planning and a lack of leadership at every level. NYT11/13/71, 1:2)

Financial Woes

Fiscal problems influenced all other problems of municipal government. When Gibson arrived in the Mayor's office, he found that Addonizio had pulled a number of tricks in order to avoid raising taxes in an election year. He

had hidden \$21 million in school operating costs and the debt projected for the end of 1971 was \$60,000,000. (New York Times, 9 20 70, 1 and Carvin, 9/79)

Since both Trenton and Washington were under Republican administrations, Gibson did not get the assistance he needed. The state legislature, dominated by suburban counties did not appropriate funds, but did pass legislation permitting Newark to levy some minor new taxes. These stop-gap measures were not sufficient and so at the Mayor's request the City Council raised the property tax rate. The major change from 1967 was the rapid increase in the city's dependence upon state and federal governments. Chart 7-7 shows how these revenues grew from 5% of the city's budget to 48% in 1974. Since the city did not control the ebb and flow of these funds, the Mayor took a calculated risk in expanding the city payrolls while simultaneously reducing the property tax prior to the 1974 election. In 1975 the cutbacks in state and federal revenues rocked the city. Its major response was to layoff civil servants. Again in 1976 and again in 1978 the city was forced to layoff personnel. The sequence of layoffs in the police department had a devastating effect on the department's ability to perform.


Deterioration in Many Aspects of Life

The economic life of the city which had not been healthy since the 1920s, declined sharply in the 1970s. Manufacturing and service industries continued to move out of Newark, the labor force continued to shrink, and the numbers grew of young men who were neither at school nor at work. While Gibson immediately established a cordial relationship with the downtown business community, his administration did not make a concerted effort to attract new firms to the city or to prevent established ones from moving.

Chart 7-7

DEPENDENCY ON FEDERAL AND STATE AID
IN MILLIONS OF CONSTANT DOLLARS

1978 = 100



Source: New Jersey, Division of Local Government Services, Annual Reports. The state has produced a consistent time series which is calculated differently from the Census Bureau's figures.

The actual dollar expenditures are converted into 1978 dollars in order to eliminate effects of inflation.

Table 7-8 below showing unemployment underestimates the number of people out of work since the definition requires that the individual be actively looking for work. Many thousands of Newark residents have given up looking for work. Note that the city's rate of unemployment is consistently higher than the county's. They both peaked in 1975 and 1976, years of a national recession.

Children attending Newark schools were performing two years below grade level in 1970. In 1971 the city suffered the longest strike of public school teachers thus far in U.S. history. The issues were the typical bargaining issues but many different community groups including Baraka's involved themselves in order to break the union which they saw as a white power block despite the president's being black. The strike and the bizarre negotiations continued eleven full weeks. During the strike a group of teachers were waylaid and severely beaten, but none of the attackers were ever identified. In the end, the union and the board settled for a renewal of the old contract but great damage had been done to relations between the teachers and the community. (Curvin, 1979) By 1978 the performance of Newark school children was no better, two years or more below grade level. It was considered a fact of life that Newark high school graduates had not learned how to read and write well enough to hold down clerical jobs. (Interviews with a Prudential executive 6/80 and with two long time residents, 1/16/80.)

Neglect of the Puerto Rican Community

In 1970 the Puerto Ricans who composed seven percent of the city's population were generally poorer than the black people. The nomination of Gibson by the Black and Puerto Rican convention raised great hopes among Puerto Ricans as well as among black people. Gibson's appointment of a

Table 7-8

PERCENTAGE UNEMPLOYMENT IN LABOR FORCES OF NEWARK
AND ESSEX COUNTY DURING THE 1970s

Division of Planning and Research, Office of Labor Statistics

	<u>Newark</u>	<u>Essex County</u>
1970	8.4	5.7
1971	10.4	7.2
1972	10.6	7.3
1973	10.3	7.1
1974	11.6	8.0
1975	18.0	12.7
1976	18.2	12.8
1977	15.9	11.1
1978	12.1	8.4
1979	11.7	8.1
1980	13.9	9.7

Source: New Jersey Office of Labor Statistics, Division of Planning and Research

The figures for 1970 - 79 are annual averages. The 1980 figure is preliminary for July.

Puerto Rican as deputy mayor focused hopes, but his appointment was a token. Specific hopes for city employment, for better housing, for Spanish language services, were all dashed. The deep disappointment which grew over the years was expressed in 1974 by a Rutgers law school professor, Jose Rivera. He pointed to the similarity of the position of black people under Addonizio's administration to the position of Puerto Ricans under Gibson. (Human Rights Commission, 1976, 17)

The Worst American City

In January 1975 Newark received this title from an associate editor of Fortune writing in Harper's. (Louis, 1975) The article concluded,

The city of Newark stands without serious challenge as the worst of all [fifty large cities]. It ranked among the five worst cities in no fewer than nineteen of the twenty-four categories, and it was dead last in nine of them. Adding one, two or even three tables couldn't possibly jar Newark from last place and there is every reason to suppose that more comparisons would simply bury it deeper. Newark is a city that desperately needs help.

While social scientists differ on value of adding up arbitrarily selected indicators in order to arrive at a composite index of the quality of life, the article's conclusions confirmed nationally the image problem which Newark had long suffered locally. Such a simplification of reality misses the commitment which many people have to their city. Their efforts have created and maintained islands of excellence and beauty. The relationship between Newark's image as the worst American city and the reality of physical and social deterioration is similar to the relationship between fear of crime and the specific crime problems which people of Newark suffer. Both images have a strong basis in reality, and both emphasize only the bleak aspects of life and both make more difficult the tasks of transforming the bleakness.

Accomplishments of Gibson's Administrations

Given the overwhelming problems which Newark faced, Gibson did make some substantial accomplishments for the city. First, he kept racial tensions from breaking out into rioting on the scale experienced in 1967 and 1968. He was firmly committed to the rights of all factions to express their views freely. He personally built bridges between the black community and the downtown business community. His own moderate tone did much to moderate the strife which had built during the 1960s.

Second, he obtained a remarkable amount of federal money and state money. Without such massive subsidies, Newark would have been bankrupt in 1971.

Third, he greatly increased the number of black people employed by city government. Gibson supporters had looked at government jobs as an aspect of representative government and as benefits bestowed. Since black people had systematically been excluded from power the Gibson appointments at high levels and for routine jobs increased the degree that the ethnic composition of the government reflected the ethnic composition of the city. In this matter his actions were in the pattern set by Commission Government and revived by Addonizio, patronage distributed among one's ethnic group.

Fourth, under the Gibson administration deterioration stopped on some measures of quality of life. In the health field the city made the most progress. The statistics on infant mortality, fell somewhat from their rates which were three times the national average.

To achieve any of these improvements, Gibson needed and accepted millions in federal aid. His administration's efforts to make a dent in the crime problem, likewise relied heavily on federal funds.

Washington's Initiative: The Impact Program

Having sketched the nature of the crime problems facing the city during the 1970s and the host of other problems which competed for attention, we turn now to the responses. In this period the new source of funds and ideas was the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration created in 1968 which will be discussed first. Afterwards we will mention state programs and then responses carried out primarily through the police department. To achieve dramatic reductions in street crime, in January, 1972 the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration committed \$20,000,000 each to eight cities through the High Impact Anti Crime Program. Recall that Nixon had campaigned in 1968 on a law and order platform. The Impact program was a demonstration of his administration's commitment in the 'war on crime'. Twenty million to spend in two years was a huge sum for Newark. In 1971 the city had spent \$21,000,000 for police and the county had spent \$6,500,000 for jails. The city developed 27 projects through which the police department spent 55% of the funds, seven community groups in Newark shared 17%, other city agencies spent 1%, the Impact planning unit spent 6%. All the county and state agencies shared 14% of the funds. In 1975 when a national consulting firm evaluated the Impact program, it found that none of Newark's projects had yet been demonstrated effective. (Chelmsky, 1976, 322-323) By 1978 when the last of the federal funding was gone, many of the projects had also disappeared. The reasons for the failures in Newark lie in fundamental mismatch between the Impact program and Newark's needs.

The Impact program in Newark is an example of ineffective policies as the result of the confluence approach to decision making in which the stream of solutions dominated the stream of problems. That is, the solution which LEAA was willing to fund did not fit Newark's problems. After a struggle, Newark

accepted the funds on LEAA's terms. The analysis below focuses on how the solutions dominated the definition of the problems. Political considerations also entered into the decision making at all five levels of government involved here: Washington, the LEAA regional office located in New York, Trenton, Essex County, and Newark. On balance, the influence of politics on decision making further twisted the solutions away from a good fit with Newark's problems for reasons outlined in chapter 1. While little of the political tussling will be discussed below, we may note that the primary way in which political considerations influenced decisions was to favor short term dramatic projects over the long term upgrading of performance. The preference of every political unit for short term impact was counterproductive in dealing with the long term crime problems.

Initially Mayor Gibson and other city and state officials believed that the Impact program was a form of revenue-sharing. Gibson was quoted in an LEAA publication, "For the first time, the City of Newark will be able to decide what its needs are to fight crime without worrying if those needs fit into some specific federal guidelines." (Jordan, 11) The Nixon Administration had been discussing its relations with state and local governments as the "new federalism", a partnership in which Washington no longer imposed blanket directives. Thus, initially, there appeared to be a smooth confluence between Washington's decision to assist selected cities to reduce street crimes and Newark's needs to reduce street crimes and to obtain funds. The requirements did not initially appear onerous, that the money be spent in conformance with federal auditing standards and within two years. Each city would set up an Impact office to draft the city's plan detailing the projects to be funded, the plan would be approved by LEAA, the city would provide 20% matching funds, local agencies would carry out the projects and the local Impact office would evaluate them. Even the six stated national objectives appeared to be general enough to accommodate almost any local effort against crime.

1. to reduce the incidence of five serious crimes by 5% in two years and

by 20% in five years the murders, rapes, robberies aggravated assaults, and burglaries which are committed by strangers.

2. to demonstrate an integrated process of planning, implementation and evaluation.
3. to acquire new knowledge about innovative programs.
4. to improve agency coordination and increase public involvement.
5. to institutionalize effective programs in the eight impact cities.
6. to disseminate the new knowledge beyond the eight cities. (Chelimsky, 1976, 25-26)

The foolishness of using the numbers of crime incidents which appear in the Uniform Crime Reports as a measure of project success has been discussed in chapter 1. When the man who designed the Impact program, Martin Danziger, was later asked the basis for the goals of 5% and 20% crime reduction, he replied, "I just made them up. It sounded good." (Vorenberg, 1976)

. As a whole, LEAA's definition of the solution resulted in projects which were ill suited to Newark's needs. For LEAA, the first three objectives on the list were most important projects must directly aim at reducing target crimes, all projects must undergo elaborate evaluation, and projects should be innovative. The national objectives coupled with the requirement that Newark spend the funds quickly, worked against effective or lasting solutions. By three different authoritative definitions of needs, the criminal justice agencies', the Mayor's and the Police Director's, the twenty million dollars were ill-spent.

During the first three months of the Impact program representatives of city and county operating agencies formed five task forces to assess their needs. The report identified inadequacies over a broad range, including police information,

manpower allocation, and facilities, case screening and preparation, pretrial intervention, defense services, court processing, juvenile services, corrections facilities, and drug programs. (Jordan, 14-16) Most of these problems and needs were never addressed by the Impact program. The solutions to these problems required standard upgrading and could not pinpoint results in bringing down the rates of target crimes. Even the information collected by the task forces was little used by the Impact planning unit. (Jordan, 24)

Mayor Gibson set community involvement as the city's major approach to reducing crime when he selected Earl Phillips as the program director. Phillips, was a 38 year old black man who was President of the Essex County Urban League. He had been active for close to a decade in community relations work including police-community relations. Phillips had been Gibson's first choice for an entirely different new position of Newark Ombudsman, but when the City Council seemed unlikely to pass the enabling legislation, Gibson persuaded Phillips to head the Impact program. (Gwyn, 1974, 19-31 and Jordan, 1975, 19-20) Thus, the new director had had no experience in the criminal justice field nor in any government agency. He hired his staff without consulting with the criminal justice agencies. His plan dealt with the social causes of crime, proposing to spend \$36,000,000 of which \$12 million would be spent by community groups. (Jordan, 37-40) Only in 1977 did LEAA recognize the value of community crime prevention.

The political benefits of community involvement were not lost upon the Mayor. Gibson greatly increased city hiring during 1972 and 1973 particularly in non-civil service patronage positions. (Batraxis) The \$12,000,000 Phillips planned to spend through community groups would produce 1,500 jobs by the conservative estimate that 75% of the funds were for wages averaging \$6,000 per year (the rate at which housing guards were hired). These jobs could, of course, be filled without civil service restrictions. However, Phillips' approach to community involvement did not satisfy a major group of black

ministers headed by one who was the first black councilman not beholden to white political leaders. Phillips had not responded to their plan for linking church based citizens groups to the police precinct stations. The ministers charged that Phillips worked with only a small segment of the community. (Star Ledger, "Black Ministers Assail Phillips", 12/1/72)

It appears that the importance of churches as social centers in black neighborhoods of Newark required their involvement for an effective community crime reduction program. Given the great antipathy which had developed between many black people and many policemen, a church based effort to cooperate with the police was a sound idea, whatever the problems with the specifics.

Police Director Redden saw different priorities for coping with Newark's crime problems. He advocated basic management upgrading of the criminal justice agencies. (Interview with a top police administrator, 9/12/80)

However, in the early 1970s LEAA's touchstone was the innovative program. Redden considered innovative programs to be frills when the agencies lacked the essentials of sound management. Specifically, Redden looked at the kind of upgrading which had long been beyond the financial reach of the city -- a centralized police facility. Director Redden had inherited a dilapidated and decentralized physical plant. A 1942 study had criticized police headquarters as antiquated. (Bureau of Municipal Research, 1942, 142. By 1972 the same building still served as headquarters, supplemented by all or part of four other buildings for central functions and four precinct stations. The particular problems stemming from the physical plant which most concerned Redden were the inhuman jail conditions, the officer frustration from working in terrible facilities which he then was likely to vent upon citizens, and the inefficiency of separation into many buildings.

From the perspective of this study, the most damaging aspect of the Impact program was the insistence upon haste. The governmental ineptitude and corruption chronicled in the earlier chapters leads to a recommendation for any funding agency to proceed deliberately and with full public discussions. Unfortunately, public discussion was less informed after the Newark Evening News had folded due to a protracted strike in 1971. Since then the city has had only one daily newspaper, unstimulated by competition to ferret out mismanagement in City Hall. Specifically, hasty solutions for crime problems are inappropriate since the interlocking factors which have promoted crime are too complex and too little understood to yield when millions of dollars are thrown at them. The rise of crime rates in Newark to levels far above the national average had taken place slowly since the early 1950s. If Newark's crime problems are substantially reduced, the process will likewise take place slowly.

The haste served political needs to 'do something about crime' before the next election. The Nixon Administration decision for a dramatic impact was announced with some fanfare in January 1972 by Vice President Agnew and Attorney General Mitchell. (Chelmsky, 19) Since LEAA had not been established as a permanent agency, but merely with a five-year authorization, the personnel of the agency were more oriented to short term programs and quick results than they otherwise would have been. The two-year life of the Impact program also fit the Gibson timetable since he faced an election in May 1974.

The unfortunate aspects of haste were that programs and personnel were tacked on to unchanged agencies and that once the funding dried up the programs withered and the personnel were shed. At least, haste did not promote graft, prevented by the tight fiscal auditing system LEAA had established through the regional offices and the state planning agencies.

Given the condition that Newark had two years to spend the \$20,000,000, probably the most benefit would have been gained by building a single, central

police facility. Director Redden's condemnation is correct, the buildings as they stand today punished prisoners, inflicted hardship on department members, and compound inefficient management. In the 1960s all buildings used by criminal justice agencies in Essex County had been woefully inadequate. In 1971 the county replaced the antiquated jail and overcrowded county court house. The city could have renovated one of the large office buildings which businesses moving out of town were ready to donate as a tax loss. For a larger investment, the city could have built a new building across from the county courthouse on land already cleared by urban renewal.

Two other federal conditions completely barred the building of a police facility. A new police station was not aimed at reducing any of the target crimes, and it certainly was not innovative. A city with well-managed agencies which had good research and development staffs could come up with sound, crime-specific programs, which might indeed use resources in a new way. In retrospect, the LEAA evaluation found one of Newark's twenty-seven programs was innovative, a rape investigation unit housed in the police department. (Chelmsky, 298) By contrast, Denver had seven innovative programs.

The other LEAA condition which diminished the likelihood that Newark projects would have long-term impact was the requirement of comprehensive planning and evaluation. Since planning is not usually the enemy of endurance, an explanation is in order. As an agency, LEAA has put a high proportion of its funds into planning and evaluation. In addition to the regional offices common to federal agencies, LEAA funded the creation of fifty state planning agencies which were to monitor the flow of federal funds. LEAA even paid for the establishment of county and city criminal justice planning agencies. None of these planning agencies were housed within police departments, courts, etc., but were detached units which planned for the spending of LEAA funds. Since a maxim of American politics is "He who pays the piper calls the tune", local

agencies dutifully received help from their local planners in drafting the plans and the evaluations of their projects to spend LEAA funds. Criminal justice agencies continued to be unfamiliar with management information systems and uncomfortable with comprehensive planning and evaluation.

The grand scale of the Impact program was matched by the complexity of the planning and evaluation which cities had to perform. In keeping with LEAA precedents, the Impact program was planned by a unit that was outside the operating criminal justice agencies. The Impact office had to follow an elaborate seven-step planning and evaluation model for every project. Evaluating the effect of programs in reducing the incidence of crimes is especially difficult due to the many factors which affect crime rates and to the imprecision of recorded crimes as a measure of crime incidents.

Newark spent over one million dollars of the grant on the Impact office. The planners had no relationships with the operating agencies other than to impose on them for data. Thus, none of their skills in planning or evaluation were applied to projects outside of those funded or to the tasks of integrating the projects into ongoing operations. Although the planning unit survived past the end of the Impact funding, the reduced staff lost interest in even following the course of the few projects which survived. A less ambitious evaluation program could have been carried out by one career employee in each of the major operating agencies. Thus, planning and evaluating at least, could have served the long-term concerns of the criminal justice agencies.

We turn now from what might have been, if the national Impact program had been congruent with Newark's needs, to an analysis of how the program actually operated. Table 7-9 lists the twenty-seven projects grouped according to the implementing agencies. Note the wide range of projects in sponsorship, aims and size. Newark's fourth Impact program director summarized the city's experience in an exceptionally frank interview as a demonstration of 'what not

IMPACT PROJECTS IN NEWARK, 1972-1977

Planning Agency	Project	Impact Funding as of 1975 in \$'000	Status as of 1981
Police Dept.	Communications System	\$2,970	Continues, diminished
	Public Housing	2,056	Continued to 1979, LEAA & SP
	Tactical Anticrime Team	1,899	Continues, diminished
	Team Policing	1,583	Ended
	Auxiliary Police	746	Ended
	Crime Laboratory	483	Not started
	Rape Unit	282	Continues, diminished
	Property Identification	27	Continues, diminished
	Block Watches	23	LEAA Community, Anti-Crime Grant
Courts	Special Case Processing	1,005	Continues, diminished
	Special Probation Caseload	843	Ended
Judicial Court	Pre-trial Intervention	102	Continues, diminished
County Corrections	Vocational Project	418	Continued SPA
	Vocational/Legal Project	268	Continued briefly SPA
	Women's Self Development	134	Continued briefly SPA
County Office	Parole Aides	74	Ended
County Departments	Supported Work (Rehabilitation)	639	Continues, Labor, SPA
	Drug Treatment (TASC)	568	Ended
	Street Lighting	107	Ended
Community Groups	Man to Man (Rehabilitation)	758	Ended
	Newark Prep	631	Ended early
	Vindicate,	627	Continued briefly, DYPS
	North Ward Youth (Prevention)	501	Continues, SPA & other
	Independence High School (Rehabilitation)	495	Continues, Labor, DYPS
	4-H (Rehabilitation)	425	Ended early
	Bergen Street Merchants	71	Ended
	Rutgers Juvenile Delinquency	38	Ended
County Office	Impact Planning Unit	1,199	Continues, diminished

(1975)

Jordan, Alan Zaikind, 10/20/80 and numerous interviews with agency personnel.

The explanation of terms for the status of the projects are:

Continues = Continues as of 1980 as a well-running project.

Continues diminished = Running as of 1980, but the project does not run well.

Continued briefly = The project ran for one or two years after Impact funding stopped.

Ended = Program ended immediately on the end of the Impact funds.

Ended early = A decision ended a mismanaged program while Impact was still running

Not started = The project was not started because the city could not make the cash match.

The sources of continuing funds are:

LEAA = U.S. Department of Justice, "Law Enforcement Assistance Administration"

Labor = U.S. Department of Labor

SPA = New Jersey State Planning Agency for Criminal Justice

DYFS = New Jersey, Division of Youth and Family Services

to do to reduce crime in the cities". (New York Times, 2/17/76, 1)

While the Director gave little elaboration in print, three aspects that went awry will be described below. Briefly, they are: the struggles over the direction of the program and its coordination with other government agencies, the substance of the projects launched and the abrupt termination of most projects with the end of the funding. The few projects which continue undiminished have had strong leadership, provide direct services, and received funding of around \$500,000.

The struggles between the Mayor's office on one side, the New York regional office and the state planning agency on the other, are fully documented in the 1975 evaluation. (Jordan) At the outset, the regional office and the state planning agency advised Washington that Newark was a poor choice because the city had a record of difficulty in fiscal and program management of federal funds, the Mayor and Council were entangled in fierce political struggles, and, concerning LEAA specifically, the city had "rarely submitted grant applications which [the state planning agency] could approve. (Regional office memorandum 1/25/72 in Jordan: 10) The state planning agency hesitated three weeks before approving Gibson's selection of Earl Phillips to head the Impact program. It severely criticized his first plan and its revision and rejected the entire draft plan submitted in September on the grounds that it was skewed toward community projects, failed to involve operating agencies, and contained many technical deficiencies. After the failure of a top level meeting in Trenton to bring immediate changes in the work of the planning unit, the regional Director and the state planning agency director met the Mayor on November 15 to inform him that Phillips would have to resign or the Impact project would be given to another city. Gibson capitulated and agreed that a state planning agency official would serve as interim Director. (Jordan) When a New York Daily News story from Washington predicted Phillips' resignation, Mayor Gibson

resisted. Phillips, forced to resign six days later, accused LEAA of racism. Star Ledger, 11/30/72, 14. Mayor Gibson did not acknowledge the validity of the charges that Phillips had failed to manage the program responsibly in the expenditure of funds and in project planning. In retrospect, he placed blame on Trenton's jealousy over the high salary paid the Impact project Director. (Jordan's taped interview with Gibson, 10/27/75)

The Newark experience of state domination was blatant in the Impact program but not unusual. The fact that Newark has less than 5% of the state's residents is basic to Newark's small influence in Trenton on all matters. In every state LEAA dollars reached cities via their respective state capitals. One big city mayor aptly characterized at a congressional hearing the cities' experience of hinderance from the state planning agencies.

The state administered block grant system has encouraged states to second guess the professional judgment of city officials and to impose unreasonable conditions on federally funded projects. (Brown, 1971, 262)

During the crucial period of decisions on which projects to fund, the assistant director of the state planning agency ran the Newark's Impact program. His plan received Washington's approval in March, 1973, fourteen months after the program had been announced. When the Mayor named his appointee for Director, Hubert Williams, a black police sergeant with a background in community relations, the appointment was held up from February 22 until June 21, 1973 while the state planning agency satisfied itself that Williams could concurrently direct the program and carry a reduced course load in his last year at law school. (Jordan, 70-72) In May 1974, the Mayor appointed Williams as Police Director and elevated his deputy to Impact Director. The plan had gone out of the Newark program after Phillips' dismissal. (Jordan)

Concurrent with these conflicts over how to shape the program, the Newark Impact office made some overtures to coordinate with other federal programs focused on crime. Washington had designated the Department of Health Education and Welfare to develop juvenile delinquency projects within each Impact city, but talk never produced a workable plan in Newark, and eventually HEW withdrew its funds. (Jordan, 30-36 and 66-39) In fact, Newark developed no coordination between any federal program and Impact beyond absorbing into the Impact staff the three criminal justice planners who had been funded by the Model Cities Program.

The one anticipated conflict over Impact spending which did not take place was between Mayor and Council. The City Council acquiesced in the arrangement that the Impact program would be entirely directed out of the Mayor's office and that Council function would be limited to one member on the advisory board and the legislative power to approve each project. When Phillips was slow in preparing the plan and grants, a council member criticized him. (Star Ledger, 'Harris warns crime project to start protecting citizens', 8/15/72) When the Mayor acquiesced in control of the Impact program by the state planning agency, Council members grumbled briefly and likewise acquiesced.

The second set of problems resided in the specified projects which Impact funded. They were a patchwork of what city and county wanted and what the state planning agency was willing to permit. Five of the twenty-seven projects cost over one million dollars and together consumed half the Impact budget. All but one of these was a police project. Additional personnel was the expense in

four of these five large projects. The Impact planning unit insisted that hiring under the Impact program had to fill new positions and could not simply be used to fill vacancies created by attrition. Consequently, the police department grew to the maximum size it had ever attained and set the stage for a massive layoff in 1975. When a city must spend money quickly on entrenched problems, it can purchase sophisticated equipment and hire more personnel. Both of these solutions are tacked on to the existing organization which has to change very little to accommodate them. When the funding ceases, the new equipment is not maintained and the personnel are fired. Some detail on the problems with the substance of the programs will be given later in the section on police.

Newark puts its own stamp on the national Impact program through projects sponsored by community groups. Although greatly reduced from the city's initial plan, community projects spent some \$1,800,000, a larger share than average for Impact cities. (Chelmsky, 165) One of them, the North Ward Youth Community Project was judged by the Impact Director Zalkind to be the most successful project of all. The funds supported jobs, recreation and training for youth run by a broad purpose organization which had sprung up among Italians in the North Ward as the moderate alternative to Imperiale. The North Ward Educational and Cultural Center had blossomed into existence five years prior to the Impact program, was supported by other grants, and took the Impact funds to support any of its work which Impact guidelines could be stretched to cover. The youth project did not focus on offenders who had committed Impact crimes. It was made acceptable under Impact guidelines by the application phrasing that stressed crime prevention and recidivism prevention among the youths served. After the end of the Impact program the Center continued its work by creatively piecing together other grants.

The Newark experience shows that when organizations can distort national solutions to their local needs, local aims can be achieved. National aims can rarely be achieved in recipient cities which most need the assistance. The reason these cities desperately need the help is that they are trapped in a vicious circle of dwindling resources and poorly managed city government. Their history of poor management sets high probabilities that the next grant will also be poorly managed.

Termination of projects formed the third set of problems in the operation of Impact. The national objective 'to institutionalize effective programs in the eight Impact cities' was honored in the breach in Newark. The city had had difficulty in coming up with the required 20% matching funds, shifting much of it from other federal grants. The deliberate design of spending quickly for a big impact left entirely to the city how it would proceed afterwards. Since Newark had been the slowest city in starting its projects, many were just beginning in 1975 when other cities were winding down. Since two million dollars in projects were scheduled to run past the final spending deadline of December 31, 1976, Newark successfully brought pressure on LEAA to extend the deadline. Newark's representative in Congress was Peter Rodino, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. He and Mayor Cinson met with the acting Director of LEAA and other top officials. An unnamed official later recalled that Rodino threatened "If Newark is cut out, I would find it very difficult to support LEAA in my committee." New York Times, 11/17/76, 1, and Star Ledger "Newark May Gain Time to Spend Crime Funds", 9/17/75 and Star Ledger, 2/18/76, 27)

Newark had less success in getting the state planning agency to commit new funds to continue projects. It considered an application to extend team policing but then refused on the reasonable grounds that Newark's plan to spread the benefits by rotating the team six months, contradicted the basis of team policing which is familiarity between officer and neighborhood residents. (Star

Ledger, 4/28/76 and Airco-Jackson Councilman James Hite Team Police Fund Cutoff') About one-third of the projects ended immediately, a few continued briefly with state funds, eight continue with diminished success and three projects continue to perform well. This record is poor when compared to other Impact cities. (Chelimski, 193-239)

In sum, the conflicts which were designed into the Impact program in Newark were instrumental to its failures. There were power struggles by the state planning agency and the LEAA regional office against the city. There were conflicts of principle. Selection of Newark on the criterion of need conflicted with selection of recipients on the basis of sound grant management. The city preference for a community based approach conflicted with the reliance on criminal justice agencies. The LEAA focus on reduction of street crimes conflicted with Newark's need for agency upgrading. And the most harmful conflict of all was the conflict between the desire for quick results and the long term nature of the problems.

Trenton's Initiatives: Foot Patrol

In January 1973 as Governor Cahill prepared to run for re election, he promised the cities of New Jersey a program called Safe and Clean Neighborhoods. (New York Times, 1/17/73, 84-1) This form of urban aid enabled the cities to hire more police officers and sanitation men. The conditions of the program were that officers be especially hired for the program, that they patrol on foot and that the city pay 50% of their salaries. Newark was slow to start the program because Mayor Gibson was arguing that officers on overtime could fill the positions immediately, while recruiting would create delays. (Star Ledger, 7/22/73, 22:1) In a compromise, the department hired 28 new officers during 1974 and paid overtime to fill 44 positions.

(Budget Office, Newark Police Department,

Safe Neighborhood Program, 1977)

Again, the city administration made a confluence decision in which solution did not fit the problem. The current consensus in the police field is that outside of high density business districts, walking officers are less capable of providing a range of service than officers in cars. Walking patrol has not been demonstrated effective in deterring street crimes. Newark sorely needed to place more officers on car patrol during the evening tour. However, members of the public yearned to see a police officer and nostalgically reflected on the old days of the officer on the beat. Newark had traditionally maintained a formidable police presence in the central business district with traffic officers on nearly every corner. Mayors across the state could not afford to refuse walking officers given the public's high levels of fear of crime and the sentimental attachment to the foot patrolman.

Problems Besetting the Police Department

The police department's responsibilities for coping with crime were engulfed in a tide of other problems, both carried over from the past and newly formed. Carried over from the days of Commission government were problems of corruption and excessive use of force, which, under Gibson, surfaced sporadically. Another carry over from the distant past was that the racial composition of the department seriously lagged the changing composition of the city. (Fisher) The new set of problems were tied to power struggles for control of the department. Collective bargaining began in 1971 with the union stripping management of considerable power. In contrast to Director Spina's enjoyment of eight years of total support from Mayor Addonizio and the City Council, Gibson's three Police Directors experienced serious opposition from the City Council, and the first Director had little support from the Mayor,

the second was fired without warning, and only the third had support. None of the three Police Directors were able to bring about comprehensive upgrading of the department. Under the first Director, police officers took sides in a bitter confrontation between Italian and black groups, under the second and third officers violently broke up peaceful citizen gatherings. The fact that the second and third Directors had not risen through the ranks and were black undercut the authority within the department. A different set of new problems arose from the fiscal crisis of the city which caused three waves of layoffs. The net effect of all these problems was that the police achieved little in alleviating crime problems and, far from providing a sense of safety, heightened people's fear of crime.

The new problems of union-management relations transformed relations between men of the police officer rank and department management. The history of Spina's capricious personnel decisions made members of the department eager to secure some rights against management through a contract. In 1968 lobbying led by the teachers' union and the state PBA won legislation setting up the Public Employees' Relations Commission, PERC. When PERC began operating in 1970, it conducted an election in the Newark department to select the bargaining unit. The Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, PBA, won against the Fraternal Order of Police, FOP. Since the city had no money, the PBA won contract language instead. Although PBA members at the time did not believe their leadership, they later recognized the power of veto the PBA leadership had in the Maintenance of Standards clause.

All rights, privileges and benefits existing prior to this Agreement are retained with the following exceptions:

1. Those benefits abridged or modified by this Agreement or
2. Those changes in benefits which are not substantial and unreasonable.

Elimination or modification of rights, privileges or benefits which are substantial and unreasonable shall be subject to the Grievance Procedure.

During the first four years of contracts, the PBA took about seventy-five cases to arbitration and won seventy-one, according to the tally kept by the PBA president. Under the Maintenance of Standards Clause the PBA successfully prevented management controls such as requiring officers who work inside jobs to punch time clocks and requiring all officers to file affidavits attesting to their police residence.

, 10/27/72) A similar clause in the contract of the Superior Officers Association (SOA) prevented management from changing the policy of providing superior officers unmarked cars to take home. The PBA kept secret its list of arbitrations won, treating them as akin to trade secrets. The city has had such a turnover of attorneys in the Corporation Counsel's office that the city did not have files of what it had won and lost through arbitration. Whenever the PBA filed a grievance it told the city that it had previous decisions pertinent to the case and the city did not know whether they existed or what they were. (Gasparinetti, 10/7/80) Coupled with the union's veto power was a mutual antagonism between union and management which often worked to thwart changes which would have improved the performance of the department. In 1978 when the ICP won the official bargaining election to represent the police officers, relations between management and labor declined to their not being on speaking terms.

The City Council worked to undercut the power of each of Gibson's Police Directors. They were not successful with John Redden, the first Director.

The fact that he was white caused great consternation among black councilmen and generally among Gibson's strongest supporters. Gibson later defended his selection on the grounds that police officers "would have crucified a black Director. (New York Times 7/25/71:VI,7)

Shortly after taking office, Redden transferred nearly two hundred members of the department in order to move honest and competent people into key positions. Individuals removed from choice assignments ran to the City Council which called Redden on the carpet. According to the recollections of a Redden supporter, the Police Director met the Council in closed session and listened while they vented their anger. Then he gave them a piece of his mind in this vein.

I'm running the police department, and I don't owe you a thing because initially you voted nine to nothing not to appoint me. My six months' leave of absence from my position as deputy chief will be up soon. If you have the guts you can vote against me. As you know, I'm in this job because you voted for me. I would like to remind you that the people who held your seats before you were indicted, and hopefully they are going to jail. I just want you to think that over. I'm going back to my job.

Redden did not receive strong support from either the Mayor or the Council. He put priority on increasing police protection in the central business district, weeding out corrupt officers and upgrading management. (McCullen, 1971, 24) The department was sorely tired in its efforts to keep order during the protracted teachers' strike. In a prepared statement Redden warned the people that demagogic rhetoric and violent conduct at public meetings was being used to inflame people, as they had been in 1967. He painted an alternative future in which the city provided black young men as recruits to the department and the department worked to assure a reasonable degree of safety for those who lived, worked and visited the city. (Newark Evening News, "Time for Decision, Redden Warns City", 4/12/71)

A year and a half later Redden resigned over the Kawaida Towers issue.

Imamu Baraka sponsored the building of a high rise apartment and cultural center at the edge of the Italian community in the North Ward. The racial confrontation started long before the first construction crew began digging the foundations. When an integrated construction crew arrived to work a crowd of chanting demonstrators would not let them pass. The presence of 145 helmeted police officers could not clear the way for the construction workers. Some among the demonstrators were off duty police officers, and the tactical unit which had primary responsibility for maintaining order there was heavily composed of Italians. Renden condemned the decision to build Kawaida Towers as motivated by 'narrow, selfish political ends.' He resigned, declaring it had become 'impossible to continue as a member of the administration'. (Star Ledger, 12/2/72, 1)

The Council refused to confirm Gibson's second nominee for Police Director, Edward Kerr. Gibson had decided upon a black man as Director, but at least two of his choices declined. (Interview with an Inspector in the Newark Police Department) Kerr was a lieutenant in the Housing Authority Police, which had just been merged into the city department. In a humiliating series of meetings Gibson presented Kerr's nomination to the City Council, a majority rejected it, but permitted him a 90-day term as acting Director. Finally, seven months after his nomination, a majority of the Council voted to confirm him. Kerr served as Police Director slightly over a year, until after Gibson's re-election. Since Kerr, on his own initiative had reverted to his civil service rank of lieutenant in order to be eligible to take the captain's test, the Mayor simply appointed another man into the vacant Director's slot.

Hubert Williams was immediately confirmed by the City Council. He came from directing the Impact program while on leave as a sergeant in the department. He had earned both a bachelor's and a law degree. Williams had other problems with the City Council during his first four years as Director. The three police officers on leave who had won election to the City Council would demand management information from him and then openly pass it to the PBA leaders, thus undercutting him.

The City Council Reflex Response to Crime

At intervals throughout Gilson's first two terms the City Council threw itself into battle against street crime by voting to hire more officers. Council members heeded the cries of fearful constituents. At the meeting of December 15, 1971 the Council heard a frightening story of a young man who died in a pool of blood while his neighbors and family called the police again and again. After other members of the public and Councilmen had told their stories of terror, a strong majority voted to increase the department by two hundred officers provided that they be assigned to foot patrol. This same Council session refused to raise the pay of civilians in the department or of Director Redden, who had threatened to resign. (Star Ledger, 12/16/71, 26)

The number of officers did rise slightly each year from 1,444 in 1970 to the largest it had ever been in October 1974 at just over 1,600. The City Council's most sustained involvement in trying to keep the department fully manned began in 1975 with the struggle to avert layoffs, which will be discussed shortly.

Police Use of Impact Funds

The \$7,500,000 spent directly by the Police Department during 1973-76 constituted a handsome addition to their operating budget of \$21,000,000. An additional two million hired a force of 110 guards at the public housing projects. Table 4-9 in a previous section lists the police projects. A closer

look at the largest project illustrates some of the department's difficulty in dealing with crime problems.

The most expensive project was a new communications system which included a 911 emergency number, a counter measuring the volume of incoming calls, a six channel radio system, a computer aided dispatching system and a computer system for patrol. Newark did not have personnel with the expertise or the will to install and run the system efficiently. While the eighteen months period designated for installation was unrealistically short, the four years required were excessive.

A sophisticated system of the type Newark installed is premised on the assumption of well running patrol and communications divisions. Where that assumption is false, the new equipment makes old problems more prominent. Specifically, the first component, the 911 emergency number is designed to encourage the public to call the police. When the police operators were flooded with calls, the department solved that problem by installing a tape recorded message which the 911 operators could play. When an operator determined that a particular call was not an emergency, she hung up on the caller and pushed a button to play the recorded message. The caller thus learned that his call was not an emergency and that he could call the switchboard for non-emergency service. Since the switchboard operators were also overloaded with calls at peak periods, they failed to answer a great many calls. This failure even to listen to requests for service probably contributed substantially to the public's frustration with the police department.

The next component, a counter on the incoming telephone lines provides valuable management information about the volume and distribution of citizen calls for service. Where management makes flexible use of manpower, a counter provides continuous feedback on a daily basis of the fit between workload and communications manpower. However, in Newark management obtained monthly figures

which showed month after month that on the average department operators had failed to pick up the phone on 1% to 4% of the calls. Since management was not able to correct this continual shortcoming, it kept the figures secret.

The dispatching system was designed to stack calls on the basis of priority. With the breakdown of the component which feeds the signals from the car radio buttons into the computer, the system went down and was not repaired for a year. Workload analyses for patrol were never performed because the department did not acquire or prepare the necessary computer programs. The computer aided dispatching system was designed to provide a wide variety of information on time, place, type of incident, response time, and workload per car. This information was never put to systematic use and the department continued the traditional practice of assigning equal numbers of patrol cars to each tour. This allocation is so clearly illmatched to the twenty-four hour cycle of workload that a sophisticated computer system is not necessary to document the need for manpower reallocation.

In conclusion, the police communications system needed substantial improvement in 1972 and thus the decision to purchase new equipment was reasonable. Since federal funds were available and since Boeing and Motorola had the products, the department acquired a more sophisticated system than it could handle. Here is a receive pattern within the Impact program. The city made a decision based on a confluence approach in which a nationally available solution distorted the assessment of local needs. The new technology represented in a 911 or kindred system works in organizations which confront and solve problems as soon as they arise. However, the history of the Newark department and of city government as a whole has been to ignore and hide problems when possible.

The four other large police projects were expensive because the funds paid for salaries. All four projects became caught up in the city's fiscal crisis and the layoffs of police officers. The two projects employing sworn personnel, forty-two man team policing unit and the forty-nine man tactical anti crime unit, selected experienced officers from within the department and then filled their old slots with new recruits. The team policing project was like many others on the East Coast, a mini-department that provided direct police service to a single neighborhood. Both the police department and the Impact planning unit thought highly of the project since reported crimes went down in the team area. Impact funds expanded the tactical unit which had begun with federal funding in 1969. The anti-crime unit established a decoy squad and attracted some highly competent officers who made many good arrests.

The civilian programs employed directly 137 man housing security force and about three hundred part-time auxiliary officers. Immediately prior to

the Impact funding, the fifty-two buildings run by the Newark Housing Authority had no separate security force. In September 1972, Governor Cahill had signed legislation which integrated the Housing Authority Police Force into the regular department. Police Director Redgen had developed this plan which quickly expanded the department and brought in more black and Hispanic officers. (Star Ledger, 'Governor fuses WHA cops with Newark regulars , 9/8/72) Back in 1964 Director Spina had made a similar move. When Impact paid for hiring new housing guards, they were designated as a ready manpower reserve for the Newark department. The hollowness of this promise became evident in 1975 with the layoffs of regular police officers. State funding carried the housing guards for a few years beyond the end of the Impact program, and then there were no more guards at housing projects.

The auxiliary police project got underway in March 1975 just as the city prepared to layoff regular officers. The three officers on the City Council sponsored the \$94,000 appropriation as a matching grant. (Star Ledger, 'Newark allocates funds for auxiliary cop patrols,' 2/10/75) The PBA condemned this waste of funds at a time that regular employees were being laid off. The auxiliary police included political appointees who took personal advantage of their positions. (New York Times, 2/17/76, 10)

The program was quickly terminated at the end of the grant. A particular consequence may be noted. Prior to Impact there were unpaid auxiliaries who directed traffic on special occasions and performed parade duty. The payment of \$3 per hour to the new breed of auxiliaries, drove out the unpaid volunteers.

Police Layoffs

On January 4, 1975 Mayor Kenneth A. Gibson presided over a ceremony at which he sent forty-seven new recruits out to the street and gave promotions to twenty-five officers. (Star Ledger, 1/5/75) At that very time, it was evident that the city would have to take drastic measures to balance its budget. For two years running, Mayor Gibson had reduced the property tax rate and increased city employment, an accomplishment achieved largely through massive assistance from Washington and Trenton. (Yatrakis, 1980, ch. 5) The struggle focused around the Mayor's proposal to layoff 433 city workers, mostly in the Public Works and Health and Welfare Departments, to cut \$17 million from the Board of Education budget, and to raise the property tax rate to \$8.89 per \$100 assessed evaluation. Futile efforts to avert the first mass layoff since the depression included consideration of furloughing city employees every fifth or tenth working day, cancelling scheduled increases in salaries and benefits, eliminating all city appropriations for the Board of Education, and making an even steeper increase in the property tax rate.

The crisis deepened in March: the budget deficit was discovered to be \$35.7 million out of a budget of \$250 million. The Mayor explained that due to recession, inflation, cutbacks in anticipated state aid to education, shrinking revenue sources, and the general rise in the cost of government, the layoffs would now have to include policemen and firemen. (Star Ledger, 3/14/75) On March 16th the Mayor's plan was described in the Star Ledger -- to layoff 130 policemen and 66 firemen and to demote 42 police officers and some firemen. If an additional \$2 million could be found, these layoffs could be prevented.

The Mayor stood alone against an array of individuals and organizations which each sought to avert or reduce the layoffs. The Police Director Hubert Williams, neither defended the Mayor's cuts nor led the opposition to them.

The most prominent opponents of the layoffs were City Council members and the Presidents of the two police unions, the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association and the Superior Officers' Association. The nine men City Council had often had a police officer as member but in 1974 the unusual took place: the voters had elected three police officers to the Council.

The Presidents of the PBA and the SOA combed the budget to find money saving proposals to discuss with City Council members on March 18th.

1. Curtailment of overtime paid to policemen on Safe and Clean Streets program.....	\$324,767
2. Temporary layoff of school crossing guards.....	\$300,739
3. Not filling 26 currently vacant positions in the police department.....	\$239,359
4. Abolition of 4 police chaplain posts.....	\$ 21,976
5. Curtailment of overtime for varied assignments, including Council meetings, parades, drug enforcement, data processing, auctions, and emergencies.....	\$190,000
Total	\$1,076,841

The Bronze Shields, the fraternal association of black police officers, made their own alternative proposals on the 20th. They suggested that the department should consider ending a variety of fringe benefits -- clothing allowances, gasoline for superior officers, extra holiday pay, and the pay differential between detectives and patrolmen. (Star Ledger, 3/21/75 and The Journal (Elizabeth), 3/21/75) However, the night of March 20th the City Council reluctantly accepted the Mayor's budget with a few amendments, leaving in the Mayor's hands the question of layoffs.

After final passage of the Mayor's \$253 million budget on March 27th a new round began in the fight to save police officers. The PBA and SOA obtained a court injunction to make certain that the department did not spend funds on overtime for the Safe Streets program. (Star Ledger, 4/5/75) The department had been filling many of the Safe Street positions by using regular officers

on overtime, a day at a time. The PBA aimed to force the department to hire into Safe Street positions officers slated for layoff.

County Superior Court Judge Pat Thomas issued a restraining order prohibiting the Newark Police Department from requiring an officer to work overtime in a Safe Streets position. (Star Ledger, 4, 5, 75) Once the restraining order was granted, all officers followed their union's direction to remove their names from the lists of volunteers for the positions. Once there no longer were lists of volunteers, the issue became moot and the hearing was adjourned. The immediate effect of these maneuvers was to cut by 39 the number of officers on the street each day.

Not to be outdone, the Fraternal Order of Police made vehement accusations on the day the PBA won the court order. How can Police Director Williams permit layoffs to happen in view of the negative effect it will have on the city? Mayor Carson is playing politics with the lives of the people of Newark! (Star Ledger, 4/5/75)

The Bronze Shields asked U.S. District Judge Curtis Meanor to hold a civil rights hearing on the impending layoffs. The Bronze Shields argued that the disproportionately small number of black and Hispanic officers would justify giving these minorities special consideration in planning the layoffs rather than simply using the Civil Service criterion of least seniority. The population of Newark had become 54% black and 12% Hispanic by 1970 but the proportions

of minorities in the rank of police officer in April 1975 were only 24% black and 2% Hispanic. (Newark Police Department, 1977) Minority group members were even rarer at higher levels. In support of their case the Bronze Shields pointed to the order which Judge Meanor had issued on October 8, 1974 requiring the police department to revise its hiring procedures so that one-third of all new recruits would be black or Hispanic. Their arguments were not persuasive. In deciding on April 28th to go along with the department's plan of laying off according to seniority, Judge Meanor stated that if he granted special consideration to minority members facing layoffs, it would be at the expense of white police officers who reasonably expected to keep their jobs.

As the layoff date drew near, the Newark Office of the State Civil Service Commission scrutinized the list of 111 officers who received layoff notices and disapproved 71 on the grounds that these individuals had veterans' status or more seniority than others who did not receive notice. (Star Ledger, 4/27/75) Civil Service officials pointed out that Civil Service regulations require that employees receive 45 days' notice, but that if the city reordered its lists immediately it would receive Civil Service approval to proceed with the layoffs as scheduled. (Star Ledger, 4/27/75)

The issue of demotions was also troublesome. The department has a flat salary schedule in which the top pay for sergeants is 11% more than top pay for police officers, and lieutenants make only 11% more than sergeants. (Kansas City Police Department, 1973 and Star Ledger, 5/13/75) However, the difference in pay between the top of the sergeants' scale and the bottom of the lieutenants' was only \$408 a year. Thus, the proposal to demote 42 officers, ranging from 1 deputy chief to more than a dozen sergeants, probably would have generated enough saving to pay the wages of fewer than five officers. Rank has importance in police departments far beyond the dollar figures, however. The

hierarchical outlook which pervades a police department makes rank a very important attribute of an officer.

The State Civil Service Commission stepped into this controversy as well. It ruled that the city could not demote 15 lieutenants without first demoting the Police Director. A complicated seniority situation had arisen when Hubert Williams, then a sergeant, took a leave of absence to serve as Executive Director of the Newark Impact program. Williams still held the rank of sergeant when the Mayor appointed him Police Director. He subsequently received promotion to lieutenant, but of course did not receive a lieutenant's salary while serving as Police Director. Williams appealed their decision, but took his demotion on May 12th along with six other lieutenants and twelve sergeants. (Star Ledger, 5/13/75)

By Monday, April 28th, the city had squeezed enough funds to save the jobs of all but fifty nine officers. (Star Ledger, 4/29/75) Director Williams stated that it was up to the PBA to make the next move. Key participants met on the night of Friday, May 2nd, the dismissal deadline, and carried their negotiations into the early hours of Saturday morning. The PBA President, Ronald Gasperinetti, and the SOA President, Joseph Rox, met with city representatives: Police Director Williams, Police Chief Anthony Barres, the city labor analyst, Albert Pannullo, and the city attorney for labor negotiations, Gerald Dorf. The union representatives would not agree to give up salary or benefits, and so the dismissals took place. (Star Ledger, 5/4/75, Rox, 9/26/80 and Gasperinetti 10/7/80)

Those dismissed were the young, energetic officers who in every department account for a disproportionately large share of the arrests and other easily measurable police tasks. Police Director Williams transferred twenty-three officers from administrative duties to the street and disbanded the twenty-one man Bureau of Investigation, which specializes in vice and gambling. Williams

explained that combatting street crime was the highest priority. 'It's impossible to adequately cover all aspects of crime in the city while under severe financial stress.' (Star Ledger, 5/4/75) In the aftermath Mayor Gabsor made a brave front, calling police protection "better than ever". (Star Ledger, 6/20/75)

The City Council held a special meeting at the PBA's request on June 19th to consider passing a resolution authorizing emergency funding to rehire the fifty-eight officers. (Star Ledger, 6/20/75) The Mayor, who had no veto power over appropriations, threatened to ask the State Division of Local Government Services to reject such an appropriation. The PBA threatened to mount a demonstration calling for dismissal of the 135 crossing guards if the City Council did not pass the emergency appropriation. On June 25th about five hundred police officers from Newark and surrounding communities picketed at City Hall demanding the reinstatement of the laid-off officers. (Star Ledger, 6/26/75) The City Council appropriated no new funds.

The PBA continued to put pressure on the city to rehire the dismissed officers by directing its members to refuse overtime work. The city obtained a permanent injunction from County Court Judge Irwin Kimmelman that the Police Director had authority to decide that a situation was an emergency and that officers could not refuse to work overtime in an emergency. (Star Ledger, 7/9/75 and Rox, 9/26/80)

The union leadership then sought to cushion the blow to laid off patrolmen by arranging for them to work tours which otherwise would have been covered by officers on overtime. The SCA president had come up with the idea that officers could work a goodly number of tours and thus have some income while waiting for attrition to shrink the department to the point where they could be rehired. The first occasion for bringing the young officers back for a tour was the Puerto Rican Day Parade on July 27th. The Police Department and the State

Civil Service Commission accepted the proposal and the Department issued guns and badges for the day. However, the plan failed because officers must be in the pension fund when they work, and laid-off officers could not get back into the pension fund unless they worked thirty days.

On October 17th the Fraternal Order of Police brought a civil suit against the City of Newark and Mayor Gibson in an attempt to undo the dismissals and demotions. The suit sought to compel the department to rehire all officers who had been laid off, to reinstate all demoted officials, to re-establish the disbanded units, and to cease using auxiliary police officers to answer minor calls for service. (The Journal [Elizabeth] 10/8/75) One may suppose that the FOP did not have as much hope of winning the lawsuit as they had of winning the confidence of the police officers in their campaign to replace the PEA as the bargaining agent for the rank and file. Meanwhile the PEA had succeeded in getting the city to rehire eight officers on July 14th to fill positions opened through attrition. By October the city had rehired ten more officers. (The Journal [Elizabeth], 10/8/75)

This protracted episode of the 1975 layoffs may be considered as ending on December 14th when Mayor Gibson announced that layoff notices would be sent to 115 firemen, 92 police officers, and 149 civilians in the police department. (New York Times, 12/15/75, 67:1 and Star Ledger, 1/30/76, 1)

The 1976 layoffs hit swiftly and the City Council moved swiftly to restore the sworn members. This second round of layoffs caused considerably less disruption to the department and anguish to the individuals involved than the first had. First, the union had exhausted legal remedies in 1975, thus painfully learning the authority of the Mayor to order layoffs. The city on its side, no longer held false hopes that the union would give up contractually guaranteed benefits. Thus, on February 17th, forty-five days after the dismissal notices went out, 92 police officers, 108 school crossing guards and 21 court attendants

were dismissed. (Star Ledger, 1/30/76, 1) Second, the City Council quickly forced Gibson to patch together enough federal and state funds to rehire most of the personnel. The Council had withheld approval of the city's renewal of the Housing and Community Development Act grant of \$20.5 million until the Mayor agreed to rehire all officers using a variety of funds including \$600,000 from the Housing grant, all of a \$250,000 grant from the state planning agency and \$300,000 from Title X of the Congressional Jobs Act. (Star Ledger, 4/11/76, 17) By mid-March 55 officers had returned to work and CETA funds had rehired all the crossing guards. (3/4/76 "Grant allow recall of 20 cops" and Information, "Back on the corner", 4/76) By July, there were only 29 officers still seeking to return from the 92 laid off in 1976 and the 37 who were still out from the 1975 layoffs when the second wave hit. In March 1977 another grant from the state planning agency funded the rehiring of the last of the officers from the 1975 layoffs. (Star Ledger "Newark cops to be rehired", 3/9/77)

Since the resolution the layoffs occurred quickly and quietly among the unions, the City Council, and the Mayor, only some of the deep rooted rancor surfaced. The tires of some police cars were slashed. (Star Ledger 11/18/78, 3) On the eve of the layoffs the PBA President had given Newark residents this irresponsible advice. (Star Ledger "East Ward protest urged over layoffs of 92 police", 1/29/76)

"If you can't depend on your senior city officials to protect you and your family, if they are going to continue laying off the men whose job it is to protect you, then you should go and apply for a firearms permit," Gasparinetti said.

In a manifestation of the lingering bitterness was a linking of murder to the cutbacks in personnel. In December 1976 a letter to the editor from a sergeant who worked in recruiting maintained that a young man on the waiting list for appointment might not have been murdered as a taxi driver if the department had maintained its authorized strength. (Star Ledger Cutbacks

blamed in death", 12/5/76)

The City Council members who were police officers on leave continued vigilance against further layoffs and even looked for opportunities to recruit. The Mayor had scheduled a third round of layoffs for the end of 1976 affecting 35 officers. The threat was not ominous because Councilman Martinez quickly announced that new federal funding under the Public Works and Local Assistance Act would avert the layoffs. (Star Ledger "Newark cops to keep jobs", 11/24/76) Once the last of the dismissal officers had been rehired, the Council pressed for new recruits. In July 1977 it appropriated funds for 28 positions. The department was on the verge of entering 41 recruits into the academy in September when the Mayor called a halt. (Star Ledger "Aides join efforts to retain cops", 9/22/77) So eager was the Council for more officers that it considered finding funds for 1977 by cutting from 1978 summer employment, recreation and either the St. Patrick's Day or the Columbus Day parade. (Star Ledger, 9/29/77, 30) Thus, at every opportunity, the City Council pressed against the City's fiscal resources to employ more officers from one moment to the next.

After the third wave of layoffs had been averted in November 1976 and the last officer reinstated the next in March, there was a fifteen months' silence on fiscal problems and layoffs. The dire fiscal straits which had been papered over before the 1976 election showed up in the preparation of the 1979 budget, just as they had in 1975. Again, a major element in the Mayor's balanced budget was massive police layoffs. The unhappy memories of the 1975 struggle haunted both sides in the 1978 confrontation. Moreover, both sides had become more antagonistic to the other. In February 1978 the Fraternal Order of Police, which had continually challenged the PBA as bargaining agent, won representation election. (Star Ledger "FOP defeats PBA in Newark bargaining rights election", 2/11/78) After the defeat, the PBA represented

only civilians in the department. As the new winner, the FOP had need to prove itself militant and aggressive in guarding the interests of the membership. In July while visiting Atlanta, Mayor Gibson had made some unguarded remarks when asked what he would do if faced with a tax revolt similar to California's proposition 13.

I'd cut the police department in half if I could get away with it. But they'd run me out of town. The police would lobby and get the money back. (Star Ledger, 7/19/78, 1)

[The Star Ledger continued, reporting the Mayor's Atlanta comments.] He also said he believed the public has been sold "a bill of goods" that the more police a city has, the lower the crime rate.

"The number of murders in high-crime areas would not change a fraction of a per cent even if there were "15 patrolmen per block," he said.

"In Washington, for example, 1,000 extra police officers were hired not so long ago. And it hasn't made any difference in the rate of crime. But the public still believes the more cops you have, the less crime there will be."

Gibson tried to soften his words when they appeared in the Star Ledger by stressing that he had been speaking hypothetically and had no intention of eliminating more jobs. (Star Ledger, 7/19/78, 16) Unmollified, the FOP President challenged Gibson to deny the fact that during the last year there were as many as 57,000 calls which went unanswered because of manpower cutbacks. He called on Gibson to apologize to "each and every police officer in this city." (Star Ledger, 7/16/78, 16)

I can't understand how he (Gibson) could make such rash and irresponsible statements. Mayor Gibson needs twice the number of police officers that he has in the city...As it is now...no woman or child is safe in this city. The Mayor wants everyone to believe crime has dropped in Newark. He claims that break and entries have declined. Why doesn't he open his eyes and look around? There's nothing left to break into.

In fact, the patrol division and the communications personnel were overwhelmed with calls for service during 1978. More than 10% of the telephone calls rang unanswered. The dispatchers sent cars on some 20,000 jobs a month but each month they received more than 2,000 repeat calls from citizens

who were waiting for a patrol car. Worse, the number of calls where a car should have been dispatched but none ever came had averaged 500 a month in 1977, but began January 1978 with 1,000 and averaged 3,000 a month through the end of August. (Central Communications Records for 1978) To meet this staggering workload Police Director Williams transferred sixty officers into patrol in mid-September. He took them from the decoy and tactical units, reducing them from one hundred men to forty. (Star Ledger "Newark to put 60 more cops on beat", 9/15/78) His decision to strip units which members of the department regarded as providing choice assignments and respected as the most productive gave rise to widespread anger throughout the department.

On October 13th, the FOP mounted a campaign with picketing in front of City Hall and leafletting to dramatize the need for more officers on the street and in the radio room. By then operators were missing more than 20% of the telephone calls. Almost all the superior officers from deputy chief down joined the demonstration to show their solidarity with the men over the shortage of personnel in the radio room. Two weeks later the FOP wrote the Mayor that he should demand the Police Director's immediate resignation. (Star Ledger, 10/27/78, 29)

Meanwhile, Newark's deep dependency on federal funds caused a crisis when Congress failed to renew the antirecession legislation which the city had counted on for \$10,000,000. (Star Ledger, 11/23/78, 40) A recent state law prevented local governments and school boards from raising their taxes more than 5% above the level of the previous year. Since the city had lowered its tax rate by 10% over the last two previous years in the typical pre-election phase of the cycle, raising property taxes to the limit would not provide sufficient funds. The city had no recourse but layoffs. Since the police department had 1,453 officers, down only 150 from its maximum before the first layoff, Mayor Gibson chose to send layoff notices to 100 police officers out of the 450 city employees to be dismissed. The individuals scheduled

for termination were the same ones who had suffered in 1975 and 1976. They were individuals who had been hired when the Impact grant expanded the department by 92 officers. They were 28 individuals whom the state had forced the city to hire in 1974 under the Safe and Clean Neighborhoods grant. Only this final wave of layoffs reached into the department past the officers hired through grant funds.

'Fear City' Campaign

Under a newly elected president, Tom Possumato, the Fraternal Order of Police met 600 strong the night of November 16 in the auditorium of a Catholic church in Vailsburg and vowed to take all legal action necessary to thwart the layoffs. The meeting endorsed a campaign to strike fear into everyone who lived in or entered the city. The message was that crime was already such an omnipresent threat that layoffs would make everyone totally unsafe. This Fear City campaign expressed the utter frustration which many officers felt.

Another expression occurred at 3:00 a.m. the night of the FOP meeting when the windows were smashed of 78 police cars parked in a department lot at the east precinct and of 8 unmarked police vehicles parked among the private cars of postal workers at the lot next to police headquarters. (Star Ledger, 11/18/78, 3) The PPA President bluntly asserted that if police officers were responsible, they did it for good reason' (Star Ledger, 11/19/78, 9)

If that is the only way they can alert the public to our problem,...then it is a necessary evil...The damaging of equipment...is the last in a long series of attempts to try to tell the public that not only are they discouraged about the layoffs, but they are adamantly opposed to the present director of police.

which would permit police and fire personnel to retire at half pay after twenty years, down from the current twenty-five. (Interview, 10/7/80)

The bill had been blocked in the 1977 legislature but came close to passing in 1978, when it might have encouraged enough senior officers to retire to save the 200 officers slated for layoffs. The Newark FOP and SOA leaders did not join the lobby for this costly legislation. Their premise was that the administration had chosen to decimate the police budget because such cuts are most likely to bring a public outcry and thus force legislative relief. They clung to vague and false hopes that the City Council had the authority to declare a state of emergency and thus circumvent the state imposed spending limits or that the state legislature would change those limits. (Star Ledger 11 21/78, 1)

In contrast to their vagueness on the form of legislative relief, the local union leaders were very clear on how to arouse a public outcry. The Fear City campaign was their tactic. Despite the city Budget Director and the Corporation Counsel explanations that the city had no legal basis for increasing spending, the unions continued their Fear City campaign.

The first phase of the Fear City campaign was leafleting which began downtown the morning after the FOP membership meeting. Four different circulars bore similar frightening messages and identified the FOP local as the author. (From the broadside files, New Jersey Room, Newark Public Library and Afro-American, 11/25/78, 2)

- IF YOU MUST ENTER-NEWARK
- . If you must walk; walk fast.
 - . Do not walk alone.
 - . Avoid isolated areas.
 - . Keep car doors locked.
 - . Avoid strangers.
 - . Leave city before dark.
 - . If attacked; scream loud.

Newark Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 12

STAY SAFE! KEEP OUT OF NEWARK!

AFRAID TO WALK IN OUR 'FEAR-CITY'?
GIVE MAYOR GIBSON [733-6400] A RING!

Fraternal Order of Police
Newark Lodge No. 12

WELCOME TO NEWARK: CRIME CAPITAL OF
NEW JERSEY

#1 in - Murder
 - Rape
 - Robbery
 - Burglary
 - Auto Theft

"HAVE A NICE DAY!"

Fraternal Order of Police

CAUTION: You are in the 'CITY OF FEAR'

NEWARK, N.J.,
due to inadequate police
manpower...

SHOP at your own

RISK!"

The first phase of the Fear City campaign rose to a climax on December 3rd when a motorcade of sixty cars and a sound van toured the city. The posters on the cars held Mayor Gibson and Police Director Williams responsible for the impending layoffs and repeated messages from the leaflets. Thereafter officers continued picketing on a small scale. (Star Ledger 'Newark cops drive' against layoff plan", 12/4/78; Mayor Gibson's prediction in Atlanta proved correct, that the police would get the money restored through lobbying. On December 29th, the City Council voted to add an extra million dollars to the first quarter budget so that the Mayor could retain the officers for the next three months. (Star Ledger 'Council votes funds to delay 200 cop furloughs , 12/29/78)

Because the first leafleting occurred immediately after the vandalism to the police cars, the two acts were in competition for attention. Vandalism won handsily, receiving all the condemnation from officials except from the Mayor and the Police Director who condemned both. No statements to the press from police officers or superior officers have been found criticizing the Fear City campaign. The damage to the police cars can be understood as a rampage carried out one night by a very few officers and covered up by a few more. The Fear City campaign was deliberate union policy carried out in daylight week after week by over one hundred officers. In both cases individuals were acting directly contrary to their duty as officers. In the vandalism officers broke the law. In the fear campaign they worked directly against the goal of creating and maintaining people's sense of safety and security and directly against public confidence in the department itself.

The layoffs occurred as scheduled on January 1, 1979 because the Council had authority only to provide the funds and could not force Mayor Gibson to spend them. The direct consequence of the layoffs was to strip the department of all younger officers, those hired since 1972. The department was down to 1197 sworn officers. This staffing at 3.8 officers per 1,000 residents was down markedly from the 1974 peak of 1,603 officers and 4.7 per 1,000 residents. However, the three cutbacks did not drop the Newark staffing to the average for large cities, which was 3.4 per 1,000. (FBI, 1978, 231)

The concurrent demotions were accepted as in 1975, as an automatic consequence of the layoffs. In an avalanche, two deputy chiefs were demoted to inspector, two inspectors fell to captain, three captains dropped to lieutenant, 27 lieutenants tumbled to sergeant and 57 sergeants descended to police officer. (Star Ledger, 1/21/79, 3) The damage done, the FOP President vowed to continue the fear city campaign. He pointed with what may be regarded as perverse pride to the 22 rape cases reported in the first two weeks of January, double the number from the year before and to a 52.7% increase

in burglary and robbery. He asserted to the reporter, "We're going to tell the people that crime is on the rise." (Star Ledger, 1/19/79)

As a coda, one might look ahead to 1979 to the startling rise of recorded robberies from 3,682 in 1978 to 6,100 and the rise of auto theft from 5, 992 to 10,676. Officers of the Newark police department lived up to the words of their union president by recording unprecedented volumes of street crimes.

Chapter 8

Conclusions: Crime as an Insoluble Problem

A government believed responsible for solving an insoluble problem suffers a variety of setbacks. Year after year, as members of the public see the problem persisting, and even worsening, their confidence in the government diminishes. The loss of confidence may proceed to a general apathy directed toward all of civic affairs and it may focus in disrespect for a particular agency that copes with the problem. Inside the government, continual frustration besets members of that agency because the continual failure is their own. The members may express their frustration collectively by lashing out at management and the public and individually by working apathetically.

While the inability to solve crime problems wracked the city, the government also lost people's confidence on a host of problems which had solutions, but which remained unsolved: uncollected garbage, rubble strewn vacant lots, and open hulks of abandoned buildings. Meanwhile the police department itself was experiencing other difficulties of a soluble nature in addition to its failure to stop crime. Assignments in the department were widely considered to be based on favoritism and ethnic considerations under both Spina and Williams. The rampant inflation of the mid 1970s eroded the substantial pay gains of the decade, reducing real pay to the 1968 level. This study's concentration on the single theme of crime does not permit weighing of other factors in causing the malaise in the police department and in the city at large.

The unrealistic expectations of victory in a war on crime applied inappropriate standards to a police department which had greatly improved its performance. In the late 1940s the New York police department was thoroughly

incompetent, a condition stemming from a long history of mismanagement and political domination. But members of the public were not up in arms over the failure of the police to keep the streets safe. In those days there were many fewer muggings, armed robberies, burglaries and murders. Part way into the next thirty years Police Director Weldon, as a professional administrator from outside Newark, made a basic reorientation in the department which immediately increased its competence making it thereafter a more effective agency. Simultaneously, however, social and economic forces beyond the control of the city were exacerbating conditions which foster street crime. People of Newark, in keeping with general American folk wisdom, held their police department responsible for the rising tide of street crime. Police Director Spina, like many other police chiefs of the time, protected his department by making the Supreme Court the scapegoat. The new wave of black migrants from the South gave the descendants of European immigrants a whole racial group to blame for the rising crime rates. By the mid 1960s people of Newark had strong and justified complaints that many of their streets were not safe. The way this issue arose in municipal elections and before the City Council served to amplify their fears. By 1978, in a bizarre twist, the police union itself, was promoting the fear of crime.

This concluding chapter first examines the trends in the factors which brought street crime in Newark to intolerable levels. Next it examines the fundamental incompatibility between the long term nature of the crime problems and the four year municipal election cycle. This incompatibility produces irrelevant solutions that heighten frustration and the fear of crime. Then the chapter assesses how race relations have become entangled in crime issues and police issues. The chapter closes with some thoughts for the future of Newark and other cities where the factors promoting street crime are climbing rapidly.

The Rise of Street Crime

As a nation the United States experienced a sharp rise in the homicide rate from the mid 1960s until it had doubled by the mid 1970s and then maintained this plateau. (See Chart 1-6 on page 17) Accompanying this rise were massive increases in the officially reported rates of robbery, burglary and other street crimes which criminologists believe were not entirely the result of more accurate crime reporting systems. The rise appears to have reached a plateau in 1973 as measured by the victimization surveys which show basically steady rates thereafter for robbery, rape, aggravated assault, burglary, auto theft and other non-commercial theft. (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1980)

From a long term perspective this rise was not an unprecedented crime wave engulfing America, but rather a returning toward a violent norm from which the years between 1930 and 1960 had been an interlude. (Graham, 1969) While every generation tends to see its crime problems as uniquely horrible, studies agree that the rates of violent crimes in big cities were the highest in the period immediately after the civil war. (Graham, 375) Violent crimes rose again in the 1920s, only to plummet sharply with the depression. Thus, from this historical perspective, the rise in street crime of the 1960s needs explanation less than do the lower rates of the three preceding decades.

Three particular factors appear to have contributed to national increases in street crimes during the late 1960s and early 1970s. As discussed in chapter they are: the unusually large proportion of the population in the crime prone age group of 14 to 24; the arming of urban America as millions purchased handguns in the illusion of acquiring self protection; and the spread of heroin and other drug addiction among a generation exposed to drugs in Vietnam.

We know that in Newark predatory crimes such as muggings, armed robberies and burglaries increased far more rapidly than in the nation at large from the 1950s into the 1970s though we have fairly consistent measures only for homicide and ^{a measure collected by another agency, arson.} (Refer to Chart 1-6 on page 17 and Chart 7-2 on page 142.) The growth in the rates of severe street crime was long preceded by widespread economic and social deterioration. Since World War II marked declines took place in the total number of jobs and in blue collar jobs particularly. There were declines in the quality of public education, the size of the city's tax base, the proportion of middle class families in the city and the stability of neighborhoods. The large black migration into Newark in the 1950s and 1960 occurred in a period when both the city and the region were rapidly losing blue collar jobs. As a result the jobless rate among black people in Newark has been chronically high, and it spurts upwards with national recessions.

The one massive social policy to address problems of deterioration was directed at housing. Unfortunately, the corrupt implementation of this policy razed far more land than was rebuilt, leaving vast acres of rubble-strewn land, and built impersonal high-rise apartments which were peopled on a segregated basis. Ever since they were built in the 1950s, the five huge housing projects holding some 16,000 people have been centers of predatory crime.

The hold of organized crime on Newark since Prohibition has contributed to the rate of street crimes in ways that are not documented. Generally speaking, the supply of illegal services provides a great many targets for robbery, from the numbers runners and winners to the customers of prostitutes. Organized crime's trafficking in heroin gave Newark a substantial drug problem from the late 1940s on, with theft, burglary and robbery as the means by which addicts supported their habits.

The argument advanced here is that street crimes in Newark will not drop to levels currently considered tolerable by the majority of Americans until basic economic and social problems are resolved. Newark is not in control of the economic and social forces which promote the high levels of street crime. Cities generally do not have the resources to deal effectively with adverse region and national trends. Certainly, the truncated core city which is Newark lacked the combination of resources, knowledge and political will necessary to cope effectively with its crime problems.

Long term crime problems and the short cycle of municipal elections

Governments which must stand on the record of their accomplishments every four years are ill-suited to deal with street crime problems, since they are rooted in long term trends. A further difficulty for governments so judged is that there is no valid set of measures to show what a city has accomplished in reducing the incidence of crime or its seriousness. There is the false measure, the Uniform Crime Reports, which appear quarterly and annually. The recurrent national increases in the crime index during the 1960s so called Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach that he is reputed to have seized a sheet of UCR figures, pounded the desk and growled, "It's bad enough to lose the war on crime, but to lose it five times a year is too much!" (Graham, 1969, 376)

The issue of rising crime rates is ready ammunition to fire against the incumbents. Addonizio used it against Carlin in 1967; Carlin returned the fire in 1966. Gibson and Imperiale hurled crime rates against Addonizio in 1970, and Imperiale used them against Gibson in 1974. The standard defense which incumbents have employed is the stroke of the pen, illustrated in Chart 1-5 on page 15. No other patterns of police activity occurred with such four year regularity. Visible demonstrations of 'doing something about crime'

did not occur at fixed points in the election cycle, not increases in personnel, in budget or creation of special units.

When some crisis thrust crime problems to the fore among the myriad municipal problems, the City Council typically made a reflex decision to apply more manpower. In reflecting on the Council's struggles to keep up manpower in the mid 1970s, we may contrast these recent events with 1954 when an Essex County Judge prodded the city to deal with mounting violent crime. Police Director Keenan immediately threw manpower at a problem by stripping other units and using overtime to bring night foot patrol up from 100 to 272 officers. In those days prior to collective bargaining, overtime did not cost a city anything except the goodwill of the officers. Since research shows that massive police presence reduces street crime in an area, in whole or in part by displacing it, an immediate reflex decision can temporarily ameliorate some crime problems. After six weeks Keenan halted the extra deployment to relieve the strain on his men. The city's subsequent legislative action was to increase the authorized strength of the department by about 125 officers, that is by slightly more than 10%.

The Newark City Council, probably similar to councils in most cities, consistently thought of more manpower in terms of hiring more officers. The state insisted in the same vein for its Safe and Clean Neighborhood program. However, if the crime problem is one that can be stemmed by an application of manpower, the solution which relies on overtime can immediately address the problem. Hiring typically takes at least a year for civil service exams to be given and scored, and for candidates to be screened and trained. Thus, the decision to hire means that the problem will not be addressed by the solution until a year later. The decision to hire also carries an implicit and unexamined assumption that the problem will not be solved by the added manpower, and thus the department will need to maintain its increased strength.

Confluence decisions were common for the city government generally and the police department specifically after the federal government had begun to provide a stream of prepaid solutions. Since the field of criminology has not produced a body of technical knowledge on what policies will produce what results, crime problems are ill defined and solutions compete without firm standards for judging among them. When a governmental unit has a poor definition of its problems, it is likely to adopt solutions which are not entirely appropriate. The relatively weak power of Mayor Gibson vis-a-vis Trenton and the dire financial straits of the city resulted in the city's accepting other people's solutions that fit poorly onto the city's problems. Newark did also make some confluence decisions to adopt some LEAA funded programs which fit local needs.

A review of thirty years of decisions concerning crime problems identifies the City Council as producing the most inappropriate ones. There appear to be several reasons why this is so. City Councils share the problem of legislatures generally in being under constituency pressure to alleviate problems and lacking staff to develop solutions independently from the administration. In the police field there is a dearth of advisors to provide council members with expert judgment. The police themselves tended to monopolize the expertise, especially before LEAA's funding of so much police research. Recall that neither of the two attorneys whom Carlin appointed as Police Director had enough knowledge of police operations to control the department. The extent that the Newark City Council had access to police expertise it was in the person of their colleagues on the Council who were the officers on leave. In the period of their heaviest influence, 1974-78, all three police officials on the Council held the police officer rank and one was a past president of the PBA. Thus, the Council naturally took labor's view on labor-management issues. Since labor refused to consider trade offs between individual salaries and departmental size, the City Council

blindly pushed to expand the department.

The public lacked informed interest groups which could comment critically upon police problems or crime problems, an absence common to most cities. Further, most urban police departments have long had rules prohibiting officers from making public criticism of the orders of superior officers or department policy. The Newark department not only retained this rule, but brought PBA President Gasparinetti up on departmental charges for his outspoken criticism during the Kawaida Towers confrontation. Eventually the case reached the Supreme Court, which declined to review a lower court judgment that police officers have no constitutional right to criticize the current policies of their departments.

Also Newark suffered a lack in channels of public communication. From the 1950s when TV news became important in shaping opinion, Newark's lack of a station hampered public understanding of the city's problems. The folding of the Newark Evening News in 1972 was a serious blow to informed public opinion. The newspaper had a long tradition of responsible investigative reporting. In the absence of competition, the Star Ledger did not fill in the void to take up serious discussion of crucial city issues, but slacked off in its coverage of city affairs.

Race relations became entangled in crime issues and police issues

The basic demographic change in Newark over this thirty year period was the transition from a white majority to a black majority. The parallel political transitions had as milestones the riots of July 1967, Gibson's election of 1970 and his appointment of the first black police director in December 1977.

During the period prior to 1970 in which a black minority lived under a white city government, black people raised the issue of police brutality, described in chapter 6. In 1968 this issue generated more intense political debate

than did the crime issue. The police brutality issue, like the crime issue, had not been clearly delineated into solvable problems. Rather, it seems that police brutality stood globally for repressive white government in the thinking of many black people. Recall that the spark igniting the 1967 riots was an incident where officers used excessive force. After the police, state troopers and national guard had quelled the riot, the charge that the police force was an army of occupation was more convincing. For black people and their liberal and radical white allies, the riots were a rebellion signaling the coming end of a repressive regime. After the 1967 and 1968 riots the police brutality issue was temporarily pushed aside as black people concentrated their efforts on attaining political power in the 1970 election. Gibson's strong, specific campaign promise to fire Spina appears in this light to be a promise to curb police brutality, to bring police under the control of black leadership and hence indirectly under the control of the black community. The promise to fire Spina seems to have carried as a very secondary message a promise to do something about street crime.

The black Mayor's announcement, "I will be your civilian review board", quieted all criticism about police brutality except from Imamu Baraka and his followers. The disappointment that the police department was not symbolically under black control through a black police director hung on the City Council's long refusal to confirm Edward Kurr. Specific instances of excessive use of force recurred and general problems remained of relations between white officers and black citizens, but politically, the brutality issue was dead.

From the founding of the Newark Police department through the 1950s, the people of Newark were policed by their own. Local boys followed their fathers and uncles into the department. Police officers as a matter of course lived in the city. In 1912 the advent of civil service had slowed the ethnic change in the department from English to German to Irish and Italian but this

lag was only some years behind the demographic transition of the city. (Fisher) The rapid transition of the city population from 16% black in 1950 to 44% black in 1970 was not paralleled by a change in the composition of the department. In 1950, 2% of the officers were black and by 1970 only 15% were. At this rate the department lagged the demographic changes by twenty years. Further, during the 1960s police officers began moving out of town. The pace accelerated after the 1967 riots. To circumvent the city's efforts to require municipal employees to live in town, the PBA joined the other large unions in the state, the fire fighters and the teachers, to obtain state legislation specifically exempting these three types of municipal employees from all residency ordinances. Thus, Newark became policed by strangers.

During the period since 1970 in which a white minority lived under a black city government, white people raised the issue of crime in the streets. To be sure, the issue had figured in the three election campaigns between 1960 and 1970, but people had not then marched, picketed or packed the city council chambers as they did in the 1970s. The calls for more police protection came most consistently from the Italian North Ward. The council members who most consistently urged an expanded police department were white and included the three police officers. By the end of Gibson's second term black people were more frequently voicing demands for more police protection. The similarity of interests between black and white began to be expressed.

Newark windows

Twice during this thirty-year period the citizens of Newark have made a massive effort to overhaul their government so that it could effectively address the city's problems. In the decade of the 1950s when the voters triumphantly introduced mayor and council government, people also left the city, bringing down the overall population by 2%. During the 1960s the white population of the city declined by 10% but the black population increased

resulting in an overall decline of 6%. In the decade of the 1970s that began so hopefully with the triumph of a black mayor based on the votes of his people, the overall population drop has been .

The people who have the resources are leaving and those who are the less able to cope with the multiple problems of urban decline are left behind. They must live among the abandoned buildings left by their neighbors.

The lack of a coherent national or state policy to address the underlying conditions that breed street crime and the lack of a city policy to improve the police service has left the public crying for more police officers. Increasing police manpower as the method of bringing street crime down to tolerable levels is like bricking in the windows of abandoned buildings as the method of solving the problems of residential abandonment. Both are stopgap solutions which at best prevent the immediate deterioration of conditions but do not touch the underlying causes.

Appendix A

DIFFICULTIES IN MEASURING PERFORMANCE IN COPING WITH CRIME

What Is Crime?

In making this historical inquiry into crime it is useful to distinguish several levels of abstraction:

- a) the individual crime incident
- b) amount or rates of a type of crime
- c) a crime problem
- d) a crime issue

An individual crime incident is a specific event which occurred. The sum of similar events over a period of time is the amount or rate of a type of crime. Problems are circumstances which people regard as unsatisfactory and capable of being improved. The posing of a crime problem implies that the condition is not an unalterable fact of life, but, rather, that steps can be taken to ameliorate the condition. A crime issue has arisen when people faced with a crime problem seek governmental action. This study concentrates on crime problems that have become crime issues and examines the ways in which governmental agencies have responded.

Three fundamental misconceptions underlie public discussion of crime issues in contemporary America. They are:

1. Crime is a thing.
2. The Uniform Crime Reports accurately measure crime rates.
3. The way to deal with crime is to deal with individual criminals.

Since these misconceptions have profoundly affected the way that cities have addressed their crime problems, it is worthwhile to dissect these conceptions at once.

Crime is a highly abstract term which includes drunken driving and shoplifting, child abuse and drug abuse, auto theft and income tax evasion. These common crimes are committed by different people, in different circumstances, for different reasons. The tremendous variety of acts which are criminal makes futile the search for a few simple solutions to crime problems. The search for simple solutions is nurtured and promoted by thinking about "crime" as though it were a single category of social ills.

There is only one sure and fast way to reduce the amount of crime; it is to make illegal actions legal. In recent years state after state has repealed its laws against public intoxication, thereby greatly reducing the incidence of that crime and annually eliminating more than a million arrests. The frequency with which people are drunk in public probably has not changed much. The problems are being handled and ignored by a different set of agencies since they are no longer crime problems. (Aaronsen, et.al., 1978)

The crime problems which disturb people most, the predatory attacks on people and property, have been summarized by the term street crime, but they also are a heterogeneous collection. The hijacking of a Brinks truck and ripping of a purse from a woman's arm have little in common, yet both are robberies. Walking into an unlocked garage to steal a bicycle and breaking through the wall of a jewelry store are both burglaries, yet the circumstances, attackers and victims differ. Arson is committed for profit, by psychologically disturbed people, and by kids. Thus, the

complexity of problems is hidden even by the specific crime labels we use. The complex realities entirely disappear when the single term "crime" is stretched to cover all these predatory actions.

The second major misconception is that the Uniform Crime Reports, published since 1930 by the F.B.I., accurately measure the occurrence of crimes. Since its beginning the UCR has dropped seven types of offenses into Part I. criminal homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny and motor vehicle theft. The first volume of the Uniform Crime Reports explained that these particular offenses were selected for Part I because these "seven classes of grave offenses show by experience to be those most generally and completely reported". (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1930) However, there are two sources of undercounting in the UCR, the inaccuracy of police department records and the failure of citizens to report to the police. These sources of error are not constant. Improvements in police record keeping have doubled some cities' reported crime rates. (United States, President's Commission, 1967, 25-26)

The annual publication of the figures from Part I alone, gave them great seriousness. National publicity has focused on the Crime Index, the sum of all Part I offenses. A single index which simply adds murders, attempted burglaries and larcenies of over \$50 is basically counting relatively minor crimes because the serious ones are rare. The Crime Index, triply flawed as an accurate measure of crime occurrence, became a major social indicator, even before the term was coined. A social indicator draws attention to a particular condition over time, giving numerical precision to how good or bad things are. Since social indicators are not anchored in social theory, they encourage policy makers to throw money at them in an effort

to bring them down, even when there is no body of knowledge of how to proceed. (Wildavsky, 1979, Ch.1) This is precisely what has happened in Newark since the riots of 1967. A great deal of money has been wasted in efforts to bring the Crime Index down.

Where the agency which controls the counting for a social indicator is also the agency which receives the brunt of the blame when the trend line turns sour, there is great pressure to falsify the data. The most consistent governmental response to crime in Newark was the leveling off of the rise in the Crime Index prior to mayoral elections, discussed in chapter

The third major misconception holds that the way to deal with crime problems is to deal with individual offenders. 'Lock em up' is one example of this approach and the vast proliferation of diversion programs and ex-offender assistance programs are other examples. Taken together these policies comprise one of four basic approaches to crime problems. The four are: to deal with the individual offender; to deal with the environmental factors which promote that type of criminal behavior; to deal with the individual victim; and to deal with the environmental factors which make easy targets of victims and their property. Only the police of all the criminal justice agencies, have traditionally had a mandate which included victim assistance and crime prevention through encouraging potential victims to take precautions. The old fashioned picture of the patrolman walking his rounds rattling the doorknobs of the shops is as much a governmental policy to change the environment on behalf of potential victims as is the law which required manufacturers to install steering column locks.

APPENDIX B

TECHNIQUES FOR ESTIMATING THE NUMBER OF CALLS FOR SERVICE

A call for service is the standard term in police usage to designate an incident in which a citizen telephoned a central department number to request assistance and in which a radio car is dispatched. Excluded are all citizen requests which take place on the street or directly to precinct stations and all telephoned requests for which no car is dispatched. For the past three decades the number and pattern of calls for service have been used in patrol workload studies. Even departments which do not conduct workload studies are likely to generate and retain records from which calls for service can be estimated.

Over the years 1948-78 the Newark Police Department made two major overhauls in the recording systems from which calls for service can be estimated. Similar systems upgrading has taken place across the country. The researcher must take into account changes in the record keeping system in order to construct a consistent time series.

In Newark, from the creation of the Radio Division in 1934 until 1959 the Radio Division maintained an annual tally of radio transmissions, that is, of all messages which dispatchers sent to radio cars. The largest subset of these transmissions is calls for service. Departments differ in the proportion of other messages included in the total transmissions. Typically, transmissions which are not calls for service include:

time checks	The dispatcher calls patrol cars during the midnight shift at regular intervals, such as hourly, to check whether the officers are all right (awake).
administrative	This category covers meet your sergeant, report to headquarters, prisoner escorts, and so on.
fire alarms	The city may have a combined dispatching system for police and fire, without sending police officers to every fire scene.

The usual method of recording was to enter each transmission into a large log book. The researcher can estimate the number of calls for service out of the total transmissions by sampling in the log to see what proportion are calls for service. The sample should be selected to include variation in season, day of week and time of day to capture the rhythmic patterns of patrol work.

Director Weldon introduced the central control number in 1959, which was then standard practice in better run departments. Cards replaced the log book as the system of recording. Each card, about the shape of an IBM card, records the nature and time of the incident along with a preassigned sequence number. Every activity of the department which needs a case number will be assigned a central control number, whether or not that case originated through central dispatching. These include:

investigations	any crime reported outside the dispatching system will be assigned a central control number
arrests	any arrest which does not already have a central control number for the case
administrative	The more dispatchers use the cards in keeping track of the availability of patrol cars, the more central control numbers will be assigned to such actions as meet sergeant, nature relief, lunch. Such use should be expected to vary with the individual dispatcher.

Director Williams modernized through installing a computer aided dispatching system, Motorola Modat. This system specifically tallies calls for service and much more. There are several types of patrol jobs which may be included or excluded from calls for service by the department and differently by the researcher.

burglar alarms	Alarms which automatically ring into the central radio room
foot officers dispatched	Department policy may be to dispatch officers on foot to certain calls instead of sending a radio car
teleserv	The department may take over the telephone routine reports on such crimes as stolen auto, larceny from auto, vandalism.

In conclusion, agency records were created for purposes different from the researcher's purposes. Agencies will retain old terms and change the content.

Appendix C
THE MUNICIPAL COURTS

A separate issue from the increase in serious street crime, was incompetence and capriciousness in the municipal court,

The concern was not effectiveness in dealing with crime; aside from drugs, crime was considered a fact of life. Of all the mayors only Carlin took steps to upgrade both the municipal courts. His concern was to bring sound administrative practices to a politically dominated agency. By the end of his first year in office, Carlin had appointed men of integrity to the bench, and more lastingly, had removed the courtrooms from the police precinct stations. For a full understanding of the structural change he achieved with the municipal court, it is necessary to provide some background on court operations.

During his first year as elected mayor, Carlin took steps to reform both the municipal courts and police as an integral part of overall upgrading. The impetus was to bring sound administrative practices to politically dominated organizations. The concern was not effectiveness in dealing with crime, since crime was not considered as anything more than a normal problem of city life. Carlin achieved substantial upgrading of the municipal court by the end of his first year in office through appointments of men of integrity to the bench and through a centralization that removed the courts from the police precinct stations.

The state government had set the example of court reform in 1948, more sweeping than any in state history. The constitutional reform created a unified state system by which the Chief Justice appoints the county court judges, new rules, and tightened administration under a State Administrative Office of the Courts, and abolished the positions of justice of the peace. The American Bar Association praised the New Jersey system for: "the highest standards of administration among the forty-eight states".(NEN, 9/7/50)

However, the reform left 488 municipalities each appointing its own parttime magistrates. In Newark the municipal bench was a patronage position which the Public Safety Commissioner appointed, taking in turn the recommendations of his fellow commissioners. The very year of the state reform, Newark municipal Judge P. James Pellecchia, who had received the office as reward for campaign assistance, pleaded guilty to having embezzled \$657,000 from the bank where he was an officer. (NYT 7/14/48:1 and NEN, Editorials 7/15/48 and 7/20/48) The Governor wrote a formal letter to Public Safety Commissioner Keenan questioning whether he had been lax in this appointment and wondering where the Judge could have gambled away all that money. (NEN, 7/18/48, "Keenan Lacks 'Gestapo'") Keenan appointed his own secretary, Nicholas Fernicola, to replace the embezzler, thus continuing the job as political reward and maintaining the Italian representation on the bench.

During its last years, the Commission Government made a few minor adjustments to cut the most offensive aspects of patronage and local influence, but did not alter the basic ways the courts worked. In 1948 the transfer of the power to make patronage appointments from the man responsible for the police department to the mayor was a small step forward toward observing a proper separation of administrative and judicial powers. The job still remained a patronage plum. Most judges worked scant hours in their parttime positions. The compensation, \$6,000 a year, compared favorably with the \$6,300 salary of the chief of police. Bitter conflicts among city Commissioners arose in 1949 and 1952 over who would receive the appointments when the three year term expired. (NEN 11/8/49, "Essex Scrapbook 11/10/51 and a letter to the editor, 3/10/52)

The cutting of the link at the top between the police department and the municipal judges did not affect the courtroom where the tie remained as close as before. Officially called police courts, they were housed in police precinct stations. Informal working relations developed between the police precinct captain and the police court judge since both had obtained their positions through political connections. Judges were very friendly with arresting officers, exchanging personal greetings, and treating defendants in accordance with the desires of the arresting officer or his superior. ((7/16/79, Interview with four senior police officers who were precinct patrolmen during this period.)) When police officers or the judge preferred lenient treatment, the judge would make the case a "book" case, by refusing to enter a criminal complaint, but simply listing the case in a large book. In 1948 the police courts handled 3238 book cases, compared to 2877 formal criminal complaints. (NEN, January, 1949)

Mayor Carlin's major reform of the municipal courts was to physically remove them from the precinct stations. Four years before, an attorney whom Carlin later appointed to the municipal bench had strongly recommended such a move on the grounds of maintaining the dignity of the people arrested. (NEN, letter to the editor from Joseph H. Lerner, 1/21/50) In the last month of his campaign, Carlin promised to remove the courts from the police stations. ((NEN, 4/11/54)) In March 1955 the Mayor sought and obtained the assistance of Chief Justice Vanderbilt of the New Jersey Supreme Court. (NEN, 3/15/55) By the end of the year the new courtrooms adjacent to City Hall were open.

Carlin had some difficulty in persuading the City Council to confirm his four appointments to the municipal bench in 1955. In this tussle over the division of power between the mayor and council, the Newark Evening News accused the council members of seeking to postpone the appointments for two months, so that the judge's three year terms would not be up until after the

1958 election and the swearing in of whoever would then be the mayor.
(NEN, City Hall, 5/28/55)

There were several requests that a black attorney be appointed, and Councilman Turner voted against the mayor's nominees because they included no blacks. (NEN, 6/2/55) By this time black people composed about 26 percent of the city's population and they formed 60 percent of those held prior to trial. (Estimates based on interpolation from the 1950 and 1960 census, and a count from records maintained at the Essex County Jail.) Three years earlier, a politically inspired attempt to appoint a black attorney as acting municipal judge had been blocked by Mayor Villani, to prevent any political advantage from accruing to his rival. (NEN, Battle over Judge, 4/24/52) In the 1955 battle, Mayor Carlin won an all white bench, and only in 1958 did he appoint a black attorney. A decade later CORE campaigned strenuously for the appointment of a second black judge and obtained the Mayor's agreement. (NEN, 1/10/68 and 2/25/68)

The workload of the Newark municipal court expanded substantially over the years, both by the greater numbers of usual cases and by the 1965 action of the County Prosecutor ^{requiring} the municipal court to hear assault and larceny cases instead of going to a Grand Jury. (NEN, 7/11/65, Newark Magistrates Reducing Essex Court Jam) In 1963 and again in 1969 the Mayor met the increased caseload by substantial salary increases for the judges, so that the position would no longer be parttime. The city created a fifth judgeship in 1967. Only in 1973 did the city appoint an administrator for the court. (Newark Annual Report of the Newark Municipal Court, 1973, p.3)

Workload was not the only problem of the late 1960s. The problems were much deeper than that. "You always know when the fix is in", an attorney was quoted anonymously in the newspaper. "That's when the judge yells and screams but does nothing to the defendant." (NEN, 12/11/69) The presiding judge was indicted by a federal grand jury in 1969 for income tax

evasion. In 1970 two more judges resigned without explanation on three days' notice, having been accused of accepting marriage fees. (NEN, 10/29 and 10/30/70)

"A grotesque organizational arrangement" were the words the new Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court chose in 1957 to describe the state's municipal court system. He recommended that the municipal courts be merged into countywide courts with fulltime judges appointed by Trenton. This sensible recommendation to scrap the municipal court system, never came close to adoption for the same reasons that municipal courts survived the 1948 court reform, a state tradition of "home rule" which guards all local powers. Again in 1970 the state considered merger, conducted a study and shelved it. (NEN 4/30/70) The reforms of the 1970s merely tinkered with the municipal court where the judges served for three year terms, directly appointed by the mayor.

APPENDIX D

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dorothy Guyot is a Senior Research Associate at the Center for Policy Research, New York. She has directed management research for the Mount Sinai Medical Center, Department of Nursing and for the Yonkers Police Department. Her focus on hospitals and police departments inquires into improving the quality of service through improving management. She is the author of numerous articles on police management and has directed historical studies and survey research. A political scientist, Dr. Guyot received her Ph.D. from Yale in 1966 and her B.A. from the University of Chicago. She has taught at the Rutgers School of Criminal Justice, John Jay College of Criminal Justice of the City University of New York, Columbia University and the California Institute of Technology.

- Ch. 1 1. Herman Goldstein (1979) "Improving Policing: A Problem Oriented Approach", Crime and Delinquency, 236-258, has made a incisive analysis of the policy consequences of improving police agencies instead of dealing with specific crime problems.
- Ch. 3 1 For a detailed discussion of the aims and tactics of the Progressive Movement see Robert M. Fogelson, Big-City Police (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1977) chs. 2 and 3.
- 2 Newark Police Department Business Office, salary file cards.
- 3 These figures on departmental and city ethnic composition are from a graduate paper by Wayne S. Fisher, "Race and Ethnicity: The Newark Police Department" CUNY Graduate Center, January, 1976.
- 4 Weber, pp. 19 and 26 citing the NEN of February 4, 1912 and the Star Ledger of June 7, 1941.
- 5 The 1931 figure was frequently mentioned by Commissioner Keenan. See NEN, ; The 1938 figure comes from the Uniform Crime Reports, Quarterly.
- 6 Group interview with Deputy Chiefs Arnold Evans, Kenneth Melchior, Thomas W. Martin, George Hemmar, and Chief I.D. Officer Nelligar 7/16/79.
- 7 The number of calls handled on an average evening tour is calculated by taking the annual number of dispatches, (100,078) dividing by the number of days in the year, and taking 45% of the daily average, since 45% is the proportion of the daily workload that the evening tour handles as shown by a number of recent studies. A rule of thumb used in New York City is that five calls per tour is the maximum that a car can handle well. Fluctuation around the mean would push busy nights as high as seven or more calls per car.
- 8 John A. Gardiner, Traffic and the Police (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1969) showed that the bottom third of 508 police departments issued less than 50 tickets per 1,000 population.
- 9 Lawrence Sherman, Scandal and Reform (Berkeley: University of California Press) 1978, and his recent article on corruption in city governments and in the police departments.

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N.J.Ref. 364.974932 G99 . 2

Guyot, Dorothy

Coping with crime in Newark

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"Trial of Dr. Beck"

AMEC

Federal Theater sent Beck to Morris Ernst ~~for~~ to be checked as to its legal angles. (Morris Ernst one of the biggest and most respected law firms in the 30's)

Morris Ernst found 3 ~~mis~~ legal mistakes in the script. Hughes said he would correct 2 of them but leave the 3rd as is.

The lawyers argued that it was a ~~big~~ mistake. Hughes said that's right and that's why he would leave it ~~as is~~ in — lawyers are not perfect — they do make mistakes.

It stayed in.

(listening to D.J. Symon trial — it should) (over)

"Susan B. Anthony" Sept +
Nov 1932 TV show about
~~home~~ a trip through America
by Anna Sher in which
she visits past homes
of famous American women,
includes Madame C.T.
Walker. (See "Beck")

Beck - cont'd

Beck and OT Simpson
case - see letters to
Emily Mann in folder marked
Theaters - McCarter

"Beck" & movies See letter
in folder - "Theaters -
George Street Playhouse

Watching "Booknotes" on Ch 37
author DeLoach (~~DeLoach~~)
Book on FBI for expense

Hilda Redd - sophisticated, hard,
well dressed woman who
slept with doctors. (a la
Paula Barbieri? in OT Simpson)
etc

Hughes practiced what is preached as far as segregation is concerned.

When Hughes joined the Ministry of the A.M. he took me to these meetings with him from the beginning.

At first there were very few women there and they were themselves mystery writers. Then - gradually, - other men began to bring their wives & or girl friends.

No problem - it made for more congeniality.

When he joined MWA, went in person rather than write. Purpose - for them to see his Black face!

Rex Stout is reputed to have said when he saw Hughes "Well - it was inevitable!"

c. you would think --

Hughes had another heart attack and was in ^{ward} ~~the~~ at Dartmouth hospital. The first, when I visited him after his first night there.

I noticed the atmosphere there was a mess. Inorganization and hostility ~~was~~ ^{were} upon

with a heart attack. I felt Hughes needed rest not stress and asked if he needed to be changed.

Hughes said just give him a little time. ~~for~~ ^{for} the time to settle things down. There was a young German there by the old H. then school who strutted all around the place.

Overnight the ward was a different place. Medically and physically well organized. Socially friendly, relaxed. The young man subdued

Civilizing & Segregation

~~Hughes loved to play pool~~
Across the street from where
we lived was a kind of
rough ~~bar~~ Tavern, ^{not at all} elegant.
When we first moved into
this beautiful apartment-
house, we'd go there ~~to~~
to have a drink or

After, while the
suggested I go have
a drink at the bar...
~~It was a very~~
suggested we go to the
Tavern and have a couple
of drinks. It was a
very pleasant visit.

Hughes had civilized
the place.

Hughes loved to play
pool. In the back room
of the tavern was a pool-
table. One evening
Hughes said he would
like to teach me how to

o'clock. To remain fit & healthy
at odd times, when some
people were around.

"I was now ready for
my debut! One evening
Hughes said let's go
play pool.

We began to play. A
crowd began to watch the
unheard of phenomena. A
woman player!

There was as usual —
one big mouth in the group.
with such comments as

"What's Miss Allison doing,
playing pool? Women don't
play pool" etc., etc.

Hughes said let's finish
the game and then we'll
go home, later he said —
"See, just give me a little
time"

For a while Hughes went to
the tavern alone. He told
the men they discriminated

at this time. They
~~were~~ ~~segrega~~
The big mouth said
the don't discriminate -

Discrimination is what white
folks do to ~~Negroes~~ Black folks.

After a while Hattie,
said let's go play pool.
We did. Again the crowd
gathered to watch a woman
play. ~~the~~

Big Mouth was again in
the crowd. As we played
suddenly I found I
had a big big fan. It
was Big Mouth cheering
the loudest for me to win.

After that other women in
the bar learned to play. It still
looked rough on the outside but
inside it became quite a place.
Many police began to frequent with ^{their} ~~their~~ ^{wives,}
and friends.

The FBI ... listening in

One Sunday morning, I
picked up the phone to make
a call. There was no dial
tone and I could hear
voices in the constant background
^{+ laughter}

Told Hughes, he listened,
same result. The phone
was obviously tapped
and the inputs were
injuring themselves so
much they forgot to cut
their end (connections) off.

Hughes checked around
and confirmed his suspicion
that it was the FBI.

Called them and told
them they did not have
to waste all that money
having several FBI
men tapping his phone.
They could come to his
home ^{anytime} and he would
open his files, talk
to them, etc.

He said he would
show the picture
on his wall, painted
by a local - not in the
Forest - Communist. And
he had no intention
of taking his pictures
down.

The FBI claimed
innocence - as to tapping
the phone - but even knew
they could not find Hughes.

They did make an
appointment and come
up to the apartment and
talked to Hughes.

While the ~~one~~ FBI
agent was there the door
bell rang. Hughes answered
the door. It was a vacuum
cleaner salesman.

Hughes listened for a
second ~~then~~ and ^{then} said,

Come on in. My pal
is inside and he is

On the 11th page. It was
of course the 1st FBI
agent checking on the
security of the other.

Another time our phone
was tapped Hughes called
~~Suber~~ C. T. T. to come
check it. The engineer
came and tried to give
Hughes the usual spiel.

Finally, he became
disgusted, picked up the
phone, called his office
and told them you can't
fool this man here; there's
nothing to do but fix
the line.

Which they did.

The State Dept.

The U.S. Dept. of State

One day Hughes was on the phone talking to a 3 year old friend.

Suddenly, operator cut in and said, "Mr. Allison some one from the State Dept. is on the line and wants to talk to you. Will you take the call?" Hughes said yes and the connection was made.

The State Dept. aide said, "Mr. Allison we have found out that ~~your~~ plans are being made in China to publish a "Corollary" - your short story - without your permission."

Hughes - ~~what~~ said in strong words - What can I do about it? I object you certainly can't go into China.

and stop them.

Then Hughes, told him to never ^{again} interrupt his important (3 yr old?) phone calls for something as unimportant as that.

Secret Service?

Hughes was always careful to keep me informed as to his whereabouts ~~in the midst of one busy afternoon~~

In the midst of one busy afternoon Hughes appeared at the library with another man. It turned out to be Mr. Whitla ^{acker}, head of the CIA or FBI Regional Office. He brought him to the library to keep me informed.

Hughes attended a program for them
Ston Lake Public Center, Nevada News.

Birthday

Hughes -- like many people with talent -- biggest hobby was working with his hands. One of his most enjoyable birthday gifts was an old picture frame we found in a used furniture store.

Hughes had a great birthday -- cleaning ~~the~~ ~~frame~~ and refinishing the frame and admiring his work when it was finished!

Black Caucus in 1990's

(After the first Black ^{Jurine} Turner -
was elected to the City Council
Newsom suddenly decided
to conduct secret caucuses.
Hughes was outraged at
the idea, since the city
legislative body belonged to the
people.

Hughes sat Turner down
to the usual kitchen table
and ~~asked~~ ^{asked} Turner on his
~~opinion~~ ^{opinion} take on the matter.
He wanted Turner ~~to~~
not to participate in the ~~secret~~
caucuses but ~~what~~ ^{to go} to publicly
sit alone in the normal
council meeting room for
the entire time the
council was meeting in
secret.

Boy - this would have
hit the headlines!
Hughes would have loved (I think)
to do that.

TV-a la C. Spear

On the other hand in the 40's Hughes attempted to gather a representation of Private Negro groups together to discuss policies (Churches, NAACP, Urban League etc.)

It was killed by Mr. Lett Head of Urban League

Among discussions - whether to continue segregation in housing projects Hughes said no more Jim Crow projects. Lett's argument ~~was~~ ~~that~~ if we fight the new one they are planning as an all white project Negroes won't get anything. Hughes lost that one - the segregated housing was erected

Hughes & Bronkelle
(show on Ch. 13 Jan 29, 1996)

12/22/96 Watching movie
"Home for Christmas" on USA
Ch 24. Suddenly heard
the line - "I didn't catch
your name." answer - "I
didn't throw it."

Hughes wrote the lines
in "It's Midnight Over New York"
years ago. I didn't think
it was that great so much
to my surprise I've
heard it used over
and over again many
times since in movies, TV
etc.

~~Recently at~~

Money Laundering

At one time a group approached Hughes in connection with backing "The Trial of Dr. Beck" for a Broadway production.

After some discussion they were on the verge of signing the contract when Hughes discovered they were connected to the Columbo family!

That was the end!

Hughes wanted no part of using "Beck" to launder crooked money.

~~England left~~

Our Bar across the street -
was used for something else
beside playing pool.

During the Martin Luther King
Civil Rights era the Bar was
used to aid his work.

Every Sunday morning Black
churches in the area collect
money to aid the Civil Rights
Drive.

They would count the money and then
on Monday morning appear at that
Bar with the donations.

The president of the Truckers
~~workers~~ workers Union met them
there.

Two not too well dressed men
with an ordinary looking car
(well cared for engine, etc)

on the inside) would appear,
pack the car with the collections
and take it to the Martin
Luther Kings Headquarters in
Atlanta, Georgia.

Hughes thought a very large
sum (up to 50 thousand dollars)
~~was~~ ^{was} ~~would be~~ sent from this area ~~area~~.

Hughes family visited the
Hearst and Hearst are the
date 1910's or early '20's

Hughes father was the
Hearst manager of the Third
Carolina Mutual Life
Insurance Company.

During the depression Hughes
father - knowing his
customers - would make
their records good confident
that they would pay as
soon as possible.

The depression on Hughes -
working at True Story Magazine
at the time, and he would
pay his father's debt.
Lawyers assured him he
could not be held legally
responsible but Hughes paid
it anyhow!

The N. J. Herald News hired
Hughes to do a story on
the Diversion,

Mr. Harold Lett, head of
the Diversion, refused to
answer any questions and
ordered Hughes to leave
or he would call the police,

Harold Settt

~~Hughes was sent to the~~

~~The New Jersey Herald News
assigned Hughes~~

as a reporter

Hughes was assigned by the
New Jersey Herald News
to question the head
of the N.J. Division against
~~Hughes~~

Discrimination

Mr. Harold Settt, head of the
Division, refused to be asked
to talk and ordered Hughes
to leave or he would call
the police.

Hughes refused and Mr. Lett called the police.

Hughes walked out to the reception area, ~~stood~~ and sat very quietly smoking a cigarette,

Soon the police rushed ^{calling out} ~~masking~~ where is the disorderly person?

Hughes raised his hand and said "~~Here I am!~~" "Here ~~he~~ I am!"

~~When the police took him outside~~ ~~the~~ Hughes raised

~~both hands and said~~
~~when~~ the police ^{just} took him
outside and told him to go.

Hughes raised both hands
and asked "Arent you
going to arrest me?"

the police, said "Do you think
we're crazy?" That's just
what you want". You ~~would~~
than have your name and
article all over the paper!

I guess I enjoyed the story
but was just as happy that
it ~~was~~ ^{did} not ~~just~~ end with
said! #

10-10-1911

Some time later it was
found that the animal
was not from the same
species as the others.

The following description
was given by the
collector. It was the
first of the group, although
it was not taken at the
same time and place as the
others.

10-10-1911

It was the first of the
group, although it was
not taken at the same
time and place as the

in the ^{the} ~~circumstances~~ ^{the} ~~present~~ ^{present}
to teach me how to
write or speak ^{is} the
exactly ~~the same~~.

~~What is~~ He then proceeded
to give me a ^{very} ~~very~~ ^{very} ~~very~~
how to write as we
edited my notebook &

illustration. He ~~also~~ ^{also} ~~also~~ ^{also}
was ~~very~~ ^{very} ~~very~~ ^{very}
the ~~the~~.

Morris Trust

~~Chapman~~ Division discrimination

Susan & Anthony TV - Md. C. J. Warren

O S Mystery Writers

Ret Stout

Swington Hospital

Tavern

Pool

7 B-1 - Sunday morning

AT&T

State Dept. + China

I didn't catch the name

Left + jail

Money Laundering

Write - Robert Treat School

There was no mention of Beck
on the T.V. show

Beck was
One of the real
reasons the
Federal
Theater was
killed.

~~Beck~~

~~Beck on this?~~

"The Closing of the Federal
Theater," on T.V. this year
2004

"The Trial of Dr. Beck" on
Broadway.

Limited Run - 1 month -
Orson Welles following.

Beck had no special ads
in front of theater - just
the usual name of play,
~~producer~~, ~~author~~ (after Hughes
~~fight~~ to have name in
proper position) etc.

Big publicity for Orson
Welles.

Beck closed to SRO, Welles? (over)

I clipped the attached
story from the Ap. 23, 1998
copy of the Star Ledger because
it reminded me so much of
Hughes experience with the
N.J. Division of Against Discrimination.

The N.J. Herald News hired
Hughes to do a story on
the Division.

The roar of the teletype, the smell of a story, the thrill of my dad's job

Jenifer Braun, whose father Bob is a *Star-Ledger* columnist, borrowed his space today.

Newspaper offices today are indistinguishable from those of, say, a large insurance agency. But before fax machines and computers, they were as loud and messy and exciting as train wrecks.

A blue haze of cigarette smoke hovered over drifts of gray copy paper and stacks of blue coffee cups on every desk. Teletype machines made a jackhammer sound under the chorused rat-tat-tat-zing! of a hundred typewriters.

The newsroom was at least as large as high school gym, and there was always a telephone ringing. There was always a man running out the door with a raincoat half on and a thin reporter's notebook brandished before him like a dagger. And there was always an editor in a blue button-down shirt, standing up at his desk with a phone in each hand, roaring over the din: "Bailey! Jaffe! What have you got for Sunday?"

I was 7 years old the first time I saw the newsroom, and I was there by accident — my father was on baby-sitting duty when a story broke. (Stories were always breaking, but I al-



Jenifer Braun: In dad's footsteps

ready knew that was a good thing.) Dad sat before his typewriter, staring hypnotized at the keys, stabbing at them with two fingers.

Around him, it seemed the whole world was being run out of this big, disorganized office. The frantic activity of reporters on deadline made the very air sizzle.

I was barely old enough to read, but it was clear that this newspaper place was an exciting place to be. And a skinny old man with white hair took time out from pacing between the desks to trade silly faces with me.

Dad came out of his on-deadline trance long enough to see me sticking my tongue out at his editor-in-chief, Mort Pye. That got me banished to the morgue, where old newspaper

stories are filed. I didn't get to come back for many years. There were no Take Your Daughter to Work days in the 1970s. But I never forgot that glimpse of a newsroom chugging down the track at full speed.

My father wrote about education for The *Star-Ledger*. Maybe not the most dramatic subject to write about, but Dad made it seem thrilling. He could make a legislative tussle over state funding of kindergartens into a hair-raising tale.

His reporting took him into governors' mansions and Supreme Court trials and once, to his endless delight, he was arrested and tossed into a Newark jail cell while tracking down a story. (I was in college by then, and he used his one phone call to leave a message on my dorm answering machine that began, jubilantly: "Guess where I am!" My roommates never understood.)

Even though I rarely got to visit the newsroom, Dad's work followed him home. People were always leaking stories to him.

Men in business suits arrived at our doorstep late at night, carrying manila envelopes filled with government documents and tape recordings. "Just give this to your father,"

they said, and then left.

At grocery stores and restaurants and street fairs, the suits would appear from nowhere like Glinda the Good Witch, bearing down on us with aerobic handshakes and cryptic conversation.

"D'ya hear Rogelstein's report? Made D'Amico look like a jackass. So the AFD and Trenton are saying Burgman is fixing the numbers."

Dad laughed and smiled and listened. He jotted notes on Sweet 'n' Low packets and matchbooks, anything handy. Reporters, I learned, knew everybody, at least everybody important, and knew everything before anyone else did. Getting what you knew into the paper before everybody else was the big prize, the righteous victory.

But just knowing was the fun part.

I don't know if trotting around behind my father expanded my sense of what career opportunities were open to me. If anything, it may have restricted it. Woodward and Bernstein were my Batman and Robin, and I named my dog after Hildy Johnson in "His Girl Friday." I learned early to be distrustful of politicians, public relations people, any-

body who used clichés. My father often told me not to come home again if I went into TV journalism ("a contradiction in terms") or advertising — or education. And a job without the adrenaline rush of deadline reporting, or the lure of secret knowledge — that wouldn't be much fun, would it? It was either the FBI or newspapers.

So I write about fashion for The *Star-Ledger*. Not the most dramatic beat, but so far I've had the chance to cover a presidential inauguration and a Miss America pageant. At one of Clinton's inaugural balls, I stood to one side of an over-full ballroom with some reporters and Jersey politicians doing their best to make their tuxedos look like wrinkled khakis and blue button-downs.

"No, no, no, the fix is in," one guy was saying. "Menendez and his buddy Janiszewski will drop out, throw their people behind Andrews, so he'll help Menendez to Lautenberg's seat in 2000."

The primary being discussed was still six months away. I laughed and smiled and scribbled a few words down on a cocktail napkin.

Dad would like this one, if he hadn't heard it already.

Star-Ledger Op. 23, 1998